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In modernity traditional Islam has been challenged by a separation from various 
spheres of life, first under colonial powers and then independent nation-states. 
Traditional patterns of religious authority have further been undermined by 
individualism and the pluralisation of sources of knowledge in an age of new media. 
In the context of migration to the West, some scholars have argued that modern 
Muslim identities are becoming more secularised and individualised. However, in a 
local case study of Sunni religiosity in the UK, I show that, overall, this is not the 
case in the city of Leeds. In Chapter 1 I examine a three-part typology of Muslim 
responses to modernity dwelling on the orientations of reformists and 
(neo)traditionalists. In Chapter 2 I outline the migrations which have seen South 
Asian and Middle Eastern Muslims and their associated (neo)traditional and 
reformist movements established in the UK. Chapter 3 offers an account of the 
qualitative methodology I used in researching the views of around 40 imams, 
scholars and members of the congregation across four different Sunni mosques in 
Leeds. In Chapter 4 I locate these mosques and their history, unpacking key ethnic 
and religious differences. Chapter 5 underlines the difficulty of establishing Muslim 
unity through case studies of the celebration of ‘Eid al-Adha and the work of Leeds 
Muslim Forum. Chapter 6 argues that although not always the most expert in terms 
of authority, mosque imams are the key providers of religious advice to their 
congregations. Chapter 7 suggests that while most Sunni Muslims and religious 
experts in Leeds assert the importance of following a school of law (taqlid), they also 
affirm the desirability of use of ijtihad (independent reasoning) by a mujtahid (one 
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qualified to exercise ijtihad) in the specific contexts of the UK. Overall, Sunni 
Muslim religiosity in Leeds remains deeply influenced by tradition, something 
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The impact of global modernity has created fundamental transformations in the 
social, economic, cultural, and intellectual life of human beings, which are all 
configured slightly differently in various societies. In Renaissance and Reformation 
Europe, the “principle of religious freedom developed, through blood and tears, and 
this led to that gradual separation of the political and religious spheres” (Cesari, 
2004: 43). With the rise of science and the Enlightenment, belief was gradually 
undermined in intellectual terms, while through the secularisation of society, public 
functions of religion were increasingly assumed by the nation-state. In this context, 
traditional sources of religious authority were undermined and religiosity gradually 
became more privatised and individualised. 
The imperial and colonial expansion of Europe disseminated such ideas to the rest of 
the world in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Rippin, 2003). Muslim 
progressives imported socio-economic institutions of the West (Rahman, 1969: 249) 
and eventually there was a questioning too of religious education, the place of 
Shari’a law, and the functions of religious authority and its institutions, such as fatwa 
and ijtihad (Salvatore, 2009: 193-5; Rippin, 2003: 187). Muslim intellectuals and 
Islamic scholars produced very different responses towards modernity, which can be 
categorised variously as ‘modernist’, ‘secularist’, ‘traditionalist’, ‘reformist’ or 
‘fundamentalist’. However, despite the role of many populist traditionalist and 
reformist/fundamentalist movements in the fight for independence, postcolonial 
Muslim states typically adapted secular-nationalist policies, implementing mass 
modern education systems, and confining religious law to personal law. The tone 
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was set by Turkey which abolished the Caliphate, giving up the symbolic leadership 
of the whole Muslim community, in 1924. Since then, most Muslim nation-states 
have had directorates for religious affairs or relevant institutions under the ministry 
of awqaf (pious endowments). Some positions, such as those of legal jurists, qadis or 
juristconsults, and muftis (one who issues legal opinions), either disappeared or were 
replaced with secular nation-states’ officials.  
From the 1970s, a widespread Islamic political revival saw the legitimacy of these 
failing regimes challenged. In late modernity, communication technologies and new 
media have further enlarged human freedoms and enhanced choice not least in terms 
of sources of religious knowledge (Eickelman, 1992; 2000). Against such a context it 
has been argued that religious authority has been challenged and reshaped (Rahman, 
1979; Kurzman, 2002; Rippin, 2003) giving rise to an individualistic approach to 
interpreting the sources of Islam (the Qur’an and Sunnah) among many ordinary 
Muslims or ‘lay interpreters’ (Robinson, 2009: 349). Late modernity has also 
witnessed new levels of global mobility amongst migrant workers, with 15 million 
Muslims now forming the largest religious group in Western Europe. Cesari (2004) 
sees migration to the West as liberation for Muslims: “increasing secularization of 
individual Islamic practice. More and more, religious practice tends to become a 
private matter, freed from the social conventions and standards of Islam as practiced 
in officially Muslim countries” (Cesari, 2004: 45). 
My research, then, aims to explore Sunni Islam in a non-Muslim country, Britain, 
with particular reference to religious belief and practice, relations between Muslims 
and with non-Muslims, as well as continuity and change in religious authority and its 
associated institutions, such as ijtihad (independent legal reasoning) and fatawa 
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(religio-legal opinions). In particular, contrary to Cesari’s claim (2004) I argue that 
in Britain at least it is not the case that as a Muslim one will most likely “lose one’s 
relationship to Islam as a cultural and social fait accompli” (Cesari, 2004: 45). In this 
regard I maintain that the persistence of traditional forms of the Islamic religious 
system (education, rituals, and authority) in Britain, not least in the context of a 
society which has enabled the reinforcing of faith, community and ethnicity, 
underlines that global modern trends are always ‘locally’ negotiated (Robertson, 
1995; Beyer, 2003, 2009).  
In emphasising the continuing significance of tradition in modernity, my work builds 
on that of others in the UK who have studied neo-traditionalist and reformist 
movements especially in South Asian Muslim traditions (see Geaves, 1996, 2000, 
2009; Lewis, 1994, 2007; Gilliat-Ray, 1994, 2010). For example, Geaves (2005) 
explores that not only religious belief and practices but also religious authority for 
ordinary Muslims has been shaped according to the method and teachings of a 
certain movement, or a tariqah.
1
 
The tariqas have capitalized on the strong empathy with the teachings of 
traditional Islam as embodied within Sufism and in recent years have been 
able to provide a unifying Islamic discourse based on practice and belief and 
drawing upon the traditional loyalty of the above populations to the 
leadership of pirs [sufi teachers] and shaykhs [saints] rather than the ulama 
(Geaves, 2005: 4). 
                                               
1
 Tariqah (plural form turuq) literally means way or path, the technical counterpart in 
English is Sufi order.  
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The Muslim Diaspora in the UK contains various people who express a diversity of 
complex forms of Islam, each constituting a small part of the global Muslim 
community (ummah). In that regard, it has two fundamental characteristic 
divergences: one is ethnic diversity, comprising Pakistanis and Bangladeshis, Arabs, 
Iranians, Turks, Africans, and so on (Ansari, 2004; Gilliat-Ray, 2010). The second is 
religious that traditionalist and reformist groups/movements originating in the Indian 
subcontinent, namely the Deobandis and Tablighi Jama’at, the Barelwis, Jama’at-i 
Islami and Ahl-e Hadis (Lewis, 1993; Geaves, 1994), predominate over the ones 
from the Middle East (Salafi, Wahhabi) or elsewhere.  
Barton (1986) and Lewis (1993, 2007) provide important information about the role 
of ‘ulama amongst the Sunni Muslim communities originating from the Indian 
subcontinent until the 1990s. Jonathan Birt (2005) studies the contestation of 
religious authority by dealing with the Deobandi ulama. Birt and Lewis (2010) 
examine the patterns of Muslim religious seminaries throughout Britain and delve 
into the details in curriculum. Geaves (2005, 2008, and 2012) also sheds light on the 
training and education facilities of imams in Britain. To sum up, not only do the 
Barelwis maintain the traditional religious system, but also the Deobandis preserve 
this system albeit their critical stance towards custom-laden practices of Sufi-
Barelwis.  
If we describe Sunni Muslim groups in Britain as ‘reformist’ and ‘traditionalist’, the 
former includes movements from the Middle East and the Indian Subcontinent 
(Salafi, Wahhabi, Muslim Brotherhood and Jama’ati Islami, respectively); whereas 
the latter could be Deobandis and Barelwis from the subcontinent. This category is in 
terms of maintaining traditional forms of religious system including education, 
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authority, ijtihad and taqlid. Thereby, the nineteenth century reform-movement 
Deobandis fits best to a traditional category with its institutions and patterns of 
religious education throughout Britain as reflected in the above literature. In addition, 
based on ethnographic research this thesis (see Chapters 4-7) suggests the same. 
Both traditional and reformist movements claim legitimacy by contesting the right to 
present true Islam and transmit their methods and teachings to indigenous-born 
young Muslims (see Geaves, 2009: 102). Traditionalists basically advocate the virtue 
of the past with strong adherence to four Sunni schools of law, whereas the 
reformists always claim to purify religious belief and practices influenced by 
customs and mystics in order to return to pure Islam practiced by the first three 
generations. The intra-Muslim relations amongst these Sunni movements sometimes 
become more complex that such sub-groups of Sunni Islam radically fight each other 
in terms of excluding one another from the main branch of Islam, even accusing one 
another for being infidel (kafir). For instance, Salafi thought in Britain is well-known 
with its enmity towards Sufi practices, and thereby the Barelwis are found in the 
centre against not only reformist rhetoric from the Arabs but also from their own 
ethnic Muslim fellows from the Indian Subcontinent, i.e the Deobandis and Jama’ati 
Islami, (see Geaves, 2000: 53-4; 2005: 5). All these groups exist within Sunni Islam, 
and either conflicts or dichotomies all revolve around issues, which emerged with 
modernity.  
In the context of Britain, according to Geaves (2009: 102), traditional Islam is under 
threat from better organised reformist movements that differ from each other in their 
agenda and, hence, cannot form any unity. Pre-modern reform movement 
Wahhabiyya (Birt, 2005), twentieth century reformists including Salafiyya (Meijer, 
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2009) and the Muslim Brotherhood, as well as more radical groups, such as Hizb ut-
Tahrir and al-Muhajirun (Taji-Farouki, 1996; Wicktorowicz, 2005; Gilliat-Ray, 
2010) become a significant and increasingly important phenomenon in that context, 
with interesting crossovers as well as conflicts between them. 
These latter two marginal groups, as the main instruments of “global Islam” (Roy 
2004: 177), target the second or third generation, indigenous-born, native-language 
speaking Muslim youth motivating into ‘neo-Wahhabi’ tendencies (Geaves, 2009: 
102). Thus, they criticise Sufi-laden traditional Islam or dominant religious identity 
of the first and second generation Muslims in the West. According to Oliver Roy’s 
analysis, in the aftermath of political Islam’s failure (Roy, 1994), 
‘neofundamentalism’ has taken on an active role, its ideologues specifically seeing 
this failure as “an opportunity, not a loss”, targeting the Muslim youth in the West to 
create a “universal religious identity” disconnected from any specific culture or far 
from any traditionalist tendency of religious identity. In summary, the reproduction 
of ethnic and sectarian rivalry between the reformist and traditionalist movements 
prevents any contribution to potential development of a uniquely British or even 
Western form of Islam (Geaves, 2009: 105).  
Considering Muslim Diaspora in Britain, ethnographic investigation should be made 
to see how global processes get configured in specific ways in localities in order to 
avoid essentialist and generic claims about Muslim communities. Thus, a key 
concern of mine in this thesis is the study of how Islam is interpreted and performed 
in the new settings of the Muslim Diaspora, which is characterised by its ‘ethnic’ and 
‘sectarian’ diversity (Lewis, 1994: 56; Geaves, 1996: 160).  
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Indeed, in a recent article Marranci (2010: 372) proposes that “social scientists 
should start from Muslims rather than Islam” because the latter term differs from one 
community to another, even from one person to another when we consider the socio-
cultural conditions of a particular geographic location, since “there are as many 
Islams as there are situations that sustain them” (Manger, 1999: 17). Contextual 
factors therefore play an important role in shaping religious identity and such 
diversity can be seen throughout the Muslim world as contesting “any simple 
Orientalist notion of an unchanging world of Islam” (Manger, 1999: 3).  
All above ethnic and religious diversity of the Muslim community in Britain drew 
my attention when I was doing my Master’s degree in Religion and Public Life 
(2008) at the University of Leeds. My journey into studying Muslims in Britain 
began in the second term of that degree course when I took a module called 
‘Muslims, Multiculturalism, and State’ given by my supervisor, Dr. Sean 
McLoughlin. Before coming to Leeds, I graduated from one of the most prestigious 
divinity schools in Turkey, Ataturk University, where I first developed my interest in 
Islamic ‘sects’. Furthermore, I worked as an official imam-hatib of the Directorate 
for Religious Affairs (Diyanet Isleri Baskanligi) for about 15 months while studying 
tasawwuf (Sufism) at the same university. Being here, in Britain, made it possible for 
me to see the diversity of Sunni Muslim religious beliefs and practices at first hand, 
especially when I visited the main mosques of Leeds, alongside reading the literature 
on Muslims in Britain. 
Concerning the literature above, there is a gap in such studies in terms of examining 
Sunni Muslims’ daily life in practice with its certain dimensions, namely religious 
rituals, intra-faith relations, religious authority, and the efficacy of traditional tools of 
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religious authority. To detail these dimensions further: firstly, the differences 
between movements from the Indian subcontinent and the Middle East in terms of 
religious belief and practice. Secondly, intra-Sunni Muslim interactions on both 
religious and social issues, for instance, how Sunni Muslims interact with others in 
making unity, e.g. allocating the time for the beginning/end of Ramadan (holy month 
for fasting) or two eid (festivals). Thirdly, the way of ordinary Muslims seeking 
religious advice and their conception of religious authority in the absence of a single 
religious authority for all and the proliferation of non-ulama or lay interpreters. 
Finally, the continuity and change in concepts like ijtihad (individual effort in 
deriving interpretations in Islamic law), taqlid (imitation), and fatawa (religio-legal 
rulings) in contemporary life. My concern focuses on such topics in order to 
investigate some of the ways Sunni Muslims cope with life in a secular, multi-faith, 
non-Muslim society but in accordance with Islamic law. As a result, this encouraged 
me to develop the following research questions:  
 What has happened to Sunni Islam and traditional religious authority in 
modernity? 
 What are the main dimensions and impact of religious diversity among Sunni 
Muslims in Britain, and what are the theological/other discourses behind this 
diversity? 
 What is the attitude of Sunni Muslims towards intra-Muslim unity in religious 
as well as social matters? 
 Who are the sources of religious authority for Sunni Muslims in the UK?  
19 
 
 What is the attitude of Sunni Muslims towards taqlid (following a law 
school), the need for ijtihad, and fatawa (the issuing of religio-legal opinions) 
among mosque congregations and religious experts?  
In seeking to explore these questions based on ethnographic research in four 
mosques associated with different Islamic movements in Leeds, I hope to make a 
contribution to the documentation of Sunni religious life in the UK, its diversity, 
efforts for intra-Muslim dialogue for social and religious unity, and the function-
influence of traditional religious authority with its instruments (ijtihad, taqlid, and 
fatawa) in the life of Muslims. In doing so, I benefit not only from religious experts 
(imams and ulama) but also ordinary Muslims. In what follows I briefly introduce 
the content of this thesis chapter by chapter.       
Chapter 1 introduces the encounter of Muslims with modernity in terms of various 
economic, political, social and cultural transformations. A three-part typology of 
Muslim responses towards modernity is explored, namely modernism (including 
secularism), Islamism (fundamentalism and reformism) and (neo-) traditionalism, 
with special reference to traditionalist and reformist movements in the Indian 
subcontinent and the Middle East. In particular, I give accounts of the Islamist 
(fundamentalist and reformist) Jama’at-i Islami and Salafi movements (including the 
Wahhabiyya and Muslim Brotherhood), as well as the (neo-) traditionalist Deobandi 
(including Tablighi Jama’at) and Barelwi movements, as all have been active in 
shaping contemporary Muslim identity in Britain.  
Chapter 2 contextualises the Muslim presence in the UK, beginning with examining 
the significance of the concepts of migration, diaspora and transnationalism. I then 
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consider how Islam has been institutionalised in Britain as part of the different stages 
of the migration process, dwelling in particular upon ethnicity and the influence of 
the above-mentioned movements transplanted to the UK, both in terms of the 
construction of religious beliefs, practices and identities amongst Muslims, and the 
representation of Islam to non-Muslims in national-level umbrella organisations, 
which have been unable to entirely transcend intra-faith and intra-ethnic polemics.  
In Chapter 3, I reflect upon my methodology and the rationale for the research 
strategies used during fieldwork in four Sunni mosques in Leeds. I discuss the 
practicalities of gaining access to the mosques, the ethical issues that arose in this 
regard and draw attention reflexively to my ‘insider’ researcher status as a young 
Turkish Muslim male, evaluating how this impacted on my observation and 
participation in religious rituals and practices, as well as the respondents I was able 
to build the best research relationships with. For instance, gender was a significant 
issue in this regard, as was language to a lesser extent. I also reflect on processes of 
data analysis. This chapter thus functions as a bridge to the subsequent ‘fieldwork’ 
chapters.   
Chapter 4 introduces the Muslim community in Leeds in terms of demography and 
early migration trends from the Indian subcontinent and the Middle East. I map out 
the ethnic and religious diversity of Muslims in the city by profiling all of its 
mosques in terms of location, size, ethnic background and religious tendency. 
Having chosen to dwell upon four mosques representing the aforementioned 
movements, I locate each in turn in more detail in terms of religious differences and 
conflicts in beliefs and practices among Sunni Muslim communities in the city. I 
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argue that, as the centre of socio-religious activities, mosques in Leeds play an 
influential role in shaping an ordinary Muslim’s religious identity.  
In Chapter 5 I deal with intra-Muslim interactions not only in religious matters but 
also in terms of representing Muslims to the wider society. I examine a local case 
study of intra-Muslim attitudes to, and efforts towards, unity as far as ‘Eid al-Adha 
(the Festival of the Sacrifice) is concerned. My investigations show that in 2010 
Muslims in Leeds performed the associated rituals on two different days, and based 
on my fieldwork I reflect the opinions and experiences of both ordinary Muslims and 
religious experts regarding this issue. I demonstrate the difficulties faced in pursuit of 
a solution to resolve disagreements among Sunni Muslims in the city on the timing 
of the celebrations, linking their arguments to different Islamic movements’ 
orientations. The chapter concludes with some reflections on Leeds Muslim Forum, 
which was established in 2001 as a vehicle for Muslim communities in Leeds to co-
operate in communicating with the wider society following the ‘9/11’ and ‘7/7’ 
bombing events.  
Chapter 6 begins by sketching the issue of religious authority in Islam in an historical 
context, dwelling on the challenges to traditional structures in modernity. It then 
seeks to offer a living example of ordinary Muslims’ attitudes to such religious 
authority in the context of a non-Muslim country. The functions of mosque imams 
and their role as everyday religious authorities are discovered by reflecting on the 
perspectives of ordinary Muslims in the selected mosques. Therefore, I consider the 
content of selected religious advice given by the imams. I also consider examples of 
fatawa given by religious scholars, for example on combining two prayers in the 
context of Britain and following a particular school of law.  
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In Chapter 7, I first deal with the interrelated notions of ijtihad, taqlid, and fatawa by 
giving a brief account of relevant theoretical and historical usage. Then I investigate 
the place of ijtihad and taqlid in the religious life of both ordinary Muslims and 
religious experts. In the British context, both ordinary Muslims and scholars are 
discussing whether it is necessary to follow one of the four Islamic schools of law 
(taqlid) or not. I show that the Salafi rejectionist approach towards taqlid (Hamid, 
2009: 356) is met with strong opposition from traditionalist South Asian religious 
groups such as the Deobandis (Metcalf, 1982: 141; Usmani, 2006: 66) and Barelwis 
(Ammar, 2001: 74). I also give an account of the prerequisites for being considered a 
contemporary mujtahid (one who exercises ijtihad) in the British context, illustrating 
the views of mosque imams.  
In conclusion, this thesis suggests that Sunni Muslim religious identity is configured 
in relation to the mosque and mosque authority, and this plays a crucial role in 
the maintenance of ethnic and sectarian discourse, which prevents Sunni Muslims in 
the city from forming any unity in religious practices and social matters. Contrary to 
the assumption that religion has become a private matter, with modernity and 
religious authority fragmented further in the context of migration to Europe, this 
local ethnographic research claims that a traditional religious system in terms of 
religious authority and its institutions (ijtihad, taqlid, and fatawa) has been 
maintained. For ordinary Muslims, mosque and mosque imams play a significant role 
in preserving that religious system.  
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Chapter 1  
Islam and Modernity: Mapping Modernist, 
Reformist and Traditionalist Responses  
For the last three centuries, Muslims from different parts of the Islamic world have 
interpreted modernity in quite different ways in societies shaped in large part by a 
religious civilisation. As we will see, Muslims initially experienced modernity as the 
realisation of their own backwardness in particular spheres when compared to the 
rapid advances in Europe. However, modernity soon came to encompass all areas of 
economic, political, social and cultural life and it can be considered a key turning 
point in the history of the Muslim world, witnessing wide-ranging transformations in 
religious thought and the organisation of religious life.  
While scholars now speak of multiple modernities or late modernities, including 
Islamic modernity, Muslims and many others tend to associate modernity with 
Westernisation. Nevertheless, their views on its compatibility with Islam have varied 
quite considerably. In terms of mapping this variety, various scholars have identified 
three basic orientations: modernism, ‘fundamentalism’ / Islamism and traditionalism. 
I will define these here briefly by way of introduction before examining each in more 
detail in the rest of this chapter.  
Firstly, ‘modernism’ may be seen as encompassing both Islamic modernists and 
secularists. The former argue that modernity is compatible with Islam, and call for a 
new Islamic theology in order to justify this compatibility. In the past, Islamic 
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theology was a methodological framework to deal with intellectual challenges. 
However, according to Islamic modernists, this old theology was unable to respond 
to the many challenges which modernity posed and so it should therefore be replaced 
by a new theology that could answer the needs of modern times. As for the 
secularists, they have argued that one of the main causes for the backwardness of 
Muslims was its adherence to tradition and religion per se, something that in 
modernity should be confined to the private sphere.  
Secondly, ‘fundamentalism’ or ‘Islamism’ refers to revivalist thinking that calls for a 
return to the practices of the ancestors (salaf u salihin), meaning the first three 
generations of Muslims, and for reform (islah) of religious practices influenced by 
customary practices and mystical interpretations. It also opposes adherence (taqlid) 
to schools of law, and sees a strong necessity for ijtihad (individual ‘effort’ in 
deriving interpretations in Islamic law).  
Finally, ‘traditionalism’ refers to those whose response to modernity has been to 
carry on much as before, maintaining a strong loyalty to the religious faith and 
practices inherited from the past and bound up with religious experts such as ‘ulama 
and Sufi shaykhs. For traditionalists, there is limited need for change in social 
institutions and the existing methodology of jurisprudence. The gates of ijtihad are 
closed as Islamic law is viewed as having reached its peak with the four originators 
of the Sunni schools of law (Hanafi, Shafi’i, Hanbali, and Maliki). 
In the rest of this chapter, I begin by introducing modernity in terms of various 
transformations in the economic, political, social and cultural spheres of the Muslim 
world. I then unpack the three-part typology of Muslim responses towards modernity 
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mentioned above with special reference to traditionalist and reformist movements in 
the Indian subcontinent and the Middle East, as they have been most active in 
shaping contemporary Muslim identity in Britain. In the final section, I explore how 
changes in Islamic theology (kalam) and jurisprudence (fiqh) have impacted Sunni 
Muslim religiosity including religious beliefs, practices and structures of authority. 
1.1. Modernity and the transformation of the Muslim world: 
“Modernity is that which has created fundamental changes in behaviour and belief 
about economics, politics, social organization, and intellectual discourse” (Rippin, 
2003: 178). Apart from the introduction of Greek Philosophy to Islamic theology 
(kalam), Muslims have never experienced such significant challenges. When Islam’s 
European expansion ended at the gates of Vienna in 1648, and then Napoleon landed 
in Egypt at the end of the eighteenth century, it seemed that there was proof of the 
Islamic world’s impotence in international politics and military matters. Some 
attempts were made in the military and educational domains by Muslim rulers and 
intellectuals to reclaim the past and close the gap with the West. For example, Selim 
III (1789-1807), the Ottoman Sultan, introduced his ‘Nizam-ı Jedid’ (The New 
Organization) in the military and administrative fields; this was followed by the 
‘Tanzimat’ (Re-organization) of 1839-1876 which encompassed  economic, social 
and religious affairs (Lapidus, 2002: 599). However, these efforts were superficial; 
students were sent to the West and Western teachers travelled East but the classical 
curriculum in education was not fundamentally reformed.  
With its industrial revolution, Europeans had already begun to seek out materials as 
well as markets for their industries overseas, and this situation eventually led to 
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Western colonialism around the world. As the leading Muslim power of the early 
modern period, the Ottoman Empire, had been experiencing splits and divisions in its 
military and social institutions and before long the majority of Muslim states came 
under the direct influence of the West: the Dutch invaded Indonesia; the British 
established their rule in India and took control of some parts of the Middle East and 
Africa; the French seized North Africa and the western part of the Middle East; while 
the Russians and Chinese absorbed inner Asia. Of course, the stagnation of Islamic 
civilisation in the medieval period may be accepted as having played a vital role in 
causing Muslims to miss the modernisation train. The stagnation of Islamic thought 
and art, the weakness of the religious intelligentsia and its institutions, and the 
recession of scientific studies are all crucial internal factors. Nevertheless, European 
colonisation did negatively impact Muslims both in terms of geographical 
imperialism and ongoing “cultural imperialism” (Shepard, 2004: 61). As Fazlur 
Rahman has argued, the second of these, which became more important when the 
former receded in the twentieth century, entered the Muslim world via Christian 
missionaries who were a carrier for modern thought of Europe and academic critique 
(1979: 212).    
In the past, Muslim civilisation met ‘Hellenistic’ thought successfully at a time when 
the Islamic world was confident and powerful. In modernity, however, the relative 
powerlessness of the Muslim powers meant that Islam experienced the 
transformations associated with modernity largely in terms of domination. As 
Zubaida argues: 
The transformations resulted mainly from the incorporation of the region 
into the expanding capitalist markets dominated by the European powers. 
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This was not merely European domination, but transformations of economy 
and society, creating new spheres of activity, classes of the population and 
relations to power. Political, military, and administrative reforms were 
responses of ruling groups to new situations (2009: 65).     
New classes developed in service and industrial fields as well as government 
bureaucracy and education. Religious classes began to disappear and their main 
functions in law and education were being bureaucratised (and secularised) at the 
hands of state personnel who gained modern education in new state schools. Having 
direct contact with the European nations, Western orientated intellectuals, poets, 
journalists, writers, and so on, read European literature widely and translated many 
works of the Western world into their mother tongues. 
Borrowing or adopting Western social institutions began gradually in the nineteenth 
century: “commercial and civil codes in Egypt in the 1870s, some fully fledged and 
intentional secularism, however comes with the Turkish reforms of the 1920s and 
1930s” (Shepard, 2004: 64). In Turkey, many secular changes were brought into the 
social and economic spheres but not often in politics, and a single-party policy 
continued until the middle of the century. In 1916, the constitutional government, the 
Committee of Union and Progress (CUP, Ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti), reduced the 
powers of the religious authority or Sheikh al-Islam, transferring jurisdiction from 
Shari‘a courts to the Ministry of Justice, and control of Muslim colleges to the 
Ministry of Education. In 1917, a new family code based on European principles was 
promulgated (Lapidus, 2002: 602). In the 1920s, the Shari‘a law was replaced with a 
civil code adopted from the Swiss code; it was subsequently followed by the 
adaptation of the Western calendar, and also by length-weight measurements and 
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western style clothing for men and women. Education was taken from the hands of 
the ‘ulama with “the unity of education law” (tevhid-i tedrisat kanunu). Briefly, it 
can be said that after the War of Independence, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk brought into 
practical effect the principles of the CUP. In Iran, meanwhile, Reza Shah Pahlavi 
was no less ambitious than Atatürk to make the country secular. To that end, he 
introduced secular law and education, and pushed nationalism and Persian identity. 
However, the ‘ulama were not brought under the full control of the state as in 
Turkey. Egypt, after gaining independence in 1922, adopted a constitution giving all 
authority to the nation, but made Islam the religion of the state. 
The abolition of the Caliphate in 1924 had an important symbolic impact on the 
Muslim community. In Egypt, Rashid Rida (d.1935) supported the preservation of 
the caliphate as did Abu-l-Kalam Azad (d.1958) in India (Masud, 2009: 247). 
However, as independence movements appropriated Western notions of self-
determination, the mid-twentieth century eventually saw the establishment of nation-
states throughout Muslim lands. The dominant political ideology of secular 
nationalism had been very much evident in the project of M. K. Atatürk (d.1938), 
founder of the Republic of Turkey (Sayyid, 1997), as it was in the Shah’s Iran, and it 
persisted in late decades in the ‘Secular Arab nationalism’ of Ba‘thist ideology in 
Syria and Iraq, Nasserism in Egypt and the thoughts of Colonel Qadhdhafi in Libya 
(Shepard, 2004: 69; Halliday, 2003: 28). However, despite a new confidence as the 
postcolonial world began to take shape, the failure of such regimes to deliver 
development to match the West eventually saw a so-called Islamic resurgence in the 
1970s and 1980s, symbolised by the Islamic revolution in Iran during 1979.  
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1.2. Muslim responses to modernity: 
An important diagnosis of Muslim stagnation in modernity comes from Pakistani 
modernist, Fazlur Rahman, who suggests that new methodologies in Islamic thinking 
are necessary in modernity:  
Muslims have to face a situation of fundamental rethinking and 
reconstruction, their acute problem is precisely to determine how far to render 
the slate again and on what principles and by what methods, in order to create 
a new set of institutions (1979: 214). 
In the past, a number of Islamic revivalists and reformists attempted to update social 
and religious institutions in the Muslim world. Such attempts can be traced back to 
the post-Hellenistic age. For instance, Imam Ghazali (d.1111) tried to systematize the 
religious sciences with his well-known book Ihya u Ulum ad-Din, while Ibn 
Taymiyya (d.1328) interpreted the sources more rigidly in a way that influenced pre-
modern reform movements, such as Wahhabism.
2
 However, such previous attempts 
                                               
2
 This emerged in the province of Najd, located in the central Arabian Peninsula, in the 
eighteenth century. Its founder was the pre-modern reformist Muhammad ibn Abd al-
Wahhab (d.1792), and like reformists in the Indian Subcontinent he opposed innovations in 
religion and sanctifying saintly people, who were already dead, and hoping for blessing 
(barakah) by visiting their tombs (Abu Zahra, 2003: 221). Ibn abd al-Wahhab began to 
spread his ideology and views through a book, kitab ut-tawhid (the book of monotheism), 
and to invite people to the true religion by giving up shirk or association and bid’a or 
innovation (Delong Bas, 2004: 68). He insisted that the innovations and sufi practices mixed 
with custom-laden beliefs that had proliferated in the Muslim world had caused the concept 
of monotheism to be sullied. Ibn Abd al-Wahhab protested against all these above-mentioned 
practices that were common at that time, and in addition he revived Ibn Taymiyyah’s 
thoughts regarding religious beliefs and practices. The movement played a vital role in the 
establishment of the Saudi-Wahhabi state in 1744 (Delong Bas, 2004:23). Today’s Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia is an extension of the alliance between the Saud family and Wahhabi 
thought. In the second half of the twentieth century, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia followed a 
‘pan-Islamic’ policy in opposition to Nasser’s ‘pan-Arabism’. The aim was that of spreading 
Wahhabi da’wah into the Muslim world, with the help of oil revenues. Subsequently, in 
1962 The World Muslim League was founded, by funding the secretariats of this 
organisation and many of its institutions. With headquarters located in Mecca and Jeddah, 
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at reform in Islam were the result of internal factors, whereas, as we have seen in the 
previous section, in modern times, there are both internal and external factors at 
work. In what follows I return to the tri-partite division of Muslim responses to 
modernity mentioned in the Introduction, locating Modernism in relation to two 
orientations which have actually been more significant in terms of their impact on 
ordinary Muslim communities both in the Islamic world and its Diaspora: Islamism 
(sometimes termed fundamentalist, neo-normativist or revivalist Islam) and 
“Traditionalism” (sometimes termed normative or orthodox Islam).3 
1.2.1. Modernist discourse (Islamic modernists and secularists): 
Islamic modernism pioneered the reformation of the educational 
institutions; agitation for liberalization and decolonisation; and the 
establishment of a periodical press throughout the Islamic world (Kurzman, 
2002: 3). 
Islamic modernism wants Islam to be the basis of political life as well as 
religious, but it perceives a need to reinterpret those structures in the light of 
contemporary needs, frequently with a clear and unapologetic adoption of 
Western notions (Rippin, 2003: 198). 
                                                                                                                                     
the WML has become an important tool of Saudi foreign policy, which also promoted later 
on The Islamic Conference Organisation (Commins, 2006: 112; Abir, 1988: 25). 
3
 See the works of some analysts including Fazlur Rahman (1979), modernist, 
fundamentalist and reformist; William Shepard (2004), secularism, islamism, and 
traditionalism; John L. Esposito (1991), secularists, conservative, neo-traditionist , and 
Islamic reformist; Youssef M. Choueiri (1990), revivalism, reformism, and radicalism; John 
O. Voll (1994), adaptationist, conservative, fundamentalist, and the personal and individual; 
and Charles Kurzman (1998), customary Islam, revivalist Islam, and liberal Islam.  
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The prevalence of modern values such as rationalism, science, constitutionalism, and 
certain forms of human rights was also part of the transformation associated with 
modernity. Those thinkers and activists who adopted such values while remaining 
self-consciously Muslim can be understood as Islamic modernists. Many Muslims 
perceived modernity as a Western concept and so regarded it as a threat to their 
religious and cultural identity. Therefore, amongst Muslim intellectual elites at the 
forefront of the encounter with the West, it was necessary to explain that modernity 
was not necessarily in conflict with Islam. The modernists had two main concerns: 
“reform in education and the need for a new theology” (Masud, 2009: 241). They 
began the effort to reform the Islamic tradition by reinterpreting its fundamental 
sources, the Qur’an, the Sunnah (the Prophetic tradition), Ijma (consensus), and 
Qiyas (analogical reasoning), in order to meet the needs of modern society. Initially, 
modernist thinkers appeared to be advocating Islam’s compatibility with modern 
science and technology by claiming that the adoption of modern science and 
technology actually meant reclaiming the Islamic heritage, since modern European 
science had its origins in classical Islamic learning.
4
 This is evident, for instance, in 
the writings of Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (d.1897) in answer to the Orientalist, Ernest 
Renan, (see Kurzman, 2002: 107-110).
5
 
                                               
4
 See ‘Modernism’ in Oxford Dictionary of Islam (Esposito, 2003).  
5
 Al-Afghani criticised the education policy of the Ottoman Government and the Khedivate 
of Egypt. Although these governments had been opening schools for a period of sixty years, 
they had never benefited from them because of the non-existence of philosophy in the 
curriculum. He advocated the necessity in teaching philosophy to prepare students for 
intellectual thought. Hence, Al-Afghani’s bitter criticism focused on the education policy 
and orthodox ulama (Moaddel, 2005: 87). Moreover, he strongly emphasised that Islam is 
the closest of religions to science and knowledge, and there is no incompatibility between 
scientific knowledge and the foundation of the Islamic faith (Kurzman, 2002: 106). 
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In the Indian subcontinent, one of the most prominent modernists, Sayyid Ahmad 
Khan (d.1898), demythologized Qur’anic interpretation by presenting it as a 
harmony of science and reason, criticised the hadith corpus, and called for renewed 
ijtihad. According to him, the doctrines of Islam should be based on revelation and 
ijtihad.
6
 In the Middle East, it could be argued, the most influential modernist thinker 
was Muhammad Abduh (d.1905), and for him moderation was the only alternative. 
When Islamic law is fully understood and obeyed, society, he believed, will flourish; 
when it is misunderstood or rejected, society will decay. Reason and revelation are of 
parallel competence; there is neither separation nor conflict between them (see 
Rahman, 1982: 63-7; Moaddel, 2005: 89-90). For both, education was a priority. 
Sayyid Ahmad Khan established the ‘Muhammadan Anglo-Oriental College’ at 
Aligarh in North India, offering English-medium higher education, and emphasised 
the importance of education in his journal ‘Tahdhib al-Akhlaq’ or Refinements of 
Morals (Kurzman, 2002: 291). In Egypt, Muhammad Abduh challenged Muslims to 
bring new curricula into Al-Azhar; his ideas also impacted the oldest and largest 
modernist organisation in the world, namely the Indonesian ‘Muhammadiyya 
movement’ founded in 1912 (Shepard, 2004: 74).  
                                               
6
 Another, later, modernist from this region, Muhammad Iqbal (d.1938), has with his 
rhetorical language exerted a great deal of influence over Muslim intelligentsia and 
university students. He advocated that the predominantly Muslim regions of North-West 
India should be governed autonomously under an Islamic system, and thus inspired the 
Pakistan movement. He proposed an ‘Islamic state’ model that provided within this political 
constitution for: a) the law of God as absolutely supreme, and b) the absolute equality of all 
members of the community (ibid, pp. 304-313). The Islamic state must have absolute 
equality among all members, with no aristocracy, no privileged class, no priesthood, no caste 
system, and so on. His views illustrated that he was obviously against any kind of division 
and discrimination. His well-known work, the Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam, 
is seen as ‘the only systematic attempt’ (Rahman, 1982:132) to renew Islamic theology and 
law in modern times. 
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Modernists reinterpreted ijma and qiyas; the door of ijtihad was pushed upon as 
human reason competed with the prophetic revelation; the principle of maslaha 
(common good) emphasised public utility; shura (consultation) became 
parliamentary democracy. In seeking to reformulate an alternative method of 
Qur’anic exegesis, modernist thinkers reinterpreted the scripture in terms of the 
‘normative’ and ‘cognitive’ standards of the Enlightenment (Moaddel, 2005: 84). 
Moreover, the modernists issued a general summons for an absolute ijtihad that 
would seek its guidance directly from the basic sources, not bound by the consensus 
of the existing jurisprudential schools (Hanafi, Maliki, Hanbali, and Shafi‘i). 
Furthermore, many modernists, including Rafi al-Tahtawi (d.1873), Chiragh Ali 
(d.1895), and S.A Khan claimed that there was not much difference between the 
principles of Islamic law and those of natural law on which the codes of modern 
Europe were based (Moaddel, 2005: 86; Kurzman, 2002: 277-91). They believed that 
it was necessary and legitimate to adapt the Islamic law to new circumstances in 
changing life conditions. Indeed, Chiragh Ali even rejected the Hadith as a source of 
Islamic law: 
the only Muhammadan law is the Qur’an; and the Muhammadan common 
law cannot be called immutable; on the contrary it is changeable and 
progressive. There is no legal or religious authority that says four madhabs 
are final and no mujtahid who could do as the four imams did (Kurzman, 
2002: 278).   
In brief, the modernists tried to purify Islam from innovations and accretions; and 
thus to reform the education system in order to re-establish Islamic principles in 
society and reform Islamic doctrine. In doing so, they gave greater emphasis to 
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ijtihad rather than taqlid by observing the importance of contexts such as climate, 
history, character, politics, and social circumstances. With regard to the practice of 
ijtihad, “it is supposed to open the way to modernization, and should be restricted to 
competent religious scholars” (Filali-Ansary, 2003: 25). However, among Islamic 
modernists, ijtihad began to take shape in the hands of non-‘ulama. Rahman 
explains:  
The ulama were incapable of this task; this is why modernism, in so far as it 
existed at all, has been the work of lay Muslims with liberal education. The 
result was that the movement split into two developments moving in two 
different directions: one in the direction of almost pure Westernism; and the 
other gravitating towards fundamentalism, or what has been called 
‘revivalism’ (1979: 222). 
Here modernism as ‘pure Westernism’ refers to a certain segment of society that 
advocates a secularity which rejects the claim that ‘Islam is a total way of life’. Most 
or all areas of public life must be governed by “human reason and initiative, not by 
the Islamic Shari‘a” (Shepard, 2004:63). For secularists in the modern Muslim 
world, religion is seen as the biggest obstacle to the progress of the Muslim 
community. The logic was that if Muslims followed the West’s path, they would 
progress as the West has. However, as suggested in the previous section, although 
such views came to held sway amongst the elites who imbibed Western ideologies of 
nationalism and socialism, they did not ultimately deliver development.  
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 1.2.2. Islamist discourse (revivalist or fundamentalist): 
In the modernist approach, intellectuals advocated Islam’s compatibility with modern 
ideas. They emphasised the rationality of Islam and its encouragement of science and 
knowledge, compared to other religions. This is a tendency discernible too in what 
Shepard (2004: 70) terms “the less extreme forms of Islamism.” Thus the hallmark of 
the Islamist approach starts in line with that of the modernists, namely that Muslims 
must return to the original sources of Islam (nass, the Qur’an and the Sunnah) and 
the beliefs and practices of the first three generations (salafu salihin) of the Muslim 
community. In fact, as Rahman (1979) maintains above, Muslim modernism was the 
root of both pure Westernism and a version of modern fundamentalism or Islamism 
(political Islam) in the hands of scholars such as Rashid Ridha (d.1935), the most 
influential successor of Abduh. As we shall see, such Islamic revivalism eventually 
found large-scale and popular manifestation in the movement of the Muslim Brothers 
(ikhwanu’l-Muslimin). With the help of the modern print media, Ridha disseminated 
‘reformist ideas’ through the publication of al-Manar, which became a “major factor 
in shaping Muslim thought from North Africa to Southeast Asia” (Voll, 1994: 162).   
Ridha emphasised the importance of renewing current Islam on the basis of the faith 
of Muhammad and his immediate companions, or salaf (elders), a term which gave 
its name to the school he helped found, the Salafiyya. The term salafi (literally the 
predecessor) has a special usage in the history of Islam that includes the era of the 
Prophet Muhammad and his companions, the generation that followed the 
companions, and in turn the generation that followed them, all together being called 
salafu salihin. Ridha tried to establish the middle ground between the old Muslim 
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universities (traditionalist ‘ulama) and the excessive secularism of the Westernizers. 
In so doing, the Salafiyya movement moved in the direction of a more rigorous 
rejection of modernizing adaptationism, and in the direction of pre-modern Wahhabi 
revivalism (ibid, p.162).   
Islamists insist that Islamic law (Shari‘a) must be followed as a guidance for all 
areas of life, public and private. Today they commonly call for an Islamic state and 
the application of the Shari‘a. In what follows, I will say more about two Islamist 
reformist movements which further illuminate the particular focus of this thesis, the 
Muslim Brothers in the Middle East and Jama’at-i Islami in South Asia.  
The Muslim Brothers (MB, Ikhwan’ul Muslimin):  
The MB was established by Hasan al-Banna (d.1949) in Egypt, in 1928. A 
schoolteacher by profession, al-Banna argued that social and religious decadence had 
resulted in colonialism and Westernisation. He insisted that “the weakness of Islamic 
society could be cured only by a return to the sources of its strength, the Qur’an and 
Sunnah” (Voll, 1994: 180) building up a mass modern Islamic organisation through a 
programme of education. The MB’s members ranged from civil servants to soldiers, 
urban labourers to rural peasants, village elders to university students (Euben and 
Zaman, 2009: 48). The essential message of the MB is simple:  
1) The rules of Islam and its teaching are comprehensive, organising the 
affairs of the people in this world and the next. 2) The foundation of Islamic 
teachings is the book of Allah and the Sunnah. 3) Islam as a general faith 
regulates all matters of life for every race and community, in every age and 
era (Voll, 1994: 181). 
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After securing grass-roots level support for the movement, al-Banna wrote letters to 
the King of Egypt and of Sudan and to the prime ministers of other Muslim countries 
(Euben and Zaman, 2009: 56-72), reminding them that Islamic values encompassed 
every sphere of life. By the late 1940s, it was the largest mass political and social 
organization in Egypt and began to spread into other Arab countries, such as Jordan, 
Syria and Palestine. It called for an Islamic order in society, and was banned in Egypt 
in 1954 (Shepard, 2004: 75). Latterly, however, it has become active once again. In 
1948, the MB was dissolved in accordance with a proclamation of the Prime 
Minister, Nughrashi Pasha, who was thereafter assassinated by one of its members. 
The next prime minister arranged to have al-Banna himself shot in 1949 ((Euben and 
Zaman, 2009: 52). 
Later on, Sayyid Qutb (d.1966), one of the most influential ideologues of the MB, 
joined the movement when he returned from America, where he had been sent as a 
researcher for the Egyptian education system. As a journalist, he wrote a 
commentary, Fi Zilal al-Qur’an (In the Shade of the Qur’an), in gaol where he spent 
about ten years following Nasser’s crackdown on the movement. In 1964, he was 
released and then re-arrested for publishing Ma‘alim fi’l Tariq (Milestone or 
Signposts on the Way), and eventually executed in 1966. Qutb championed a return 
to ‘pure Islam’ and a move away from the materialism of the West, which he 
perceived as contaminating Islam. Allegiance should be to Islam alone, for that 
provides the perfect social system for all humanity, one which will cure all the ills of 
the modern world. Once a truly Islamic state is established, all aspects of life will fall 
into their proper place (Rippin, 2003: 193). For him, social justice is more important 
than technological, economic, or administrative issues. Thereby, a return to Islamic 
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principles will restore all spheres of social life. According to Lapidus (2002: 634), in 
the 1970s, a group called Jama‘at al-Islamiyya, which were student associations 
dedicated to the Islamization process, carried on the principles of the Muslim 
Brothers to recreate an Islamic society based on a restored caliphate.  
Jama‘at-i Islami (JI):  
The JI was founded in 1941 by Abul A’la Mawdudi (d.1979) in pre-Partition India, 
and has ideological connections with the project of the MB. Mawdudi studied dars-i 
nizami from Deobandi ‘ulama in Fatihpuri Seminary where he received his ijazah 
(certificates to teach religious sciences) in 1926 (Nasr, 1996:18), but he also gained a 
modern western education (Geaves, 1996:179) and worked as a journalist. The last 
decade of British rule in India, with its attendant anxieties over the future of 
Muslims, induced Mawdudi to develop the political dimension of his Islamic vision. 
He told Muslims that they were a separate nation in India, but not in the European 
sense suggested by the (modernist) all-India Muslim League. Mawdudi argued that 
the way to carry this message forward was to establish not a nation state, but an 
Islamic state in which every constitutional part would reveal Islam in both ideal and 
practical manifestations.  
Like al-Banna, Mawdudi’s call was for a return to the Qur’an and a purified Sunnah 
of the Prophet Muhammad so that Islam might be revitalized; this could only truly 
happen if Islam became the constitution of the state (Rippin, 2003: 193). Thus, the 
Shari‘ah had to be fully restored and all laws from other sources repealed in every 
sphere of social life. According to Mawdudi, Islam is a complete way of life, 
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regulating all aspects of life; and the Shari‘ah does not recognise any division 
between state and religion, this being a western invention (see Geaves, 1996:183).   
Mawdudi’s political vision is based on religious doctrines that have the notion “God 
alone is sovereign” (Robinson, 1988:18) as their nucleus. Men have gone astray 
because, “nationalism, secularism, and western models for democracy are all based 
on the idea of sovereignty of people” (Geaves, 1996:183). Furthermore, he saw 
problems in Islamic faith and history. He argued that “original true faith had been 
corrupted by later accretions, leading to Jahiliyyah (ignorance, paganism in pre-
Islamic faith) and kufr (disbelief)” (Nasr, 1996:59). All worldly matters directed the 
Muslim’s attention from the divine to the mundane. Political power is essential to 
change this situation and reveal Islamic faith. The state is merely God’s vice-regent 
(khalifa) on earth (Robinson, 1988:18). 
The state would be ruled by an amir in consultation (shura) with a council (Geaves, 
1996:184). This is the same as the JI’s structure. This model is that of ‘theo-
democracy’, based on the equality of all Muslims under the sovereignty of Allah. 
Legislation takes place in four ways: “by interpretation, analogy, inference, and 
independent judgement” (Robinson, 1988:19). In the interpretation of the sources, 
Mawdudi avoided following any school of law (taqlid), de-emphasising theological 
and legal differences in favour of a systematic reading and regimentation of the 
religious sources (Nasr, 1996:61). 
To reach ‘true’ Islam, such as in the reign of the Prophet and his rightly guided 
caliphs, is merely a matter of purifying Islam of customs and innovations. Education 
was a primary agent for Islamic revivalism. The JI created its “student union, Islami 
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Jamiat-i Tulabah, to spread Mawdudi’s influence to Pakistan’s future leaders” (ibid, 
77). Although the JI had small numbers, it played a substantial role in directing 
Pakistan away from developing into a secular state in favour of becoming an Islamic 
state. For instance, some of its leaders became ministers under Zia ul-Haq (Geaves, 
1996:186), and arranged several changes (albeit superficial ones), were based on 
Shari‘a under the headings of law, economy and education. Nonetheless, as a 
political party, the JI has not been successful at the polls as a result of the 
movement’s failure to spread its ideology to “most of Pakistan’s rural voters, who 
comprise some 70 per cent of the population” (Lewis, 1994:43). 
Mawdudi gained a religious education; but, he was not from among the ‘ulama. He 
criticised the ‘ulama’s view about the closure of the ijtihad gate. He advocated that 
this door was still open and that whoever had a qualification in Islamic sciences 
could exercise ijtihad (independent legal reasoning). He also “derided the ‘ulama for 
their moribund scholastic style, servile political attitudes, and ignorance of the 
modern world” (Nasr, 1996:116). However, Mawdudi was accused of breaking with 
traditional orthodoxy by some Deobandi ulama- for example Manazir Ahsan Gilani- 
and this accusation was shaped later by severe fatawa (plural form of fatwa) against 
the JI. Nasr further states: 
Additional fatawa came from Saharanpur, Malabar, and Lucknow, accusing 
Mawdudi of giving unorthodox Qur’anic and hadith interpretations, 
departing from the norms of Hanafi Law, issuing unorthodox religious 
verdicts, belittling the importance of the Prophet, insulting the companions 





 pretentions, and, in some cases, demonstrating Khariji 
tendencies (1996: 118).  
Finally, Mawdudi came under attack from all the schools and groups of ‘ulama in 
India and Pakistan. 
1.2.3. Traditionalist discourse: 
Despite the intellectual and activist efforts of modernists and Islamists to engage 
modernity directly, the majority of the Muslim masses have remained loyal to 
religious beliefs, practices and structures of authority inherited from the past. In late 
modernity mass education and modern technologies have made available the 
religious texts and sources to an ever-growing number of Muslims, thus further 
challenging the privileged access of ulama to these sources. As Eickleman suggests, 
modernity sees an “enlargement of human freedoms and an enhancement of the 
range of choices as people begin to take charge of themselves” (2000: 121). 
The focus here is both “conservative Ulama and members of Sufi orders” (Shepard, 
2004: 81). Traditionalists maintain that today Islam should be based on traditional 
sources including the Qur’an, Sunnah and, crucially, the accumulation of Islamic 
tradition. Consequently, traditionalists believe that there is no need to change social 
institutions or educational systems; the gate of ijtihad is closed, as Islamic law 
achieved its peak with the four jurisprudential schools. In short, traditionalists or 
what may be better described as ‘adaptationist neo-traditionalists’ (ibid, p.81), for 
even remaining true to the past in a new context involves a reiteration of tradition, 
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 A Shi’a belief that the last imam Muhammad Mahdi, who is in occultation, will return to 
save the believers. 
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are those who keep the traditions of learning, and legitimated popular customs, as a 
rich heritage. From the beginning of the twentieth century, with the overwhelming 
effect of Islamist groups mentioned above, the traditionalists have also often 
preferred to be silent on political issues.  
Rather than discussing all traditionalist movements, I am going to introduce in turn 
the Deobandis (including Tabligh-i Jamaat) and the Barelwis as patterns of 
traditionalist discourse which emerged in early modern India, since both have been 
influential in shaping Muslim religious belief, practice and patterns of authority in 
the context of Britain. 
The Deobandi movement and Tabligh-i Jama‘at:  
Muslims in the Indian subcontinent faced a number of transformations in public life 
which resulted in various responses to colonialism and British rule. Pre-modern 
reformist figures, such as Shaikh Ahmad Sirhindi (d.1625) and Shah Waliullah of 
Delhi (d.1762), insisted on preserving religious identity (see Rahman, 1979: 201-3; 
Geaves, 1996: 130-3) among ordinary Muslims by focusing on religious education. 
This trend especially gained more importance after the Mutiny of 1857. The ‘ulama 
tended to move into the small towns (kasbahs) such as Deoband, Saharanpur, 
Kandhlah, Gangoh, and Bareilly, which were less touched by the British presence 
and were, increasingly, the centres for preserving Muslim cultural and religious life 
(Metcalf, 1982:85). The North Indian ‘ulama, Muhammad Qasim Nanautvi (d.1877) 
and Rashid Ahmad Gangohi (d.1905), established a traditional education centre in 
Deoband, some ninety miles northeast of Delhi, in 1867 (Metcalf, 1982: 88; 
Robinson, 1988: 4). The school became the pattern for all the other subsequent 
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madrasahs throughout the subcontinent (Geaves, 1996:147). The movement 
effectively expanded its network on the basis of this school prototype in many areas 
of India, so that the total number reached 8934 by the time of its centennial 
celebration in 1967 (Metcalf, 1982: 136). 
Economic independence from the government and funding by public subscription 
(Metcalf, 1982:97) were what distinguished the school and its success. In addition to 
the formal organisation of the school which was supplemented by associational ties 
of origin, educational experience, and the Sufi orders (ibid, p.98), it adopted several 
modern pedagogical methods, such as “written examinations, syllabi, classroom 
teaching, attendance registers for students and annual convocations” (Masud, 
2002:238). The school was set up to create well educated ‘ulama who would become 
prayer leaders, writers, and teachers, and thus disseminate their learning, in turn. For 
this reason, as regards the educational system, a curriculum was shaped mainly from 
the Islamic sciences (tafseer, hadith and fiqh). Students would be trained in the 
specialism of the three great intellectual centres of North India: in manqulat, the 
studies of Qur’an and Hadith, the speciality of Delhi; and in ma‘qulat, the rational 
studies of law, logic, and philosophy, the speciality of the two eastern cities of 
Lucknow and Khairabad (Metcalf, 1982: 100). However, they fully focused on the 
former, manqulat. In the school, ‘dars-i nizami’, the syllabus of Farangi Mahall in 
the 18
th
 century, was adopted as curriculum. Its second speciality was fiqh, since the 
Deobandis stressed correct performance of ritual and ceremonial duties rather than 
the study of jurisprudence. Consequently, this led the school to become a maslak 
(school of thought) that the Deobandis sought to revive religiosity (ibid, p.101). In 
this process, they claimed both intellectual and spiritual leadership, adopting Shari‘a 
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(Hanafi in fiqh, Ash‘ari in kalam8) and Tariqat (the path of Naqshbandi, mainly9). 
While so doing, they issued a considerable number of fatawa (legal opinions), 
understood to be based on the four sources of law (adille-i Shari‘a), namely the 
Qur’an, Sunnah, Ijma (consensus), and Qiyas (analogical reasoning). Indeed, “From 
1911, these fatwas were recorded and published regularly” (Nielsen, 2004:135). 
Although the Deobandis are labelled by Barelwis as being ‘Wahhabi’, they never 
sought to eliminate Sufism but rather to integrate it into an obedient religious life 
(Metcalf, 1982: 145). Thus, the Deobandis emphasised the importance of all Islamic 
knowledge accumulated over the centuries and followed established Sunni schools of 
law in beliefs and practices.   
As an offshoot of the Deobandi movement, the Tabligh-i Jamaat (TJ) was founded 
by Mawlana Muhammad Ilyas (d.1944) near Delhi in 1926 (Robinson, 1988: 15). It 
is also known as “the faith movement” (Lewis, 1993: 16) and could be said to be the 
activist form of the Deobandi movement. TJ’s work began in the region of Mewat, 
whose indigenous people were far from Islamic in belief and rituals because of the 
influence of Hinduism and Shi’ism. “M. Ilyas believed that the British were the main 
opponents of Islam, but he never allowed himself to be drawn into political 
activity”(Geaves, 1996:154). He thought that every Muslim had a responsibility to 
generate an awareness of Islam in others, and believed that if Muslims adopted the 
following practices, they would be successful in their religious life: 
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 As regard as the faith sects, dominant sects, Maturidiyya and Ash’ariyya still construct the 
main bulwark of orthodoxy in Sunni Islam. 
9
 The Deobandis were not totally against Sufism, since they had close relationship with 




1) Inculcating missionary spirit, 2) acquiring and transmitting Islamic 
knowledge, 3) enjoining what is right and forbidding what is wrong, 4) 
working together in mutual love (Robinson, 1988:15).   
TJ are well organised in preaching and missionary tours, which  consist of an amir 
(leader), a mutakallim (speaker), a rahbar (guide), and the size of the team can range 
from three to ten (Geaves, 1996:153). The aim of TJ is the same as the Deobandis, to 
practice religion and preserve religious identity. A substantial difference, however, is 
that the TJ has been successful in transforming itself from a local into a global 
movement. Volunteers under the leadership of experienced Tablighi preachers go 
from house to house, inviting Muslims to attend the mosque and to learn how to 
pray. Typically, they avoid religious controversy and political issues and focus on 
personal religious observation.  
The Barelwi movement:  
The name Barelwi comes from this movement’s charismatic founder, Ahmad Riza 
Khan (d.1921), who was from Bareilly, a town in northern India (Sanyal, 1996).  As 
an ‘alim, his scholarly defence of the Sufi way of life was the basis of the movement. 
The Barelwis claim that they are ahl al-sunnat wa’l jama‘at or people and 
community of the prophetic path (Sanyal, 1996: 166; Geaves, 1996: 103). This 
allows them to counter the reformist groups’ central criticism that their Islam is 
impure and full of innovations (bid‘ah) and cultural accretions. On the contrary, they 
accuse the Deobandis and Jama’at-i Islami of being Wahhabi. This kind of “fatwa 
war” (Lewis, 2002:40) is still ongoing. 
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The Barelwis are often described as a reaction to other reform movements such as 
the Deobandis and Ahl-i Hadis (Geaves, 1996: 95), but Metcalf (1982: 296) argues 
that “like the other two, they offered religious guidance to their followers.” The 
Barelwis used their legal scholarship “to justify Islam as it had been handed down- a 
custom laden Islam which was closely tied to the Sufi world of the shrines where 
believers sought help from saints to intercede for them with God” (Robinson, 1988: 
8). Unlike the Deobandis, the Barelwis were not so hostile to their colonial rulers for 
the threat they posed to Islamic culture (Geaves, 1996:95). 
Ahmed Riza Khan’s teaching places, first of all, great emphasis on the pre-eminence 
of the Prophet. He stressed the Sufi concept, the light of Muhammad, which is 
derived from God’s own light (Metcalf, 1982:301; Robinson, 1988:9; Geaves, 1996: 
95). He denied the charge of the ‘Wahhabis’ that this theory compromised the unity 
of God. Instead, he insisted that the Prophet was himself light, “present and 
observant (hazir u nazir) in all places. He was human but his humanity was of a 
different order from that of other men. He was also given unique knowledge of the 
unknown (ilmu’l-ghayb)” (Metcalf, 1982:301). All these understandings are based on 
the chapter of Najm, which give details about the Prophet’s attributes, in the Qur’an.  
Therefore, the Prophet could be called upon to intercede (tawassul) for human beings 
with God (Robinson, 1988:9). Furthermore, the Barelwis showed a great deal of 
respect for Sufi orders and awliya (Sufi pirs and saints), such as “Abdu’l-Qadiri 
Jilani, who lived in the twelfth century and was regarded the last great ghaus [helper] 
which is coming from the Prophet and his rightly guided caliphs and his descendants 
through Ali, Hasan and Husain” (Sanyal, 2005:94).  
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The Barelwis focused on daily religious life instead of opening schools. However, 
after the death of Riza Khan, the success of the Deobandis encouraged them to 
establish schools to train ‘ulama. In the meantime, the movement spread its 
institutions both inside and outside of South Asia. As with the Deobandis, the 
Barelwis insisted on following the four schools of law in Islamic beliefs and 
practices. 
1.4. Conclusion: 
The nineteenth century saw the conquest of Muslim lands by Western imperial 
powers - British, French, and Dutch – and the transformation of Islamic societies in 
economic, political, social and cultural terms. To recall the response of Muslims to 
modernity according to the content and style of their message, it is the modernists 
who have represented liberal intellectual thinking; Islamists are more or less 
puritanical revivalists who reject blind and unquestioning adherence to the legal 
rulings of theologians-jurists of the medieval Islamic era and in the twentieth century 
advocated for an Islamic state; traditionalists emphasise the status quo of Islamic 
scholarship, teaching and preaching. Unlike modernists and Islamists, they follow the 
rules of the schools of theologians-jurists of the medieval age, and see them as 





The Muslim Diaspora in Britain 
In the previous chapter, I examined the encounter of Muslims and colonial modernity 
with reference to the response of reformist and traditionalist Islamic movements from 
both the Middle East and the Indian Subcontinent. Colonial connections were at the 
heart of the economic migration of “over twenty million” Muslims (Nielsen, 
2004:161) to Europe in the postcolonial period, with the social, cultural, ethnic and 
religious diversity of Diasporas constituting a microcosm of the global Muslim 
community (ummah). This chapter contextualises the Muslim presence in the UK, 
beginning by examining the significance of the concept of ‘Diaspora’ which is 
important because its terminological scope widened with later additions, such as 
‘guest-workers’, ‘immigrants’, and so on (Vertovec, 1999). I continue by reviewing 
the migration process and how Islam has been institutionalised in Britain, dwelling in 
particular upon the dynamics of reformist and traditionalist movements, including 
their ongoing influence on the representation of Islam in national-level umbrella 
organisations, which have been unable to entirely transcend intra-faith polemics. The 
chapter concludes by pointing forward to my main concern in this thesis with Sunni 




2.1. Muslim migration to Britain and the process of settlement: 
In the post-colonial era, economic globalisation has been one of the most influential 
factors shaping the inter-relationships of Muslims with other countries. There has 
been massive migration from Muslim lands to Europe, for example from the Indian 
subcontinent to Britain, from Algeria to France, and from Turkey to Germany. Since 
the 1960s and 1970s the terminology surrounding migration has increasingly been 
expanded. In addition to the term ‘migration’, which simply suggests movement 
from one location to another, ‘Diaspora’ and ‘trans-nationalism’ have also come to 
prominence since the 1990s especially (Tölölyan 1996; Cohen 1997; Vertovec 2000; 
Baumann 2000). Sean McLoughlin (2005a: 527) examines the historical usage of 
such terminology, and argues that social groups such as ‘immigrants’, ‘ethnic 
minorities’, ‘exiles’, ‘expatriates’, ‘refugees’, ‘guest-workers’ and so on, have all 
been re-imagined as ‘Diasporas’ today. However, Diaspora is best understood in 
terms of continuing consciousness of an ethno-national homeland. Furthermore, in a 
globalized age, rapidly changing communications technology enables people 
(including Diasporas) to maintain contact with others around the world more quickly 
and easily than in the past. Under these conditions, he states, “Diasporas can become 
‘trans-national’” (2005a: 527), that is simultaneously rooted in more than one place 
across the borders of nation states through circulations of people, goods, money and 
ideas. As compared to container models of the nation-state, Mandaville argues that: 
Transnationalism provides a better way of understanding social formations 
organised across or beyond various territorial polities, it also provides a 
better account of Muslim politics under globalising conditions.  (2007: 276) 
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Religions may not constitute Diasporas themselves, but being ‘cognate phenomena’ 
in the theory of Robin Cohen (1997: 187), they provide ‘additional cement’ and 
serve to enhance the social cohesion of ethnic groups which remain crucial to the 
understanding of Muslim minorities. 
In the context of Britain, Geaves (2007) studies the relationship between religion and 
ethnicity further, and points out the three major categories requiring elaboration: 
‘ethnic culture’ (for example, Pakistani, Indian, and so on), ‘Qur’anic Islam’ (and 
Islamic ‘orthodoxy’ more generally) and ‘British culture’. The interaction of these 
three categories, produces various outcomes and tendencies shaped by generation 
and other factors. Furthermore, Geaves states:  
In the first stages of migration, the major interactions take place between 
British culture and ethnicity. Islam principally plays a functional role as a 
marker of identity as first-generation Muslims engage in micro-politics 
focused on community building. However, the second generation find 
themselves drawn towards British identity as a natural allegiance of birth 
and as a result of socialisation processes. However, the tensions that can 
exist between the loyalties of parents towards ethnic identity at the place of 
origin and the social norms of the new culture can be very difficult to 
negotiate. Thus, we find British-born Muslims beginning to move away 
from the engagement between ethnic cultures and to develop a discourse 
based on religion as their primary identity (2007: 18).    
Thus, “religion as passive instrument of ethnic identity” (Knott, 1992: 5) has shaped 
and continues to shape ‘British-Muslim’ identity but the dynamics are changing. 
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Reformist and traditionalist movements find a new voice among those religiously 
serious second- or third-generation British-born Muslims. Nevertheless, the 
increasing emphasis on religious identity itself produces quite different Muslim 
orientations, rather than one single Muslim community of Britain. 
As McLoughlin (2005a: 540) has pointed out, the particular contexts of migration 
and settlement have a number of consequences in the Diaspora. Muslims initially 
came to Britain as sailors and travellers in the sixteenth century, and a century later, 
it is reported that more than 40 Muslims were residing in London and working as 
tailors or shoemakers (Ansari 2004). These early migrants were from Ottoman 
territories, and their presence was a direct result of interaction between the British 
and Ottomans. In addition, the British extended their power over those Muslim lands 
in South Asia and, with the opening of Suez Canal in 1869, in the Middle East and 
Africa (Ansari, 2004: 27-8). Seamen from Muslim colonies such as Yemen, 
Somaliland, Malaya, and India (Ansari, 2004: 36) travelled to Britain, as did 
servants, nannies, soldiers, and so on. Muslims stayed mainly in port cities such as 
Liverpool, Cardiff, Glasgow, or South Shields. In between the two world wars, 
former seamen and soldiers especially moved into the Midlands, Yorkshire, and 
Lancashire, finding jobs in textile mills as unskilled or semi-skilled employees (see 
Ansari, 2004: 47; Gilliat-Ray, 2010: 42-3). It was these pioneers who formed the 
bridgeheads for later settlement, especially amongst South Asian Muslims. 
In the second half of the twentieth century, labour migration from Muslim lands was 
the most significant movement into Europe: Turks to Germany, North Africans 
(especially Algerians) to France, and South Asians (Pakistanis, Indians and 
Bangladeshis) to the UK (Nielsen 2004: 161). All migrated in order to fill the labour 
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shortage in these industrialised European countries. In Britain, the immigrants, often 
peasant farmers, were generally from rural regions such as Mirpur in Pakistani 
administered ‘Azad’ Kashmir and Sylhet in Bangladesh (Ballard, 2002: 5). Operating 
as international commuters, men came to industrial cities for a number of years to 
earn money and send remittances home before returning there only to be replaced by 
a kinsman.  
Roger and Catherine Ballard’s migration model (1977: 51) illuminates that, 
following the pioneers and the international commuters, migrants began to bring 
their wives and children to the UK and this process continued until the 1980s. 
Gradually, this process encouraged Muslims to see themselves as ‘settlers’ rather 
than ‘sojourners’ (Lewis, 1993: 37). However, the need was still existing for 
“networks and institutions which would allow them to carry on practicing religion 
and culture” (Joly, 1995: 7). Hence the close connections between homeland and 
diasporic institutions and organisations emerged. Thus there is a tendency to 
emphasise ‘tradition’ over ‘translation’, ‘ethnicity’ over ‘hybridity’ (McLoughlin, 
2005a:540). Initially, in the early days of migration and in locations where the 
numbers of Muslims remained small, mosques were shared, as a process of ‘fusion-
cooperation’ temporaily over-rode ethno-cultural and sectarian origins. However, as 
numbers grew, so did the reproduction of ethnic and sectarian affinity or ‘fission-
fragmentation’ (Lewis, 2002: 56; McLoughlin, 2005a:540), as can be seen in the 
settlement of Muslims in Leeds (see Chapter 4). 
While “disunity because of ethnicity” (Mandaville, 2007: 297) has been a major 
issue for Muslims from within their own communities, they have often felt 
themselves as ‘other’ in Britain, often being employed at the lowest level of the 
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labour chain and encountering “considerable racial discrimination” from wider 
society. In seeking to transcend exclusion, Islam has become a key focus for the 
identity of Muslims in Britain especially when they have been criticised or attacked 
by others on the basis of their religion, such as over the Rushdie affair, and later 
‘9/11’ and ‘7/7’.  
2.2. The Institutionalisation of Islam in Britain: 
When the Prophet Muhammad migrated from Makkah to Madina in 622 AD, the first 
task for Muslims was to build up a mosque, which would bring believers together for 
religious, social, educational, and political purposes. Muslims in Britain adopted the 
same methodology, initially using houses converted into mosques. The first arrivals 
were not so much interested in the establishment of religious institutions since they 
expected to return to their homeland with their earnings (see Geaves, 2007: 15). 
Later on, as the community developed and families joined the migrants, there was a 
proliferation of religious institutions throughout Britain. Even purpose-built mosques 
appeared on the streets of metropolitan cities. The first purpose-built mosque in 
Woking, the Shah Jahan Mosque, was founded in 1889 
(www.shahjahanmosque.org.uk). 
Mosques and Islamic schools were a sign that Muslims desired to preserve their 
religious identity. By 1985, the number of registered mosques was 314, and that 
figure had risen to 452 by 1990 (Nielsen, 2005: 46). Nowadays, it is estimated that 
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there are about 1500 mosques (Charity Commission, BMG Surveys of Mosques, 
2009), serving Britain’s 2.7 million Muslims.10 
As McLoughlin (2005a: 540) states, “the idea of congregation can become more 
significant than in the homeland, as public meetings for worships provide an 
opportunity for socialising.” In similar vein, Stephen Barton (1986: 179) reports that 
the mosque he studied in Bradford was a refuge for Muslim immigrants from the 
stresses of life in British society. In addition to the conventional functions of the 
mosque (prayer, preaching, religious education), some other roles such as “library, 
publishing, resolution and consultation centre, social gatherings, marriage, and so 
on” (Joly, 1995: 75) have been added in Britain. Mosques have also become a sort of 
representative political medium between local authorities and Muslims, linking with 
various departments of social services, such as schools, prisons, the police, and 
hospitals, as well as maintaining interfaith-dialogue with other religions. 
Consequently, mosques in Britain have become a nerve centre of community life for 
Muslims in Britain, functioning as a place of worship, a supplementary school for 
both children and adults, as well as a meeting point for socio-cultural events. 
Another important institution is the religious school (madrasa) or seminary. In the 
formative stage of institutionalisation, imams were found among migrants or 
imported from migrants’ countries of origin to work in Britain. Although this 
continues under the watchful eye of government by “tightening entry controls” (see 
Birt, 2006: 694-5), community leaders have established educational institutions 
                                               
10
 This figure is according to the 2011 census data given by Office For National Statistics 
(ONS).  http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/publications/re-reference-
tables.html?newquery=*&newoffset=25&pageSize=25&edition=tcm%3A77-286262 
(Accessed on 13 December 2012) 
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(Islamic seminaries) for training students in the traditional Islamic sciences with a 
view to producing British-trained imams and religious teachers. There are now at 
least 25 seminaries in the United Kingdom, one having been established in the 1970s, 
three in the 1980s, eighteen in the 1990s and three in the 2000s (Birt and Lewis, 
2010: 94). Seminaries are organised in terms of South Asian sectarian traditions. 
Seventeen seminaries belong to the Deobandi tradition, five are Barelwi, one Azhari, 
one Nadwi, and one Shi’a. Only five provide education for girls. The age criteria in 
these seminaries for all students is up to 16 (ibid, p.94). The curriculum and capacity 
of students who graduate each year can be summarised thus: 
Discounting the numbers of women being trained, there are nearly 2,500 
young men studying in such seminaries. Considering that roughly half of 
these students normally go on to pursue the full alim [Islamic scholar] 
course of six years after completing the memorization of the Qur’an (hifz), 
and that the dar al-ulums established after 1997 have yet to produce full 
graduates, a reasonable estimate is that currently around 140 `ulama 
graduate in Britain every year, a small proportion of whom having come 
from abroad will return home to serve their communities. The potential 
capacity of the sector is approximately 250 a year, which could be achieved 
by 2010. (Birt and Lewis, 2010: 96) 
Despite this capacity, “85% of the estimated 2,000 British imams are foreign born” 
even today (Birt, 2006: 694). The graduates take positions in the “prison and hospital 
chaplaincies” (see ibid, p.698-700) but are sometimes thought too expensive or 
independent minded to be popular with congregations.  
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2.3. The Construction of religious identity: Sunni Muslim religious 
movements in Britain 
In the previous chapter, we reviewed three Muslim orientations towards modernity: 
modernists (including secularists), Islamists (reformists), and traditionalists. In the 
post-modern period, the religious life of Muslims continues to be shaped by a 
number of reform and traditionalist movements and having reviewed the background 
of ‘traditionalist’ Deobandis and Barelwis and the ‘Islamist’ Jama’at-i Islami and 
Muslim Brothers in the previous chapter, I now focus on their institutionalisation in 
Britain. 
As in British India, so the traditionalist Deobandis “tried to be as independent as 
possible of the British state” (Modood, 1992: 145). Thus, they focused their effort 
internally on education by establishing religious seminaries [the overwhelming 
majority of seminaries, 17 out of 25, belong to Deobandis (see Birt and Lewis, 2010: 
94)] throughout Britain. As early as 1967 the Deobandi ‘ulama founded the Majlis 
Ulama UK (Geaves, 1996:163), an organisation designed for organising conferences, 
planning tours of visiting preachers, printing calendars and posters to establish 
correct times for prayers, and so on. Through the dar al-‘ulums and graduates from 
these schools, the Deobandi movement has contributed disproportionately to the 
supply of imams and religious teachers. Modood (1992: 145) notes that ‘through 
active proselytization they build up a mass following as well as an international 
reputation in Islamic learning’. In other words, through the work of their sister-
organisation, Tablighi Jama’at (their work is not only at a local and national level, 
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but also transnational), the Deoabandi movement has become globalised. In national 
level, however, Yahya Birt states that: 
The main challenges for the movement have been firstly to appeal to a 
younger British-born constituency that is actively disembedding ‘pure’ 
religion from what is seen as the composite religio-cultural Islam offered by 
their parents, and secondly to respond to emergent Salafi and Islamist 
critiques of following religious scholarship (taqlid) and failing to take 
Islamic politics seriously. (2005: 184) 
Despite sometimes being characterised as ‘isolationist’ (Lewis, 2002: 219), in the last 
decade especially through a new generation of activists the Deobandi movement has 
expanded its interaction and cooperation with the wider society, working with local 
schools and colleges, promoting community liaison with the police, MPs and policy 
makers, publishing Islamic literature, public lecturing on  Islam, making interfaith 
and having a support group for drug and alcohol abuse (Birt, 2005: 189).The other 
traditionalist movement, the Barelwis, are representatives of the traditions of Sufi 
mysticism from the Indian subcontinent. In Britain, those associated with the 
movement in some way are probably amongst the largest of British Muslim working 
class constituencies: “the majority of Pakistanis in Britain are Barelwis” (Modood, 
1992: 145).  Flexibility is a feature of their behaviour, as is a more positive attitude 
to the state (Robinson, 1988: 10). The Barelwis do not see living under a non-
Muslim state as a threat. Modood states that: 
unlike the Deobandis, they are not apolitical [but] they, unlike the 
fundamentalists, have no political grand plan; under the Raj they cooperated 
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with and were favoured by British rule...Their religious passion is usually 
aroused when their doctrines and forms of worship are denounced by 
Deobandis and fundamentalists as un-Islamic historical accretions. This 
intense sectarianism has led to and continues to lead to serious violence in 
Pakistan and there are not many towns in England which have mosques and 
have not witnessed such a clash. (1992: 146) 
In Britain, the Barelwis are divided into several regional groups and in terms of 
networks associated with particular pirs (Sufi masters) and orders such as the 
“Qadiris, Chishtis, and Naqshibandis” (Geaves, 1996: 101). Geaves quotes one of the 
leading figures of the movement in the UK, Mawlana Shahid Raza Khan, who hints 
at why the Barelwis are so fragmented and have struggled to organise themselves as 
effectively as the Deobandis: 
though the ulama believe in tariqas, all is not well within those institutions: 
existing pirs who came here frequently from Pakistan and other parts, they 
do not hold moral and spiritual values like their ancestors, they want to 
build school or spiritual centre and uneducated people respond to them 
warmly, furthermore pirs have lack of Islamic knowledge (1996: 102). 
In Britain, three factors have sometimes worked together to temporarily overcome 
the usually disparate nature of the Barelwi tradition:  
Reaction to the publishing of Salman Rushdie’s book, the Satanic Verses; 
fears for the future of the younger generation; the arrival in Britain of 
resident charismatic pirs who are forming powerful groups of Barelwis 
amongst British Muslims (Geaves, 1996: 105-6). 
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However, fragmentation and division continues to be a hallmark of the movement. 
Thirdly, of all the South Asian Muslim movements, the most comprehensive 
structure and ethos belongs to the JI, despite its small numbers. However, “with 
Saudi money and support it is better nationally and internationally, organised than 
the other two” (Modood, 1992: 147). Until the 1990s, when Middle East origin 
movements began to have an impact on the UK, reformist and Islamist orientations 
in Britain were most associated with elite JI-related organisations. Eschewing the 
project of an Islamic state in the British context, nevertheless “it was the student and 
young professional migrants of the JI-related organisations who developed a da‘wah 
(mission) strategy based on the creation of a revivalist counter-culture” 
(McLoughlin, 2005c: 62). 
The JI is represented in the UK mainly by four organisations: “The Islamic 
Foundation (IF), The UK Islamic Mission (UKIM), Young Muslims UK (YMUK), 
and The Muslim Educational Trust (MET)” (Nielsen, 1989: 232). First, the UKIM, 
founded in 1962 (www.ukim.org), concerns itself with mosque facilities (prayer, 
sermons) throughout the country and provides training programmes (tarbiyah) for 
members and associated members to train mentally and spiritually to carry out the 
work of the movement (Geaves, 1996: 200). Second, the IF which was founded in 
1973 (www.islamic-foundation.org.uk) and is currently located in Markfield, about 
nine miles outside of Leicester, functions as “a training and educational institution; a 
research organisation; and a publishing house” (ibid, p. 202). For the wider society, it 
also provides programmes and courses such as a Home Office-endorsed Cultural 
Awareness Training programme on Muslims in Britain for non-Muslim 
professionals, and post-graduate degrees in Islamic studies in the Markfield Institute 
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for Higher Education (MIHE), validated by Loughborough University (McLoughlin, 
2005c: 58). Third, there is the YMUK (www.ymuk.net), formed in 1984 on the 
initiative of 27 young Muslims representing various local youth groups who met in 
Spencer Place, in Leeds, to form a national organisation (Geaves, 1996: 206). The 
membership, made up mainly of university undergraduate and post-graduate students 
in Britain, is involved in activities campaigning for universal aspects of Islam by 
asserting that Islam is not the property of any particular culture. Fourth, the MET, 
established in 1996 (www.metpdx.org/index.html), is dedicated to monitoring the 
requirements of Muslim children in the British school system. Its activities range 
from providing materials for teachers to give Islamic Studies lessons in English to 
Muslim children in state schools; publishing books and posters on Islam; to issuing 
guidelines to that effect on such matters as sex education, diet, dress restrictions and 
participation in sports (ibid, p. 207- 8).                                                         
Having outlined the establishment of the South Asian background movements in 
Britain, I can now go on to describe some prominent movements originating from the 
Middle East that have been influential in shaping Sunni Muslim identity in Britain. 
Either through migration flows or da‘wah (mission), reformist movements in Britain 
target a wide range of the ethnic composition of the Muslim communities.  
In Britain, as Gilliat-Ray (2010: 71) has claimed that, from the 1970s onwards, Saudi 
Arabian-backed projects have been presented in terms of ‘mission’ (da‘wah), such as 
the building of mosques and Islamic centres and the large-scale publication of books 
propagating Wahhabi thought. Madawi al-Rasheed (2005: 156-7) points out the role 
of important religious institutions financed by Saudi Arabia in London, such as The 
Islamic Cultural Centre and al-Muntada al-Islami, and their impact on British 
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Muslims. Furthermore, Birt (2005: 168) argues that, in academic circles, less 
attention has been given to the implications of the link between the al-Saud family 
and the Wahhabi ‘ulama for the export of Wahhabism abroad. The Wahhabi ‘ulama 
were encouraging worldwide mission (da‘wah) to spread the ‘one and true correct 
Islam’ elsewhere. The da‘wah mission has been supported by British-born graduates 
from the Islamic University of Medina gaining special training at the faculty of 
da‘wah.  When they returned to the UK, they formed the Jam’iyat Ihya’ Minhaj al-
Sunnah (JIMAS) in 1984 as an instrument to disseminate Wahhabism (Birt, 
2005:172). Wahhabism is often used synonymously with Salafism,
11
 the way of life 
and religious practices of the first three generations of the Muslim community. Birt 
argues that in recent times all Islamic movements in the UK have had to respond to 
the challenge to interpretations of Islamic orthodoxy that Wahhabism represents. 
Salafiyya and Muslim Brotherhood (MB, Ikhwanu’l Muslimin) are other Middle 
Eastern originated movements operate in Britain. The usage of the term ‘Salafi’ from 
pre-modern times onwards is a broad-based Islamic thought that refers to those who 
try to emulate the first three generations of Muslims. Thus, the term is pervasive in 
the revivalist and reformist discourses. It cannot be confined to any particular 
movement or group, given that almost every reformist thought desires to return to a 
pristine Islam. A Wahhabi, a member of the Jama’ati Islami or Ikhwan’ul Muslimin, 
or a Deobandi can claim that (s)he has salafi thought. “So while salafis share a 
broadly similar ideological orientation, they differ markedly in terms of their 
methodological strategies” (Gilliat-Ray, 2010: 68).   
                                               
11
 Reformist movements, such as Jama’ati Islami and Muslim Brotherhood, also claim that 
their thought is Salafi or they aim to return to pristine Islam (see Gilliat-Ray, 2010: 68). 
Throughout this thesis, this claim is also evident from the discourses of these movements.  
62 
 
In the previous chapter, we have seen how the hallmark of ‘Islamist discourse’ is a 
call for a return to the practices of the ancestors (salaf u salihin), and reform (islah) 
of religious practices. Subsequently, the Salafi thought influenced the reformist 
movements both in the Middle East –the MB- and in the Indian subcontinent – the JI 
(Gilliat-Ray, 2010: 70).  
The aforementioned reformist movements from the Middle East share Salafi thought 
in their activities in Britain. The demand for ‘authentic’ Islam (Gilliat-Ray, 2010: 71) 
among British Muslims is similar to the experience of the nineteenth and twentieth 
centuries’ reform movements. Furthermore, Gilliat-Ray states that social influences 
have played a role in this regard: 
There is rarely meaningful overlap between secular education in mainstream 
schools, and religious education in makatib, sometimes delivered by 
ineffective religious leaders from the South Asian villages and towns of 
their parents and grandparents. This dissonance can cause some degree of 
educational confusion. Similarly, the conservative traditions of parents and 
grandparents are no defence against the direct or perceived experience of 
Islamophobia (2010: 72).  
In the midst of all the ethnic and sectarian complexities of religious life, there is “the 
Salafi thought articulated by charismatic religious authority figures” (ibid, p.72). The 
target of Salafi thought is the younger generation of Muslims from the South Asian 
background, preferably British-born, who seek a ‘cohesive Muslim identity’, and 
potential converts who search for a ‘rationalized Islam’ (Hamid, 2009: 392). The 
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usage of English as a medium plays a pivotal role in that process. Sadek Hamid 
further states: 
Asian Muslim young people tired of “cultural Islam” and a religious 
leadership that was distant and unable to communicate with them found in 
the Salafi perspective a “de-culturalised” Islam, an approach to religious 
commitment that seemed to be intellectually rigorous, evidence-based and 
free of perceived corruptions of folkloric religion or the “wishy washy” 
alternatives offered by rival Islamic tendencies (ibid, p.390).   
In seeking ‘authentic Islam’, cultural and transported factors in interpreting religion 
amongst South Asian movements motivated young Asian Muslims to accept Salafi 
thought. Salafi thought in Britain has also emerged with a particularly virulent anti-
Sufi rhetoric, opening up the historic conflicts between the Barelwis and the 
Deobandis imported from the subcontinent (Geaves, 2000: 53-4).    
As for the MB, as Gilliat-Ray (2010: 76) has pointed out the movement “does not 
officially exist in Britain”. Nonetheless, there are some organisations that derive their 
inspirations from it. The Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) and The European 
Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR), were both founded in 1997, the former for 
the political representation of Muslims, and  the latter for claiming religious authority 
for European Muslims. The MAB became prominent in 2002 by engaging with the 
‘Stop the War Coalition’, and led to the establishment of the British Muslim 
Initiative and the Cordoba Foundation in 2006 (Gilliat-Ray, 2010: 76). In the 
inaugural meeting of the ECFR in London, more than 15 scholars from around the 
world attended and approved a draft constitution (www.e-cfr.org, accessed on 12 
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March 2010). The current president is Dr. Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, a Qatar-based 
Muslim scholar with a reputation gained through satellite TV programmes on Al-
Jazeera TV. 
Finally, some radical political organisations in Britain, such as Hizb ut-Tahrir and 
Al-Muhajirun, also share a background in Salafi thought. Hizb ut-Tahrir (HT) was 
founded in Palestine in the 1940s. The founder, Taqi al-Din al-Nabhani, described 
HT as a political party with Islam as its ideology and with the goal of resuming an 
Islamic way of life by establishing an Islamic state which will implement Islam and 
propagate it worldwide (Taji-Farouki, 1996). HT was banned from British university 
campuses by the National Union of Students in the 1980s and 1990s and is banned 
from many European countries today (Abbas, 2007: 3-14).  A UK splinter group, Al-
Muhajirun, was founded by Omar Bakri Muhammad in 1996. He had much success 
in maintaining the HT’s political ambitions and infiltrating university Islamic 
societies in Britain before its actions began to be viewed with suspicion. Eventually, 
al-Muhajirun was disbanded by its leader in 2004 (see Wiktorowicz, 2005).  
Briefly comparing these movements and their orientations in the UK, it is possible to 
say that South Asian traditionalists especially have maintained ‘isolation strategies’, 
which has sometimes led to them to be hopelessly adrift from contemporary life 
(Geaves, 2007: 23-4). Differences in the details of religious life are still reproducing 
a culture of polemics, with one group accusing another of deviating from orthodoxy. 
For example, the Barelvis identify themselves as Ahl-as Sunna wal-Jama’at (Geaves, 
2009: 102), the people of the Prophet’s way and community, claiming legitimacy and 
authenticity and being true representatives of Sunni Islam in the UK. This allows 
them to counter the reformists’ central criticism that their Islam is impure and full of 
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innovations and cultural accretions. By contrast, the Barelwis accuse other reform 
groups such as the Deobandis and Jama’at-i Islami as being Wahhabi.  
Nevertheless, there have also been elements of co-operation and alliance-making in 
evidence. Going back to the 1970s and 1980s, Modood (1992: 149) argued that JI 
was in receipt of Saudi money to advance a shared project of da‘wah (mission). 
More politically engaged than its traditionalist counterparts (McLoughlin 2005c), JI 
has nevertheless understood the importance of a working relationship with the 
Deobandis, a larger constituency with whom it shares a conservative agenda. As for 
the Deobandis, Birt (2005:174) states, too, that “they have encouraged the younger 
British-born ‘ulama to accept aspects of the Wahhabi critique of Sufism”.  
Thus, it is important to note that the categories of traditionalist and reformist overlap 
sometimes, and the situation on the ground is more complex than that suggested by 
typologies. For example, the Barelwi and Deobandi movements strictly encourage 
their members in following a particular school of law, the Hanafiyya (Metcalf, 1982: 
141). In that sense, both share a traditionalist attitude. Both also have something in 
common in imitating Chisti, Qadiri and Naqshbandi Sufi orders (see ibid, p.158 for 
the Deobandis; and Geaves, 1996: 101 for the Barelwis). However, the Deobandis 
differ from the Barelwis, and oppose some Sufi practices, such as celebrating the 
birthday of the Prophet Muhammad and visiting Sufi shrines. In this regard, the 
Deobandis approach the Salafi-Wahhabi attitude against mysticism and popular 
Sufism. Similarly, the JI and the MB share the same thought with the Deobandis, but 
the JI and MB are against taqlid. They insist on disregarding the whole gamut of 
Islamic thought and practices accumulated over thirteen centuries, as we have 
already noted above. 
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2.4. National-level representation and intra-Muslim interactions: 
who speaks for British Muslims? 
In Britain, the first official Muslim representation can be traced back to the 
establishment of the Liverpool Mosque and Institute (LMI) in 1891. Ansari (2004: 
122) notes that it activities, which included lectures and talks, as well as social 
solidarity (almsgiving to poor and homeless people, regardless of their religion), 
gradually extended to a national and international audience through subscriptions to 
its publications from Europe and the Muslim world. This success culminated in the 
appointment of the LMI’s founder, William H. (Abdullah) Quilliam, as sheikh al-
Islam (religious authority) of the British Isles by the Ottoman sultan (Geaves, 2010). 
The outbreak of the First World War was a deterioration in the relationship between 
Britain and the Muslim world, and this adversely affected the LMI and Muslims in 
Britain. However, as mentioned above, the first purpose-built-mosque in Woking and 
its offshoot, the Muslim Society of Great Britain, became the symbolic centre of 
British Islam until the early 1960s, as Ansari (2004: 341) has argued. 
As we have seen, when families joined migrant workers in the UK post 1960, there 
was a mushrooming of mosques and educational institutions in line with ethnic and 
religious orientations (for example, Indian Deobandi, Pakistani Barelwi). Institutions 
from the home country were reconstructed in Britain and ethnographic works by 
Barton (1986), Gilliat-Ray (1994), Lewis (1994), Joly (1995), Geaves (1996), 
McLoughlin (1997), and Werbner (2002) document this process very well. Ansari 
(2004: 343) has claimed that external factors also reinforced migrant’s emphasis on 
ethnic distinctiveness: “from 1960s to the 1980s British governments, both local and 
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national, saw migrants primarily in ethnic terms.” This contributed to the processes 
whereby Muslim organisations became concentrated in racial and ethnic ghettoes.  
Given the complexities of collective identities and the different contexts in which 
people live their everyday lives, the common bond of Islam has not always been 
uppermost for Muslims in Britain. Nevertheless, in seeking to represent a common 
front ‘beyond sectarianism’ (Lewis 1994) to local councils and wider society, local 
umbrella organisations such as the Bradford Council for Mosques were established 
from the 1980s to pursue claims for public recognition in arenas such as education. 
The Rushdie affair in 1988-89 projected such questions onto the national level for the 
first time, reflecting both the impact of global Islamic revival upon British Muslims 
and also frustration with a race relations industry that refused to see Muslims as 
‘Muslims’ (McLoughlin 2005c): religion was being emphasised as “a major identity 
marker around which to organise” (Morey and Yaqin, 2011: 46). 
However, if mosques were well established in various local UK contexts, the 
Rushdie Affair underlined the weakness of Muslim organisations on a national level 
(McLoughlin, 2005c). The Union of Muslim Organisations of the UK and Eire 
(UMO founded in 1970) was largely ineffective and came before its time, while the 
UK Action Committee on Islamic Affairs (UKACIA, founded in 1988 as an alliance 
of some Deobandis and JI in response to the Rushdie Affair) struggled to find a 
government that was willing to listen in the 1990s. The case of these two 
organisations illustrated not only that to be successful they would need a receptive 
audience but also that Muslims would find it difficult to overcome entrenched ethnic 
and religious difference. The UKACIA, for instance, was in competition with other 
Muslim organisations such as Kalim Siddiqi’s Muslim Institute. In 1992, he 
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established the Muslim Parliament “as an independent national forum on which all 
Muslims, irrespective of denomination or racial origin, can meet to pursue their 
common objectives.”12 Such discrete voices and claims of Muslim organisations to 
represent the whole Muslim community in Britain led to the intervention of the 
British government. “Conservative Home Secretary, Michael Howard, advised 
Muslim activists to speak with one voice” (McLoughlin, 2005c: 60). 
This  intervention prompted the UKACIA to form a National Interim Committee on 
Muslim Affairs, and the committee then consulted more than 1000 organisations on 
the need for a new umbrella body to represent Muslims, similar to the Board of 
Deputies of British Jews (ibid, p.60). Eventually, the committee inaugurated the 
Muslim Council of Britain (MCB) in 1997. Having more than 500 affiliations
13
  
throughout the country, and with the backing of a New Labour government more 
receptive to Muslim calls for public recognition at the national level, for a time the 
MCB served as “the Muslim community’s interlocutor with the British government,” 
(Mandaville, 2007: 295).  
However, in the aftermath of 9/11, “the MCB fell out of favour when it did not 
support the so-called ‘war on terror’,” (McLoughlin and Abbas, 2010: 549), and 
since then, the relationship between the British government and the MCB has been 
problematic following various press exposés of the reformist Islamist heritage o f 
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 http://www.muslimparliament.org.uk/history.htm (Accessed on 10 April 2012) 
13
 See the MCB’s 2009-10 Annual General Meeting report, available on 




some MCB activists in JI and MAB.
14
 In 2009, for instance, Communities Secretary, 
Hazel Blears, suspended all communication for about a year when the MCB’s deputy 
general secretary (Dr. Daud Abdullah) was signatory to a declaration of support for 
Hamas’s military actions against Israel (Morey and Yaqin, 2011: 84). As Philip 
Lewis (2007: 67) has argued, other significant Muslim groups also felt 
uncomfortable with the MCB’s “conservative rhetoric with the dominance of 
Deobandi tradition”. This culminated, though not very successfully, in the 
establishment of the British Muslim Forum (BMF) and the Sufi Muslim Council 
(SMC) in 2005 and 2006, respectively. These two have largely become “home to 
Barelwis and other Muslims with Sufi networks” (ibid, p.67) but they have not yet 
sufficiently overcome internal divisions to prove as effective as the MCB on a 
national level.  
It is clear from the above that ethnic and religious diversity is at work here. The 
common bond of Islam amongst the Muslim community in Britain is often lost in the 
complexity of ethnic and cultural priorities and political ideologies that engender 
other unities on a particular matter. To some extent, the British state has sought to do 
what Muslims could not achieve, by establishing an advisory council that comprises 
all the groups mentioned above, plus the Shi’a, in the form of the Mosques and 
Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB) (founded in 2006) (Mandaville, 2007: 
295). Its executive board consists of members from the MCB, the MAB, the BMF, 
and the al-Khoei Foundation (an umbrella Shi’a organisation).15 In spite of the fact 
that this organisation is mainly involved in mosque maintenance and management 
                                               
14
 The establishment of the Muslim Association of Britain (MAB) in 1997, mainly consisting 
of Arab Muslims with “historic connections to the Muslim Brotherhood” (McLoughlin and 
Abbas, 2010: 549). 
15
 http://www.minab.org.uk/about-us/executive-board (Accessed on 16 March 2012) 
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issues, and in training imams to be able to meet the demands of British Muslim 
society, it could prove a significant space of intra-Muslim dialogue although not on 
theological issues. Putting aside ‘sectarian’ differences, it aims to meet the needs of 
British Muslim society. However, on the evidence of this chapter, the MINAB has 
faced ‘ethnic’ and ‘sectarian’ challenges which the previous national umbrella 
organisations experienced. 
2.5. Conclusion:   
Migration is not a new phenomenon for the Muslim community, for even in the early 
days of Islam Muslims fled from Makkah to Ethiopia and later to Madina in order to 
emancipate themselves from oppression. In the European context, mass migration to 
non-Muslim states was a matter of economic necessity. Most migrants sought to earn 
money and enjoy a better way of life by coming to Europe. Indeed: 
Islamic sources allow a Muslim to live in a non-Islamic environment 
depending on the believer’s intention and under three conditions: to be free 
to practice, to bear witness to the message and to be useful to Muslims and 
society as a whole (Ramadan, 1999: 170).
16
 
Events such as the ‘Rushdie Affair’ and more recently ‘9/11’ and ‘7/7’, have 
underlined the need for Muslims to unite, defend and better represent Islam in 
Britain. Indeed, the presence in the UK Diaspora of Muslims from different parts of 
the world is arguably an opportunity for followers of Islam to better know and 
understand each other, gaining an experience of intra-religious pluralism. However, 
                                               
16
 Tariq Ramadan has pointed out that in European societies, at least five fundamental rights 
are secured: “the right to practice Islam, knowledge, establish organisations, autonomous 
representation, and appeal to the law” (1999: 136-7). 
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as we have seen in this chapter, as regards matters of belief and practice, Muslims in 
Britain are still divided by those debates that were raging in nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century India (Metcalf, 1982: 301) and the Middle East.  
Nevertheless, as we shall see in Chapters 4 to 7, reformist and traditionalist 
movements have had a very significant impact on the forging of Sunni Muslim 
religiosity. The local mosque is a key space in this regard, both for prayers and 
festivals but also for everyday religious advice. From the mosque and madrasa, the 
circle expands to Shari‘a courts,17 fatwa centres like the ECFR, and information and 
advice found on university campuses and the internet. However, before such matters 
are investigated further, in the next chapter I will address the question of 
methodology and how I carried out my research among four Sunni Muslim mosque 
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 There are about 85 Shari’a courts operating across the UK, and some of them (such as in 
London, Birmingham, Bradford, and Manchester) have been granted official rights to 
enforce the rulings in family matters with the power of British judicial system, while some 
others are still operating unofficially. They are dealing with a number of cases ranging from 
divorce to inheritance. (The Times, 14 Sept. 2008, www.timesonline.co.uk accessed on 31 
March 2010). Work by Samia Bano (2004) shows how Shari’a courts work as a mediation 




Methodological reflections on studying Sunni Muslim 
communities in Leeds 
The University of Leeds’ Community Religions Project (CRP) has conducted a 
number of research projects in the field of Religious Studies since the 1980s, 
exploring the settlement and development of migrant communities in Leeds, 
Bradford and elsewhere using ethnographic methods.  One of the main aims of the 
CRP has been “to contribute to academic debates about the relationship between 
religion and ethnicity” (Knott, 1992: 7). In the previous chapter, we have witnessed 
the importance of ethnicity during the migration and settlement of Muslims in the 
Diaspora. It was also clear that, in terms of the study of Islam, the CRP-related works 
of Barton (1986), Lewis (1993, 1994) and Geaves (1994, 1995) have made a defining 
academic contribution towards the understanding of religious differences associated 
with key transnational movements in South Asian-heritage British Muslim 
communities. Studying at the home of the CRP in Leeds, this and other relevant 
literature prompted me to develop the research questions as previously mentioned in 
the Introduction to this thesis. As a result, my aims in studying Sunni Muslim 
communities in Leeds can be summarised as:  
 to study various dimensions of religious diversity among Sunni Muslims and 
reflect upon the theological debates influencing the religious life of Muslims 
from different ethnic and religious backgrounds.  
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  to compare religious beliefs and practices between four mosques 
differentiated by ethnicity and sect. 
 to examine intra-Muslim relations, for example, concerning the eid al-adha 
(Feast of the Sacrifice).  
 to seek for any attempts by Muslims in the city to communicate with the 
wider society. 
 to explore the patterns of religious authority among Sunni Muslims, by 
examining the views and experience of both religious experts and ordinary 
Muslims, and to investigate the place of ijtihad, taqlid, and fatawa in the life 
of Muslims as being instruments of religious authority. 
In this chapter, then, I reflect upon the various methodological issues raised by the 
fieldwork I conducted intensively from June 2010 until February 2011, so as to 
generate the data to help me reach the aims set out above. First of all I describe the 
qualitative research methods I employed, evaluating in turn my use of participant 
observation, conducting interviews and gathering more ephemeral material, 
including a content analysis of internet sites. Then I describe the fieldwork process, 
my own analysis and ethical issues. 
3.1. Research Locations and Methods, Reflexivity and Challenges: 
Kim Knott (2005: 245) points out that there are rather different methodological 
approaches to the study of religions that have emerged in the West in recent decades. 
On the one hand there is the clearly ‘secular and scientific’ model, while on the other 
more ‘reflexive’ models reflect a postmodern concern with the contingency of 
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knowledge. Nevertheless, the study of religion remains multi-disciplinary and 
benefits from various methods, approaches and standpoints. Following Chryssides 
and Geaves, this project takes an ethnographic approach:   
The social sciences have provided the study of religion with a number of 
insights into understanding the relationship between religion and society, 
and have over the years provided their own discourse into drawbacks and 
problems of gathering data in the field, both quantitatively and qualitatively. 
In particular, they have offered the study of religion the valuable tools of 
ethnography so that living religious communities may be explored (2007: 
61). 
In any social context ethnographers of religion choose a locale, spend time with its 
inhabitants, listen, watch, question, think, listen again, and then they write reports 
concerning what goes on there (Spickard and Landres, 2002: 10).  
For my research, I chose to conduct fieldwork in Leeds because, firstly, the city has 
not been the subject of much research on Muslims in Britain (cf. Geaves, 1995) and, 
secondly, because it includes a Muslim population which reflects more of the ethnic 
and sectarian diversity of the Muslim Diaspora in Britain than many other locations. 
My chosen fieldwork locations were predominantly mosques, which are at the heart 
of Muslim religious life. To begin to think about my research questions, during 2009-
10 I visited all the mosques in Leeds, observing the visible religious diversity of their 
physical space and congregations ritual performances, as well as other differences 
between them. Thereafter, I created a basic map of contemporary religious diversity 
and difference among Sunni Muslim communities in the city (a list is presented in 
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Chapter 4, Table 1). In sum, of the 21 mosques in Leeds, about 18 were identified as 
serving Sunni Muslims, and from these four were selected as case studies for further 
investigation. As a Sunni Muslim myself my research involved “close association 
with, and participation” (Brewer, 2000: 59) in religious ritual and other practices but 
with the intention of understanding the purpose and meanings of the activities of 
Sunni Muslim communities in the selected mosques.  
As has been documented in Chapters 1 and 2, Britain’s Sunni Muslim communities 
are diverse according to ethnic and sectarian orientations. Thus, choosing the four 
mosques, namely Leeds Islamic Centre (LIC; South Asian, Deobandi); Leeds Grand 
Mosque (LGM; predominantly Arab, Ikhwani/Salafi); Leeds Iqra Centre (IC; South 
Asian, Jama’at-i Islami); and Leeds Makkah Masjid (LMM; South Asian, Barelwi), 
provided an opportunity to gain a greater insight into similarity and difference in 
Sunni Muslim religiosity. I hope to be able to illuminate a better understanding of the 
real life meaning of religion for both religious experts and ordinary believers alike.   
3.1.1. Participant observation: 
The purpose of my ethnography, as McLoughlin (2007: 274) has pointed out, is to 
understand the complexity of ‘Islam and being Muslim’ in different people’s lives. 
As a Muslim of Sunni Turkish background, my insider status meant that there was no 
obstacle to me gaining access to mosques in the first instance. The mosques of Leeds 
are all open to me for prayer and participating in any other events, such as social 
gatherings, conferences or seminars, special celebrations like the birthday of the 
Prophet Muhammad (mawlid/milad), and festive celebrations. However, from June 
2010, I wanted to begin my research in earnest. Therefore, before starting my 
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fieldwork, I sent an information letter by either mail or e-mail to all four mosque 
management committees. I received a confirmation e-mail in response only from 
LGM. The others did not respond, but when I followed up in person they orally 
informed me that they were happy for me to do research in their mosque. For the 
observational part of this research, consent could not otherwise be taken on behalf of 
the congregation as a whole. 
My frequent visits to the selected mosques made me familiar to the congregation, 
and my keen interest to talk with people opened pathways for further conversation. 
Overtly, I introduced myself as a PhD student at the University of Leeds, and 
explained my academic and religious background, as a researcher in Islamic studies 
and as a hafiz and ex-imam (in a mosque in Turkey). I approached firstly the mosque 
imams and had informal conversations as with fellow Muslims. Then I was 
introduced by the mosque imams to the congregation as ‘a Muslim scholar’ doing a 
higher degree in the university. To some extent, they acted as gatekeepers for my 
research. They also participated in my research, though just one did not want to 
complete the interview. When I was asked about my research topic, some found it 
interesting; for instance, Sheikh Muhammad (official imam of the LGM and fellow 
PhD student) commented that examining Muslim communities in Britain and 
understanding religious diversity was a current issue and an important one in terms 
of reflecting Sunni Muslim attitudes to living as a minority in a non-Muslim country.  
The contacts with mosque imams initiated an informal ‘snow-balling’ (McLoughlin, 
2000; Bolognani, 2007) process leading to a contact chain for potential participants 
among ordinary Muslims. This developed as individuals referred to other fellow 
Muslims for participation. Indeed, as Bolognani (2007: 284) has pointed out, 
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“generally speaking the informal snowballing process was far more successful than 
contacting individuals, associations or mosques through formal means such as letters 
on University-headed paper”. Nonetheless, it was not always easy to explain the 
details of the research topic or ethical procedures like taking consent from the 
participants. Indeed, some ordinary Muslims rejected my invitation for an interview, 
seeing the research about Muslims as something that was not necessary.  
The ethnographic approach consists of both observing and listening to the views of 
different groups or communities during ceremonies, rituals, and social events 
(Bryman, 2004: 292), as well as talking to people informally about the context in 
question. I spent at least one month visiting each mosque, praying the five-times 
daily prayers with the congregation and spending most of the time between the 
prayers in the mosque, making informal conversations and recruiting informants for 
the interview. In doing so, my aim was to see differences and similarities regarding 
religious observance and rituals between the mosques and to compare them 
accordingly. It helped me to understand existing differences amongst the Sunni 
Muslim communities and revisit the literature about them in the context of Britain. I 
began by observing ritual differences in patterns of daily and Friday prayers and 
listened to va‘z, khutbahs or sermons to determine whether their content included 
anything about religious belief and practices. I attended festive celebrations, too, 
including iftar gatherings during Ramadan, the holiest month in the Muslim calendar, 
‘eid (festive) celebrations, milad un-Nabi (the birthday celebration of the Prophet 
Muhammad), tafseer (Qur’anic exegesis) classes at LGM on Monday evenings, and 
at the weekends in the LIC. In addition, I also attended a number of community 
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events related to Muslims more generally in Leeds, including those organised by the 
IC in Leeds Town Hall, as well as interfaith meetings in the LGM and LMM.  
Basing myself in the mosques, I took advantage of opportunities to build 
relationships with the religious experts and members of the congregations before 
conducting interviews. Nonetheless, to convince other fellow Muslims to participate 
in the research is not easy, but takes time. Having gained a religious education and 
had active involvement with Islamic skills such as reciting the Qur’an and making 
the call for prayer (adhan), I was given several opportunities to perform these. In the 
selected mosques, except the LIC, I called for prayer, and once I recited a passage 
from the Qur’an in a milad un-Nabi programme held in the LMM. After these, it was 
as if people changed their perceptions towards me, and furthermore, such 
involvements created a bond of trust and intimacy. 
While observing religious rituals and events, I nevertheless avoided note-taking or 
recording except in relation to the tafseer class in LGM since all attendees were 
allowed to record the talk. However, as soon as a particular program had finished I 
would start writing up my observations. So, more often than not, I attended religious 
activities at the mosques just like one of the regular attendees. Nevertheless, in 
conversation I was overt about my role as a researcher. Moreover, although I am a 
Sunni Muslim, my Turkish ethnicity and my dress made me noticeable amongst the 
South Asian congregations of three of the mosques (the exception being LGM, which 
is more ethnically mixed and is popular with international students from the 
university). After prayers, several times people approached me to ask who I was, 
which was helpful to me as a researcher and enabled me to exchange contact details 
with potential participants. Perhaps my location in the field is best described, then, as 
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a ‘participant as observer’ (Knott, 2005: 252). Indeed, while my language skills in 
Arabic are good, I do not speak Urdu, Panjabi or Bengali. Therefore the research was 
conducted mainly in English, with some Arabic when appropriate. In all four 
mosques there are also English translations of the sermon (khutbah and va’z) on 
Friday once it has first been delivered in Arabic or Urdu, while at LGM study circles 
were in Arabic and at LIC in Urdu. I did attempt to learn Urdu, which has some 
overlap with Turkish, but because of my limited time I abandoned the idea. With the 
aid of translators in the congregations I was able to understand the gist of topics. In 
the LMM and IC, study circles on the same topics were available both in English and 
Urdu. 
For me as a Muslim researcher the most challenging part of the research was the 
ethical problem of approaching Muslim women with a view to them becoming 
involved in the research. As a Muslim male researcher in the Islamic space of a 
mosque it was very difficult indeed to approach Muslim women. Available examples 
show that issues to do with the identity of the researcher have played a significant 
part in ethnographic studies, but have not created an absolute barrier. 
Jeffery (1976) argued that, in a way, being female was advantageous as it 
provided her with access to areas that would have been denied to men 
because of purdah (gender segregation). Others have argued (Goodwin, 
1994) that female outsiders in Muslim societies have been able to interact 
with both genders by intermittently taking up an 'honorary male' status 
(Bolognani, 2007: 281).  
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The fieldwork site is an important factor in that, for instance, a school environment 
or social life may prove to be a more open space. For instance the ‘honorary status’ 
of researchers like McLoughlin (1998) as ‘gora (white man)’ and Bolognani (2007) 
as ‘gore (white woman)’ can be mentioned here. However, the mosque is a totally 
different environment, given that the segregation of women from men during prayers 
and any other activities is a religious norm. According to some Islamic views, it is 
also forbidden for a man and woman to talk in private unless they are related. For 
instance, there is a Prophetic tradition (hadith) that suggests if a man and a woman 
are in a place alone, the third person present is Satan, and so there is the possibility of 
unlawful activities. Being aware of these views, I tried to use the imams of the 
selected mosques as gatekeepers who might arrange for me to talk with women, but 
they advised me that it would not be possible. For instance, once in the LGM, during 
a Ramadan night session after tarawih prayer, it was announced that the imam was 
going to answer questions in the women’s section. Thus, I approached the imam and 
asked permission to accompany him during this question and answer session in order 
to see what sorts of questions were being raised. However, acting as a gatekeeper, the 
imam replied that “the congregation does not accept that” - although he was 
subsequently accompanied by a member of the mosque committee, which underlined 
that I did not have such a privileged status. I also sent e-mails with information about 
my research and proposed interview questions to some Muslim women via a female 
member of the mosque committee at LGM. However, I did not receive any response, 
and in the end managed to interview only three Muslim women who are postgraduate 
students. We met outside the mosque space at the university. 
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3.1.2. Qualitative interviewing: 
During my visits to the mosques, I was preparing the interview questions according 
to my research questions and provisional chapter themes. I tested whether the 
interview questions would work or not when I found chances to talk with the 
congregation in an informal way. When the time to recruit respondents came, I 
summarised my research project verbally and handed them an information sheet 
about the research, its purpose and sponsorship, how long the interview would be and 
what would happen to the data. In the case of those who agreed to be interviewed, 
around a week later I took their consent by using a form approved by the PVAR 
Faculty Research Ethics Committee (Appendix C). In being overt about my research 
and identity, I avoided any deception or lack of informed consent (Bryman, 2004: 
511-4). I was also very careful not to invade people’s privacy. I did not ask them 
about the quantity and quality of their prayers, for instance. I also informed 
participants that they could refuse to answer any question or withdraw from the study 
at any point. Only one person did not answer certain questions, and in the end they 
did not give their consent for the interview to be used. 
My aim was to interview 10 people in each mosque and, on average, I very nearly 
achieved this target, completing 10 interviews at the LIC; 11 in LGM; 9 in LMM; 
and 9 in the IC. This number includes both members of the congregation and the 
mosque imams and other religious experts (I interviewed one expert twice). The 
duration of each interview, whether with experts or members of the congregation, 
was about one hour on average, though several lasted longer than this. In general, the 
interviews took place inside the relevant mosque outside of times for the daily 
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prayers. I recorded the interview digitally and saved it to my university folder (for 
data protection procedure of Leeds University) to be transcribed later for analysis. 
Whenever I cite them throughout the thesis, the names of interviewees have almost 
always been anonymised using pseudonyms. Exceptionally, and with their explicit 
written consent following email exchanges sharing details of the relevant text and 
quotations to be included in the thesis, I have used the real names of certain well-
known local religious experts. These are as follows: Qari Asim and Qari Qasim 
(imams of Leeds Makkah Masjid), Sheikh Muhammad Taher (imam of Leeds Grand 
Mosque), Hasan al-Katib (ex-president of Leeds Muslim Forum) and Sheikh 
Abdullah al-Judai (member of the European Council for Fatwa and Research). 
There was no criterion for selection in terms of age for the imams and religious 
experts, as they are a small (if important) part of the sample and they were recruited 
on the basis of their official position. Moreover, the interviews with them were fairly 
structured - a “standardised interview” (Bryman, 2004) – with me asking the same 
set of questions to all four (Appendix B). In terms of the former group (members of 
the congregation), approaches to potential interviewees were made after introducing 
them to my research topic following one of the daily or Friday prayers. The 
participants were randomly invited to take part in the research, initially through 
informal talk as fellow Muslim brothers, and then to the extent that the details about 
me and my research project became a conversation topic. Often, I waited to make 
sure that a potential participant was a regular member of the congregation in the 
mosque. I also verified the participant’s religious identity through one of the 
interview questions. I handed the information sheet to the potential participant, and 
then awaited his response as to whether to take part or not. 
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However, interviewing members of the congregation was different from interviewing 
the imams. A more semi-structured approach was adopted of necessity, with some 
changes made to questions and sequences according to the participant’s education 
level, for instance. Substitute questions and new topics sometimes emerged during 
the course of the interview. Some five informal interviews (without recording or 
note-taking) were also carried out in line with the participants’ wishes. As noted 
already, three of the mosques were predominantly attended by people of South Asian 
ethnicity, while one was Arab and, as I have already explained, gender was a 
constraint in terms of recruiting interviewees. In the British context, for instance 
Gilliat-Ray (1994) suggests that female religious identity, especially with regards to 
young British-born women, has dramatically changed with the facilities which 
British modern life and secular education provided. According to her analysis, a 
tendency seeking authentic Islam independent from cultural practices or ethnic 
identities is common amongst young Muslim women (Gilliat-Ray, 1994: 176). 
However, their preferences in seeking religious authority, continuity and change in 
following a particular school of law (taqlid) need to be investigated to see how 
religious life continues among female Muslims.
18
 
3.1.3. Collection of ephemeral material:  
Content analysis of texts and discourses were also important for this study. I gathered 
information via the internet and literature (including books in English on religious 
beliefs and practices, pamphlets, posters, newsletters, and fatawa) circulating in 
                                               
18
 A more recent research, Women, Leadership and Mosques: Changes in Contemporary 
Islamic Authority (Brill, 2012) edited by Hilary Kalmbach and Masooda Bano, explores 
female activities in religious authority and leadership in Muslim majority countries 
throughout Muslim world and Muslim minority communities in non-Muslim countries. From 
the latter’s context, however, Britain is absent from such a comprehensive research. 
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mosques and Islamic bookshops. As (Bunt, 2000) has observed, the internet plays a 
significant role in many Muslims’ lives and in numerous organisations by 
establishing a web presence for Islam, utilising the networking and dissemination 
possibilities of the medium. The selected mosques have their own websites to 
communicate with their congregations; these announce important events and 
activities; store audio and video materials on religious matters or events held in the 
mosque; and host discussion forums and links to other websites. I regularly checked 
the mosque websites from the beginning of my fieldwork until submission. 
Additionally, these websites exhibit fatwa in a specific section or under Frequently 
Asked Questions (FAQs), and provide links to other fatwa websites for more 
information. 
3.2. The process of data analysis and reflexivity of the fieldwork 
research:   
After completing my fieldwork at the beginning of 2011, I began transcribing the 
interview recordings into textual form. There was some speech recognition software, 
for instance Dragon, which is supposed to transcribe digital voice recordings into 
text. However, this was not reliable since it created irrelevant content from the 
original voice recording. Therefore, I transcribed the interview recordings manually 
over a period of about one and a half months. While this is time-consuming, as all 
researchers know, many ideas concerning analysis came to the fore during the 
process: for example, in terms of constructing the organisation and content of the 
fieldwork chapters. As I went through the material I highlighted key passages in 
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interviews or key events that could be quoted in discussing the key themes in 
particular chapters.  
The interview questions were already planned according to the key themes 
mentioned in the introductory section of this chapter. Therefore, I was able to sort or 
code the responses into categories fairly easily, cross-referencing them with coded 
events described in my field-notes and ultimately deciding on what to focus on in 
each chapter. For instance, observing the celebration of ‘eid al-adha (the Feast of the 
Sacrifice) in November 2010 on different days prompted questions to ask of both 
ordinary Muslims and religious experts. The attempts made by the mosque imams 
and committees to agree on the same day for the ‘eids were revealed through the 
interview questions, so that the informants shed light on this particular topic. As a 
case study, I reflected upon the incident from its various theological and sociological 
aspects, analysing the content of what people perform as far as their religious beliefs 
and practices are concerned. 
I was able to complete the picture by bringing the responses to certain questions and 
clusters of questions together, and so tried not only to analyse the picture in general 
terms across Sunnis in Leeds, but also in terms of particular ethnic and sectarian 
mosque congregations and in terms of different age groups (the younger generation 
aged between 18 and 40, and the older generation aged 40 plus). I should add that, 
while I was aware of electronic programmes used to code and analyse data, such as 
NVivo, I heard from other researchers that it is not always reliable and judged in the 
end that it would not deliver significant benefits over traditional methods. Reading 
fieldwork notes and interview transcripts repeatedly makes it possible to see various 
issues by looking at them from different angles. Indeed, it is an ongoing process, and 
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so during the writing-up period I constantly found myself having to go back to the 
fieldwork materials, and if necessary went back into the field to verify matters 
through observation or asking questions.  
Despite my being a Muslim, to reflect on the facts is the task for my researcher 
identity as a scholar in the study of religion. I therefore tried to be “neutral with 
regard to questions of truth, maintaining ‘methodological agnosticism’ (Chryssides 
and Geaves, 2007: 40)”. Furthermore, coming from a different ethnic background 
and studying Muslims from the South Asian and Arab backgrounds enabled me to be 
suitably ‘distanced’ in my interpretation and assessment. 
3.3. Conclusion: 
‘Being there’ for me as a Muslim researcher means exploring the complex structure 
of Sunni Muslim communities in Leeds in terms of religious beliefs and practices. In 
the above sections, I have discussed my ethnographic experience of conducting 
fieldwork research in four of Leeds’ mosques. As a ‘participant observer’, my 
observation of  religious rituals and practices and seeking the meanings of them from 
a theological point of view contribute to a better understanding of the religious 
complexity of Sunni Muslims in a local context. Face to face rapport between the 
informants and the researcher during structured interviews verified the data gained 
by participant observation. Collection of additional material in the fieldwork sites 
provided further information for the research. The fieldwork experience and 
methodological strategies are peculiar to the researcher and can give valuable 
insights to others in the field.   
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Having provided this methodological commentary on my fieldwork experience, in 
the four chapters that follow I contextualise, describe and analyse the findings of my 
fieldwork. In turn, my discussion of Sunni Muslims of South Asian and Arab 
heritage in Leeds dwells upon: i) a general mapping of religious diversity in belief 
and practice across the four mosque case studies; ii) an assessment of the state of 
intra-Muslim relations and co-operation with reference to a case study of ‘eid al-
adha; iii) an investigation of the main sources of religious authority for members of 
the four mosque congregations, with a contrast drawn between imams and more 
specialised scholars and the internet; iv) an examination of the significance of taqlid, 










Religious diversity and difference among Sunni 
Muslims in Leeds 
When researching Muslims in non-Muslim countries like Britain, “many Islams” (el-
Zein, 1977) or “Muslim communities” (from different geographies and cultures) are 
often found in the same location. The factors behind the creation of such plural 
discourse are fundamentally to do with the ethnic and religious divergence of the 
Muslim community in the UK Muslim Diaspora. Research about Muslim 
communities in Britain by Lewis (1993) and Geaves (1994) has been especially 
important in terms of defining different religious tendencies in this regard, such as 
the differences between Muslims influenced by the Deobandi, Tabligh-i Jama‘at, 
Barelwi, and Jama‘ati Islami movements (see Chapters 1 and 2 above). 
This chapter aims at demonstrating the religious diversity of the Sunni Muslim 
community in Leeds, which is also ethnically diverse. My main concern is to study 
religious life within the Sunni Muslim community in a non-Muslim country. In doing 
so, I will reflect on my observations and fieldwork experience gained during this 
research to examine Muslim diversity in terms of the religious belief, practices, and 
religious rituals in four different mosque communities, namely Leeds Grand Mosque, 
Leeds Makkah Masjid, Leeds Islamic Centre, and Leeds Iqra Centre. This is because 
the mosque is crucial in shaping religious identity and community development as 
Gilliat-Ray (1994: 205) has argued in the context of Britain. 
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Initially, I will map out Muslim diversity in Leeds by giving a brief history of 
migration and settlement, and attempt to categorise Sunni Muslims according to 
group orientation, both ethnic and religious. I shall introduce the four mosques, each 
of which represents a certain ethnic and religiously oriented congregation. In doing 
so, I am going to seek to identify any religious differences by comparing the beliefs 
and practices observed in the mosques. In the second section of this chapter, I am 
going to discuss briefly the debates and discourses on religious beliefs and practices 
among Sunni Muslims in Leeds. For that, I will benefit from the views of both 
ordinary and expert Muslims from the four different mosques, in matters of daily 
faith, practice and religious rituals.  
4.1. Muslims on a local scale: Muslim diversity in Leeds 
According to the 2001 census, there were about 21,394 Muslims in Leeds,
19
 
amounting to 2.99% of the whole population in the city. A decade later, the number 
of Muslims has reached to 40,772 according to the 2011 census,
20
 being 5.4% of the 
city’s population. In one of the CRP’s research papers, Muslims in Leeds, Ron 
Geaves states that in the censuses of 1971 and 1981 there was no question on 
religious identity. Although the 1991 census had a new question regarding ethnic 
origin, it did not address religion; nevertheless, it did become clear that the number 
of people of South Asian heritage was 20,996, of which 47% were Indian, 44% 
Pakistani, and 9% Bangladeshi. It is estimated that Muslims from India are a small 
minority, while the majority of Muslims in Leeds as elsewhere in the UK are from 
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 See http://www.leeds.gov.uk/Community_and_living/Religions_faiths_and_beliefs.aspx 
(Accessed on 24 March 2011) 
20
 See http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/publications/re-reference-tables.html?edition=tcm%3A77-
286262 (Accessed on 13 December 2012) 
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Pakistan and Bangladesh. The 2001 census gives the following figures for the 
number of other religious minorities living in Leeds: Hindus (4,183), Sikhs (7,586), 
and Buddhists (1,587).
21
 These figures in total are about half of the size of the 
Muslim population in the city. When we consider the 2011 census data, the above 
figures had risen to 7,048; 8,914; and 2,772 respectively. Therefore, the last census 
provides figures for ethnic groups, such as Indians 16,130; Pakistanis 22,492; 
Bangladeshis 4,432; Arabs 3,791; and so on,
22
 that make it impossible to identify the 
exact number matching with the number of Muslims. 
I can say from my own observations and experience of living in the city over about 
five years, from 2007 to 2012, that the Muslim population in the city is increasingly 
multi-ethnic (e.g. not only Pakistani and Bangladeshi, but Arab, Turkish and 
Kurdish). The categories in the last census about ethnicity, such as mixed, white 
Asian, black African, and other ethnicity, are ambiguous in defining the number of 
other ethnicities such as Turkish, Iranian, and Kurdish. However, the multi-ethnic 
Muslim population in the city conforms to the general pattern of Muslim 
communities in other metropolitan cities such as London, Birmingham, and 
Bradford.  
When we examine religion, too, we can see a multi-faceted Islam throughout Britain. 
The main division is between its Sunni and Shi‘a branches. The latter is always a 
minority except in Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Azerbaijan, and Bahrain, and the Shi‘a 
Muslim population in Leeds shows the same characteristics as elsewhere in the 
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 http://www.leeds.gov.uk/Community_and_living/Religions_faiths_and_beliefs.aspx 
(Accessed on 19 November 2011) 
22
 http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/publications/re-reference-tables.html?edition=tcm%3A77-
286262 (Accessed on 13 December 2012) 
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world, being a minority within the Muslim population. There are about 21 mosques 
in Leeds (see Table 1 below); and just three of them belong to Shi‘a Muslims. My 
research has not investigated Shi‘a Muslims, but rather focuses on the Sunni Muslim 
community in the city. 
Figure 1: A map of Mosque Distribution in Leeds (mosques signalled here by 
letters are identified in Table 1) 
 
The main map is retrieved from http://outsizefiles.leeds.gov.uk/maps/leeds_pc.html, 





Table 1: Mosque list in Leeds  






A) Ahlul Bayt 
Islamic Centre  
LS3 1BQ Arab, 
Iranian 
Shi’a Ja’fari Imamiyya 450 
B) Al-Madina 
Jamia Mosque              
LS6 1HR 












LS8 5AJ Somali, 
Arab, 
Pakistani  
Sunni Mixed Salafi 120  
E) Baab-ul-Ilm 









Pakistani Sunni Hanafi Sufi-
Barelwi 
700  




Pakistani Sunni Hanafi Jama’ati 
Islami 
200  
H) Jamia Masjid 
Abu Huraira* 





I) Jamia Tul 
Batool 
LS8 4EJ Pakistani Sunni Hanafi Sufi  200 







Shi’a - Twelvers 250 
K) Leeds Grand 
Mosque* 
LS6 1SN Multi, 
mainly 
Arab 




L) Leeds Islamic 
Centre* 
LS7 4BR Pakistani, 
African 
Sunni Hanafi Deobandi 4700 
M) Leeds 
Makkah Masjid* 
LS6 1JY Pakistani Sunni Hanafi Sufi-
Barelwi 
2700 





Mixed Mixed Mixed 200  




Mixed Mixed Mixed 250 
P) Lincoln Green 
mosque 
LS9 7LY Kurd, 
Arab 
Sunni Mixed Mixed 300  
Q) Makki Masjid 
and Madrasa 
LS6 1NP Pakistani Sunni Hanafi Deobandi 350 
(men 
only) 
R) Markazi Jamia 
Masjid Bilal* 






Note:  The table has been created based on my personal observation and data provided by 
http://mosques.muslimsinbritain.org/maps.php (Accessed on 05 June 2012)  
*Conforming to one or more of Mosques and Imams National Advisory Board (MINAB)’s 
five self regulation and standards.
23
 
The above Map 1 shows mosque distribution in Leeds Metropolitan District, while 
the Table 1 illustrates the ethnic and religious orientations among the Muslim 
communities in Leeds. On Map 1, I have used letters to show clearly the location of 
each mosque using its postcode. As can be seen on the map, the mosques are found 
in densely populated areas, except for the Iqra Centre and Baab-ul-Ilm Muslim 
Community of Metro. 
To date, I have visited all of the mosques mentioned in the table, whether Sunni or 
Shi’a; however, it is not my concern to examine all of them further, nor the Shi‘a 
ones as already mentioned. Instead, I chose four mosques, namely Leeds Grand 
Mosque (LGM), Leeds Makkah Masjid (LMM), Leeds Islamic Centre (LIC), and 
Leeds Iqra Centre (IC) in which to conduct fieldwork research. This is because 
together these mosques are not only palpable examples of at least some key ethnic 
diversity (Arab and Indo-Pakistani), but also - and especially - because they are 
representatives of the aforementioned reformist and traditionalist movements like the 
                                               
23
 http://www.minab.org.uk/self-regulation/standards  (Accessed on 7 June 2012). The 
MINAB’s five standards are: 1) Members apply principles of good corporate governance. 2) 
Members ensure that services are provided by suitably qualified and or experienced 
personnel. 3) There are systems and processes in place to ensure that there are no 
impediments to the participation in the activities, including governance, for young people. 4) 
There are systems and processes in place to ensure that there are no impediments to the 
participation in the activities, including governance, for women. 5) Members ensure there are 
programmes that promote the civic responsibility of Muslims in the wider society. 
S) Masjid Quba LS8 4LG Pakistani Sunni Hanafi Deobandi 300 
T) Masjid-e-
Umar 
LS11 6JG Pakistani Sunni Hanafi Deobandi 560  




Sunni Hanafi Deobandi 810  
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Salafiyya and Muslim Brotherhood, Jamaa’ti Islami, Deobandi-Tablighi, and Sufi 
Barelwi, as we shall see below in more detail.  
4.2. The history of the Muslim presence in Leeds: 
Muslims from the Indian Subcontinent constitute the majority of the Muslim 
population in Leeds and this conforms to the general pattern in Britain. South Asian 
Muslim immigration to Britain mainly comes from the following districts in modern- 
day Pakistan: Mirpur, Campbellpur, Peshawar, Jhelum, Gujarat, and Rawalpindi; and 
Bangladesh: Sylhet (Dahya, 1974: 80; Shaw, 1988: 12-13). In Leeds, Muslims 
predominantly come from the Mirpur and Sylhet districts (Geaves, 1995: 2).  Four 
stages of migration identified by Ballard and Ballard (1977: 51) with regards to Sikhs 
in Leeds can be applied to the South Asian Muslim settlement in Leeds. Thus the 
four stages of migrant settlement may be summed up as involving, firstly, individual 
pioneers; secondly, the larger scale migration of unskilled labour; thirdly, the 
reuniting of wives, children, and other family members; and finally, the development 
of families and of a British-born second generation. Significantly, however, Pakistani 
and Bangladeshi Muslims were later in reuniting their families than the Sikhs due to 
greater religious-cultural conservatism, and this process was not complete until the 
1980s. 
Research by Geaves (1995) provides the early history of Muslim settlement in the 
city from the 1940s. He explains that pioneer migrants initially worked as peddlers, 
then later on set up takeaway and restaurant businesses, as well as finding unskilled 
job opportunities in textile mills and other factories. Their close cooperation and 
bringing of other kin and family members not only from the subcontinent (Geaves, 
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1995: 3), but also from other cities of Britain (Dahya, 1974: 80), is typical of the 
pattern of settlement of Pakistanis and Bangladeshis elsewhere.  
According to Geaves (1995: 9), Muslim self-awareness in Leeds began with a 
Muslim’s death in hospital, in 1953.  The body stayed there for about four days, and 
the hospital somehow contacted another Muslim called Mozifur Rahman (originally 
from Bengal), owner of the Ghulistan Restaurant in Chapeltown Road, to take the 
body from the hospital; otherwise it was going to be cremated. Geaves also quotes 
Mr. Rahman’s experience in finding out that there was no Muslim burial ground in 
the cemetery, and discovering how he could buy a plot there. After getting advice 
from the authorities, Mr. Rahman decided to approach other Muslims and collect 
money to buy the plot. Eventually he managed to buy a plot for twenty people in the 
cemetery. Rahman’s English wife played an important intermediary role in this 
process. 
Subsequently, Rahman tried to make contact with all Muslims in the city and collect 
money in order to open a community centre or mosque where they could come 
together. In 1953, Muslims also formed ‘the Pakistan Muslim Association’ (PMA) 
with Mozifur Rahman as president. For several years they tried to buy a place for 
prayers, but in the city nobody was ready to sell Muslims any property which could 
be used as a mosque. Muslims started to negotiate with the Jewish community to buy 
their old prayer hall. The building at 21 Leopold Street was bought on 26 June 1958 
in order to convert it into a Mosque.
24 The first mosque in the city, the Jinnah 
Mosque, was eventually opened in 1960 through the great efforts of pioneers of the 
Muslim community (Geaves, 1995: 9-11). In the first stage, we can see how ethnicity 
                                               
24
 http://www.leedsic.com/about_us/index.html. Retrieved on 25 February, 2010.  
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plays a pivotal role among Muslims in the city, so that when the PMA tried to bring 
Muslims together, there were different opinions among Bengali Muslims (East 
Pakistanis) who did not wish to involve themselves with the West Pakistani 
Muslims.
25
 There were also theological differences between the two groups, since the 
former had strong links with the 19
th
 century reformers like Karamat Ali (d.1873) 
and Haji Shari’atullah (d.1840), and consequently many Bengali Muslims studied in 
Deobandi Dar al-Ulum centres (Ibid: 9). Geaves maintains that: 
Mozifur Rahman claims that he persuaded the Bengalis to include the West 
Pakistanis in the interests of the Muslim unity...despite slight differences, 
the Bengalis agreed and the Jinnah mosque, the first in Leeds, opened in 
1960. The Pakistan Muslim association ran the mosque with joint trustees 
from the Bengali and West Pakistani communities (1995: 9). 
The early settlers started to pray in the mosque, enjoying some unity because of their 
small numbers despite “Bengali-Pakistani” and “reformist-traditional” (Geaves, 
1995: 9-11) differences. The mosque served the Muslim community of 500-600 
single men and about half a dozen families of the pioneer settlers, and remained a 
focal point for the Muslims in Leeds for many years. Furthermore, it was the main 
mosque until the opening of the Islamic Centre in Spencer Place in 1981. However, 
Muslims could not preserve this unity as civil war broke out between the East and the 
West Pakistanis in the late 1960s. The establishment of the State of Bangladesh in 
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 Tensions between East and West Pakistan existed from the creation of Pakistan in 1947. 
East and West Pakistan were separated by more than 1,000 miles. The two parts of Pakistan 
shared few cultural and social traditions other than Islam. However, the political and national 
aspirations of East Pakistan resulted in civil war in 1971, in due course leading to the 
establishment of Bangladesh as a new state.   
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1971 resulted in the creation of “the East Pakistan Association” and later on the 
“Bangladesh Association” (Geaves, 1995: 12), which broke away from the PMA.  
Thus two typical stages of settlement can be seen in the history of Muslims. Initially, 
small numbers of Muslims associated together regardless of their regional, caste, or 
sectarian origins, thus exemplifying “fusion and cooperation”; then came 
fragmentation as numbers grew, and ties of village kinship and sectarian affiliation 
gradually became more significant as the basis of communal aggregation - “fission 
and fragmentation” (Lewis, 2002:56; and McLoughlin, 2005a: 540). In addition to 
migrant worker settlement in Leeds, a large proportion of international university 
students, mainly of Arab ethnicity, came to Leeds in the late 1970s and 1980s. The 
history of this Muslim settlement in Leeds is largely undocumented. Mr. Hamid, a 
local Pakistani businessman in his sixties states that: 
The Arabs mainly came here to study at the university or the Leeds City 
College, including for post-graduate study. In the 80s and afterwards, Arabs 
were also applying for jobs at textile mills and other factories. Then some 
political asylum seekers from the Middle Eastern countries migrated into 
West Yorkshire, either on kin advice or for any other reasons. The process is 
that firstly, they came here and shared a flat or house with friends and 
relatives, then they got a council house, and finally settled here. Sometimes 
they set up their own business, such as kebab takeaways or restaurants. 
(Interviewed on 17 April 2012) 
Hasib from Syria gives his personal story and mentions other push factors affecting 
the Arab migration to Leeds:  
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In the late 70s and early 80s, I came here for postgraduate study, and as far 
as I know there were many other Arabs who after graduation, either got a 
job or established [their] own businesses...The Iran-Iraq War [1980-88] 
played a vital role in the immigration, especially from Iraq, since many 
migrated for political reasons and to seek asylum in this country. Later on, 
the occupation and civil war worsened the situation and still more Iraqi 
Arabs migrated here, either for political or economic reasons. (Interviewed 
on 11 May 2012) 
Arab migration to and settlement in  the city corresponds to Ballard’s model in that, 
according to the above informants, individual Arabs came to Leeds initially as 
students, asylum seekers, or unskilled migrants. After securing the necessary money 
or accommodation, the Arabs brought their families and relatives. Today, the number 
of Arabs in Leeds is 3,791 according to the 2011 census.  
4.3. Mosques in Leeds: 
With the increase in population, the Muslim communities of Leeds needed more 
places for worship and for educating themselves and their children. Reproduction of 
institutions and networks in the context of Britain, as Joly, (1995: 7) has pointed out, 
“would allow them to carry on practicing religion and culture.” Indeed, it is a 
characteristic feature of migrant Muslim communities in a non-Muslim environment 
that many pioneers, regardless of their educational backgrounds, have considered the 
necessity of establishing a masjid to follow the methodology of the Prophet 
Muhammad when he migrated to Medina. In addition to the basic traditional 
functions, such as the five daily prayers, Friday congregation and sermon, funerals, 
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religious education for adults and youth, and so on, the mosques in Britain are also 
increasingly places for social (marriage, meetings), cultural (lectures, talks, female 
pursuits), and sporting activities (McLoughlin, 2005b: 1048).
26
 
Mushrooming numbers of prayer places and community centres were clearly seen 
amongst the Muslim community in Leeds. In addition to the aforementioned ethnic 
tension between Bangladeshis and Pakistanis, ‘sectarian’ diversity began to appear 
amongst the Muslim community in the city. Some of the Bengali community 
founded another mosque named Shah Jalal Mosque. The Islamic Centre was opened 
by the PMA in 1981 and imams from the Deoband School took positions in leading 
prayers as well as educating children. The Jinnah Mosque was sold back to the 
Bangladeshi community, which renamed it as Al Ameen Mosque.  
International university students and Arab Muslims living nearby Leeds University 
used Omar Welfare House
27
 for social gatherings, meetings, and Friday prayers 
alongside the prayer room at the university. Later on, in 1994, the members of Omar 
House bought a church in Woodsley Road with the intention to convert it into a 
mosque, to be known as the Grand Mosque (Geaves, 1995: 12). In the same year, the 
Pakistani-Kashmiri (Mirpuri) community which uses Bilal Mosque in Harehills 
raised the money to construct the first purpose-built mosque in the city (Geaves, 
1995: 13).  The foundation stone of the new mosque was laid on Conway Road. Now 
                                               
26
 See also a recent report by the Quilliam Foundation, 'Mosques Made in Britain' at 
http://www.quilliamfoundation.org/images/mosques_made_in_britain_quilliam_022009.pdf. 
The Quilliam Foundation is a counter-extremism think tank set up to address the unique 
challenges of citizenship, identity, and belonging in a globalised world (Accessed on May 
15, 2012). 
27
 It was a house located on Hyde Park Road, Burley, functioning as an assembly point for 
international university students.  
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it is called Markazi Jamia Masjid Bilal, with twin minarets and a green dome, and 
has capacity for 3200 people, including women.  
 Geaves (1995: 13) gives an estimate for the number of mosques in Leeds as between 
10 and 12, and now, according to my research, the figure has reached 21. As 
mentioned above, the Muslim population almost doubled between 1991 and 2001, 
and in parallel to this increase, so also the number of mosques has risen. However, 
while the first prayer places used to be small houses converted into mosques, the 
current trend is generally for purpose-built buildings that have the capacity for 
accommodating thousands at the same time.  
All mosques in Leeds provide five times daily and Friday congregational payers with 
a qualified imam, Qur’anic circles for children and adults, other study circles 
(Qur’anic exegesis, Hadith, Sirah or biographical history of the Prophet and His 
companions), fatwas and consultation in family matters (marriage, divorce); and 
some of them also serve as a supplementary school, while only the biggest mosques 
have funeral facilities (washing, burial preparation). Now, after mapping the 
mosques of Leeds, we can focus on our four selected mosques in some detail, 
exploring their history, ethnicity, religious orientation, jurisprudential school, and 
tradition regarding Islamic belief and practices. 
4.3.1. Leeds Islamic Centre (LIC): 
Also known as Central Jamia Mosque, the LIC, as mentioned above, was established 
by the Pakistan Muslim Association (PMA) in 1981, when Muslims needed a bigger 
place than the Jinnah Mosque on Leopold Street (Geaves, 1995: 13). Firstly, 48 
Spencer Place was bought, and then through a step-by-step process next door 
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buildings were added to the Islamic Centre complex
28
 to provide more spaces for 
social, sporting, and educational activities. For example, during a funeral held in the 
Mosque, for about three days the mosque complex provided food while the kin of the 
deceased person accepted condolences in the mosque. The complex was eventually 
completed in 2001.  
Similar to the LMM, the LIC is a purpose-built mosque in the Pakistani construction 
style, and has twin minarets and a dome (see Figure 2 below). With a capacity of 
4700 people, it is the biggest mosque in Leeds. The LIC is a three-storey building 
which consists of three main prayer halls on each floor. The basement is generally 
used as a girls’ supplementary school and is also occasionally used for funeral 
(janaza) prayers. The middle floor is the usual prayer area for men and ablution 
rooms are found on the left-hand side before the main entrance of the mosque. The 
top floor prayer hall is the same shape, except for a hole in the centre so that people 
below can see the dome just as much as people on the top floor can see the imam, 
especially during jum‘ah sermons. The top floor also has rooms used for children’s 
education as a supplementary school for boys and girls separately.  
The mosque is located in the northeast side of Leeds city centre, in Chapeltown, 
where the early migrants settled, and very close to Leopold Street. Lower class 
businesses, restaurants, corner shops, boutiques, halal food and grocery stores, and 
people with diverse ethnic dress styles along the main road, Roundhay, present an 
image as if from Pakistan or the Middle East. The Chapeltown and Harehills areas 
have been places of multi-ethnic migrant communities for decades. 
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 See http://www.leedsic.com/about_us/index.html (Accessed on September 20, 2010). 
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Figure 2: A Picture of Leeds Islamic Centre 
 
The picture retrieved from http://www.leedsic.com/_images/Mosque-Aerial-View.jpg 
by the permission of LIC’s management office. 
The LIC has two official imams, both of whom have graduated from Deobandi dar 
al-ulums, and they are referred to as mawlana. The congregation consists of mainly 
followers of the Hanafi school of law from Pakistan, along with some Afghans, 
Somalis, and a handful of Arabs from North Africa (Tunisia, Morocco). As Geaves 
(1995: 13) has claimed, the centre has been under the influence of Deobandis since 
its foundation, and hosts visiting scholars, tablighis, mawlanas or imams from Dar 
al-Ulum in Dewsbury. Every Thursday evening, people among the congregation go 
to Dewsbury Central Jamia Masjid, next door to the Dar al-Ulum, in order to listen 
to a bay’an or conference and attend tashkeel (a meeting to make a promise to go 
somewhere else for 3, 7, 40 days, 4 months, or 1 year to do tabligh to remind other 
Muslims what a Muslim needs to do to maintain religious identity).  
For Friday congregation, the imams deliver sermons in a mixture of Arabic, Urdu, 
and English. The imam sits on the pulpit (minbar) while he speaks before calling for 
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prayer; and after that he stands up on the pulpit and holds a long stick while 
delivering his Friday sermon, a combination of Arabic praise for Allah and greetings 
to His prophet Muhammad, and prayer for the whole Muslim community. Although 
the imams deliver the first sermon slowly, the usage of two languages causes a lack 
of concentration from the point of non-Urdu speakers. When I asked about the stick 
that the imam holds during the sermon, “it is a sunnah, a practice of our Prophet 
Muhammad (pbuh)” responded the imam of LIC. This is a clearly visible difference 
between the Deobandi (Tablighi) and the other religious orientations in the city. The 
key point is that from the Deobandi point of view it is extremely important that the 
Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad is maintained in such a practice. 
The LIC provides classes for adult men, such as tafseer given by one of the regular 
imams at the weekend, and hadith on Friday evenings given by another expert 
Mawlana Othman, a graduate from Bury Dar al-Ulum, after maghrib or sunset 
prayer. Occasionally conferences and lectures by renowned visiting Tablighi or 
Deobandi scholars are given to the community. However, it seems that the LIC 
mostly allocates its facilities and staff for children’s education.  “More than 600 
children go to the supplementary school under the guidance of male and female 
teachers”, says one of the wardens in the mosque.   
The children are given traditional religious education while sitting down, with long 
book-rests in front of them. The main courses include basic Arabic, to equip them to 
be able to read the holy Qur’an; basic Islamic beliefs and practices, such as the 
principles of Islamic belief (believing in Allah, the prophets, angels, books, fate, and 
resurrection), and the main pillars of Islam (the testimony, prayer, fasting, 
pilgrimage, and alms giving); the history of Islam; and tajweed classes (reading the 
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Qur’an correctly and according to the rules); and learning basic du‘a (prayers while  
performing namaz) and chapters from the Qur’an to be able to read within namaz.29 
4.3.2. Leeds Grand Mosque (LGM): 
As noted above, the LGM was founded in 1994 by members of the Omar Welfare 
House Trust. It was funded by Sheikh Saif Bin Muhammad Al-Nahayyan who is 
from the United Arab Emirates.
30
 The LGM is located in the western part of the city, 
in Woodsley Road, close to both universities and colleges. Halal butchers, together 
with international food stores owned either by Arabs or Indo-Pakistanis, are 
abundant in the surrounding streets. Middle-class businessmen and postgraduate 
university students predominate in this neighbourhood populated primarily by 
Arabic-speaking immigrants from the Middle East and North Africa. 
The mosque is not purpose-built (see Figure 3 below) and consists of a main prayer 
hall; a balcony for women with glassed wall and separate entrance, overlooking the 
main prayer hall; another smaller balcony on the right-hand side for men which is 
sometimes used by women during crowded sessions and prayers; a glassed room on 
the left-hand side of the main prayer hall, used for study circles as well as for prayer, 
especially during winter when the attendance for prayers is low. The mosque has 
capacity for 500 male and 150-200 female Muslims, and sometimes people pray in 
the garden on the grass during crowded Friday and ‘eid (Fitr and Adha festive) 
prayers. Nonetheless, the mosque committee has an extension plan and raises funds 
for that, as announced routinely after Friday congregations.  The mosque has also a 
                                               
29
 This syllabus information is based on an informal interview with one of the teachers in the 
LIC’s supplementary school. (17 November 2010) 
30
 http://www.leedsgrandmosque.com/mosque/history.asp Accessed on 25 May 2011   
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room in the basement which is used as a gymnasium and place for the first mosque-
based Muslim scout activities in Leeds.
31
  
Figure 3: A picture of Leeds Grand Mosque 
 
A considerable number of Muslims from the Malaysian and Indonesian student 
community also live near to the mosque. In addition, English converts and other 
ethnic minorities such as Turks, Kurds, and Muslims from Balkan countries attend 
the mosque for jum‘ah and ‘eid prayers. Considering all this, the LGM is a unique 
place for an international Muslim community in Leeds. It is also important to note 
that female Muslims come to the mosque for daily (five times), jum’ah (Friday), 
tarawih (a sunnah prayer up to 20 rak’ah at night during the holy month of 
Ramadan), and eid prayers. The attendance of women for every prayer in this 
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 http://www.yorkshireeveningpost.co.uk/news/latest-news/central 
leeds/city_gets_its_first_muslim_scouts_1_2080714 (Accessed on 5 October 2011)     
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The dominant language used in the mosque is Arabic, but this is followed by an 
English translation of sermons when the imam finishes his sermon (khutbah). 
Although the imam, Sheikh Muhammad Taher, follows the Maliki school of law in 
practice, the congregation consists of Hanafi, Shafi‘i, Maliki, and Hanbali followers, 
and that is noticeable during congregational prayers. We may cite here some 
practical examples of these differences. During the standing up (qiyam) position 
some people clasp their hands either from elbow to elbow or with their right hand 
resting on their left hand wrist, and then put them in different places such as on the 
chest or just above the navel; some raise their hands before proceeding to the act of 
prostration (sajdah), while some others do not. In terms of expressing their ethnic 
diversity, people come to the mosque in all types of ethnic dress, ranging from the 
thawb or traditional Arab customary wear to Asian styles, and to blue jeans, suits, 
and so on.  
The khutbah or sermon is delivered in very formal Arabic, and consists of two 
sections. In the first, the imam generally touches upon belief matters, such as the 
main pillars of Islam and the requirements of living as a Muslim in this day and age, 
using examples from the Qur’an and Sunnah; and then he addresses current issues 
including injustices towards Muslims in some parts of the world, like Palestine, and 
more recently a number of khutbah have been condemning the dictatorships in North 
Africa and the Middle East. With this feature, addressing the global Muslim 
community (ummah) very frequently, the mosque is distinguishable from the other 
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 See the aforementioned Quilliam Foundation report 'Mosques Made in Britain'. 
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mosques. The second section focuses on the need sometimes to complete the topic 
delivered in the previous section, or gives a brief lecture on a religious practice 
which might be misunderstood or mistakenly implemented, and the sermon then 
finishes with a supplication.  
People come from far afield (e.g. Harrogate and Bradford) to listen to the imam, 
Muhammad, renowned for his voice and recitation of the holy Qur’an. Occasionally, 
Abdullah al-Judai (originally from Iraq), a famous sheikh among Muslims in Leeds 
and member of the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR) and Dr. Hasan 
al-Katib (originally from Iraq), chairman of Leeds Muslim Forum and active in inter-
faith dialogue in the city, deliver sermons in the same format, though al-Katib 
provides  his own translation. 
The mosque has a number of activities including Qur’anic circles for children, both 
male and female; sirah or biography of the Prophet Muhammad in English for 
females and the youth; tafseer or Qur’anic exegesis in Arabic by Sheikh al-Judai; 
tajweed classes (reading the Qur’an correctly and fluently) given by Sheikh Taher, 
and other activities such as conferences, interfaith dialogue, and Islamic exhibitions 
for local schools. It also provides fatawa (plural of fatwa) or legal reasoning, and 




4.3.3. Leeds Iqra Centre (IC): 
The IC was founded in 2001 as a local branch of the United Kingdom Islamic 
Mission (UKIM established in 1962) which is a counterpart of Jama’at-i Islami in the 
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 See more on http://leedsgrandmosque.com/ 
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UK (see Chapter 2).
34
 It is not a purpose-built mosque, rather it is a modern house 
with two floors (see Figure 4 below). The basement has a bookshop, a library with 
study room, washing (wudu’) area, and a prayer hall for women (50-100) with 
separate entrance; the top floor is the main prayer hall with the capacity for 150-200 
people. 
Figure 4: A picture of Leeds Iqra Centre 
 
The IC is located in middle-class Moortown, LS17, to the northeast of Leeds city 
centre, and far from the heavily populated Muslim locations as shown on Map 1. 
However, the IC is the only Sunni mosque in that area and the centre is not big 
enough for the Sunni Muslim population. Hence, the mosque committee and local 
Muslim community are raising funds to construct another mosque in the area. “We 
are planning to build up a bigger education centre and prayer hall close to here [the 
current centre]” says a semi-retired volunteer, Haji Sadiq (interviewed on 15 March 
2011). 
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 http://www.ukim.org/ukim/ (Accessed on 04 May 2010) 
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The attendees are predominantly Pakistani Muslims, and some international Arab 
students come to jum‘ah and ‘eid prayers. Middle class businessmen and highly 
educated Muslims (doctors, engineers, accountants, teachers), as a hallmark of the 
reformist Jama’ati Islami membership profile, were among the attendees when I 
talked with some of them during my visits in 2010 and 2011.   
The congregation are mainly followers of the Hanafi school of law, as in the LMM 
and the LIC, but forty per cent of my interviewees here have responded, as I shall 
discuss in Chapter 7, that they are following only the Qur’an and Sunnah of the 
Prophet, not any particular school of law. The imam of IC is Ershad, who has gained 
his religious education in Markfield Institute of Higher Education (MIHE, see 
McLoughlin, 2005c: 64), Leicester, and holds an MA degree in Islamic Studies from 
Birmingham University. The mosque is unique among Sunni mosques in Leeds, in 
terms of using only the English language in sermons and any other activities. It 
shows how UKIM gives importance to integration to British society as well as 
educating and accessing to Muslim youth. The imam delivers Friday sermons in 
English on current topics and issues in daily life, advising on how to preserve 
religious identity while living in a non-Muslim environment, and on how to represent 
Islam well and positively to the wider community. 
The IC offers a number of social and religious activities such as Qur’anic circles for 
children and adults, study circles for females, including the history of the Prophet’s 
life (sirah), basic Arabic, tajweed, and Urdu for beginners, and other women’s 
activities such as ‘Moortown Community Fair’ as an interfaith activity. It also 





 Similar to the other mosques mentioned above, a supplementary school 
is one of the main functions of the centre, and provides maths and science classes for 
children, in addition to religious education. A highly urbanised middle class Muslim 
population benefits from the mosque facilities not only for religious education but 
also in the form of auxiliary programmes for the formal school curriculum. 
The characteristic feature of UKIM can be seen in any of its branches throughout 
Britain. The motto “to convey the true spirit of Islam to the Western world” 36 is 
always emphasized and the main purpose for all UKIM centres throughout Britain is 
summed up as follows:  
a) The propagation and projection of the true Islamic teachings implicitly 
identifying and exposing concepts and innovatory practices that are alien to 
the message of Islam. b) Demonstrating to the nation's opinion-formers, 
academics, industrialists, financiers, etc that Islam is a timeless and relevant 
problem-solving way of life. c) Providing a valued Islamic education to 
Muslim children living in the UK.
37
 
4.3.4. Leeds Makkah Masjid (LMM): 
The LMM is the third largest mosque in Leeds. Purpose-built, it has three minarets 
and a green dome in the Pakistani architectural style (see Figure 5 below). The idea 
for construction of the mosque goes back to the late 1990s. The previous “small 
Barelwi-oriented mosque, Al-Madina Jamia Masjid, serving the local Mirpuri 
community” (Geaves, 1995: 16) since the 1970s, was not big enough to cater for 
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 http://www.iqracentre.org.uk (Accessed on 27 February 2010) 
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Muslims as the local population had increased dramatically.
38
 Leeds Muslim Council 
(the management committee of al-Madina Jamia Masjid) finally decided to buy a 
place in the area to build a purpose-built mosque. There was only one property on 
sale which was thought to be suitable for the construction of a mosque. It was a 
church that had been abandoned for many years. However, it was a unique church 
with a wooden structure and was a registered listed building, so the plan to buy this 
church, demolish it and build a new worship place for Muslims came under 
challenge. After a long negotiation with the local authorities and MPs, Muslims 
managed to buy the place and started constructing the mosque in 2000. About three 
years later, the project was completed at a total cost of £1.8 million, and the mosque 
in Thornville Road was opened as the Makkah Masjid. 
39
 
Figure 5: A picture of Leeds Makkah Masjid 
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 Al-Madina Masjid still serves the Muslim community in the Hyde Park area, LS6, but it is 
generally used as a supplementary school for children and as a Qur’an school. 
39
 For more information see http://www.makkahmasjid.co.uk/wp/index.php/makkah-
masjid/building-leeds-makkah-masjid/ (Accessed on 21 December 2010) 
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The LMM has capacity to cater for 2700 people. It has three floors: basement 
(kitchen, dining area, and ladies’ hall with separate entrance), the second floor (main 
prayer hall, ablution facilities), and the top floor (including a supplementary prayer 
hall which is used for special days and rituals, and rooms for computers and a 
library). The dome of the mosque is ornamented with calligraphy of Qur’anic verses 
and frescoes in the Pakistani style which constitute an immediately attractive feature. 
In view of its overall presentation and facilities, the LMM has won awards 
40
 from 
several organisations and it is pointed to as a model for prospective mosque 
constructions in future.  
The LMM is located in the Hyde Park area, LS6, close to both universities and the 
city centre, like the LGM. The neighbourhood is populated primarily by those 
speaking Panjabi, Pothwari and, among the more educated, the Urdu religious lingua 
franca from the Indian subcontinent. Halal supermarkets and takeaway shops in the 
surrounding streets are common. People of Pakistani ethnic origin, mainly from 
Mirpur district, predominantly constitute the mosque’s congregation, though some 
other ethnicities and especially university students, such as Indonesians, Turks, and 
Africans, along with Muslim converts, also come to jum‘ah and ‘eid prayers. They 
are only a handful in number and not comparable with the number in the LGM. 
The LMM has a regular imam, Qari Asim, who is a solicitor and succeeds his late 
father, Hafiz Fateh Muhammad, and his role in the community. The deputy imam, 
Qari Qasim, is the younger brother of Qari Asim and is a Qur’an teacher at al-
Madina Masjid in Brudenell Grove. Both imams are hafiz (i.e., they have memorised 
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 The Brick Development Association, Best craftsmanship award for 2003, and Public 
building runners-up, see http://www.makkahmasjid.co.uk/wp/index.php/makkah-
masjid/building-leeds-makkah-masjid (Accessed on 23 December 2010) 
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the whole Qur’an by heart) and they deliver sermons on jum‘ah and ‘eid prayers in a 
mixture of Arabic, Urdu, and English. The mosque congregation and imams describe 
themselves as “Sufi and Barelwi”, or “ahle sunnah wa’l jamaah” (Sanyal, 1996: 68; 
and Geaves, 2000: 75), which latter expression literally means the group of people 
who follow the ways of the Prophet Muhammad. The congregation follow the Hanafi 
school of thought in Islamic jurisprudence, and the prayers are performed by nearly 
everyone according to this madhab. 
Like in the LGM, the khutbah includes general advice aimed to strengthen faith and 
the practice of religion accordingly. In addition to the examples from the life of the 
Prophet Muhammad and His Companions, the prominent Sufi orders’ life and 
suggestions are sometimes pointed out according to the content. Unlike in the case of 
the LGM, the congregation individually pray more sunnah or nafil namaz (not 
compulsory) up to ten rak‘ah (a series of ritual movements which form a part of the 
namaz) after the main prayer fard (obligatory), and the imam makes a small dhikr 
(remembrance of Allah and His messenger) followed by a supplication immediately 
after finishing the fard namaz. Furthermore, while people go out after the whole of 
the namaz has finished, about five or more notable people assemble next to the imam 
and recite durud sharif, salat o salam or some poems by Sufi sheikhs, especially 
those by Ahmad Riza Khan Barelwi (d.1921) to ask intercession of the Prophet, 
which is, as Geaves (1996:106) has observed, the “Barelwi customary na’t in praise 
of the Prophet.” 
In a similar vein to the LGM, the LMM has a number of activities for a range of 
groups from children to adults, including females. Children’s classes are generally 
held in Al-Madina Masjid in Brudenell Grove, and the weekend classes for the youth 
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including both genders take place at Woodsley Multicultural Community Centre, in 
Woodsley Road. Tajweed and tafseer classes are generally given after the month of 
Ramadan by both imams. A number of lecture series are provided by the mosque to 
the community.
41
 These include such things as basic fiqh (jurisprudence), Sufism, 
morals and banner in Islam, spirituality, and so on; conferences, Islamic exhibitions 
especially during inter-faith week, and some gatherings (majlis or procession) for 
milad un nabi (the birthday of the prophet) and urs (death anniversary) of Sufi 
figures and prominent religious leaders. 
4.4. Discourses on religious diversity among Sunni Muslims in 
Leeds:  
The definitive works of Lewis (1993), Geaves (1996), Birt (2011), and Hamid (2011) 
about ‘sectarian’ aspects of South Asian Muslim communities in Britain are 
primarily helpful in terms of understanding the religious tensions between Muslim 
communities. As discussed in Chapter 2, there is a schism between the reformist 
Deobandi-Tablighis, Islamist Jama’ati Islami, and Sufi-oriented traditionalist Barelwi 
groups. My concern here, in this section, is to illustrate the picture of religious 
diversity among the Sunni Muslim communities in Leeds, and to discuss some of the 
common discourses amongst them.   
Initially, when I visited the mosques in Leeds, there was no clear difference between 
them. Having knowledge about Islamic theology, all the differences seem to me 
normal and familiar. For instance, following one of the four schools of law, and 
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performing salat or namaz (prayer) slightly differently according to these schools, is 
well established throughout the history of Islamic Law and is well-known among the 
Muslim community. The overwhelming majority of my interviewees have responded 
that they have great respect for other jurisprudential schools whilst themselves 
following just one of them. In fact this diversity can be seen throughout the whole 
Muslim world as well as throughout the UK. In the past Muslims had the chance to 
see different nations in the same place mainly during the pilgrimage time or through 
trade; nowadays Muslims are everywhere especially in Diaspora, and can witness 
diversity in terms of practicing their religion. This is one of the advantages (and 
disadvantages) of being in the Muslim Diaspora. Thus, the representation of the 
Muslim community in the UK is in some ways a miniature of the whole Muslim 
community of the world.  
Being Hanafi, Shafii, Maliki, and Hanbali is seen as a sign of flexibility and richness 
within Islam, given that ethno-cultural, geographic, and educational differences are 
influential in picking and choosing a madhab (Abu Zahra, 2003). Additionally, 
human nature with its different capacities in perception, reason, evaluation, and 
implementation is another factor in that. It is useful to quote the views of some of my 
informants about this diversity within the Sunni Muslim community. Thirty-three-
year-old Qari Asim, the imam of LMM, who is of Pakistani origin, states: 
Diversity in fiqh matters is good and well established, you know, so certain 
people can follow certain ways and most of the diversity arises because of 
the cultural issues. For example, a family member can become Maliki, the 
rest are Hanafi, and usually there are some diversity issues. But, at the end 
of the day, whoever follows whichever fiqh he should completely act upon 
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it. Regarding belief diversity, Sunni-Shi’a, we would rather not have it, but 
they are so well established in the history, so it is hard to solve historical 
problems... (interviewed on March 27, 2011). 
The current imam of LGM, Sheikh Muhammad (a 42-year-old) states in a similar 
vein:  
We have schools of thought in law, any kind of law, man-made or divine 
law, how people understand the verses, the passages from the holy book and 
practice of the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), is an outcome of human 
thinking and reflecting the rules of Islam, the teaching of Islam. If you said, 
there  is only one saying in Islam, one rule in Islam and every single Muslim 
must practice the same, this would cause lots of problems. Because Islam 
came to different countries, different nations, and people are different in 
their way of thinking, they are different in the way they see things, so this is 
a natural way of thinking about dealing with the verses from the Qur’an and 
the Sunnah. ...the most important thing is to benefit from all of them, not to 
be extreme in sticking to one of them. (Interviewed on May 31, 2011)     
In addition, the imam of the IC centre, Ershad (42 years old) points out that diversity 
in juristic issues is a rahmah (mercy), as the Prophet declared. However, he 
maintains: “Sadly, now because the conditions of Muslims are stagnant, far from the 
true message, people have made it a religion of conflict and a deviant one, which 
should not be the case” (interviewed on April 22, 2011).    
To sum up, diversity in fiqh or jurisprudence is seen by the overwhelming majority 
of my research participants as natural and as a form of flexibility for the benefit of 
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the whole Muslim community, which consists of various ethno-cultural elements and 
religious orientations. From my personal observation, I can say that having such 
diversity in Britain or any other European country enables Muslims to know each 
other better, and to understand the religion more with its universal aspects depending 
on time and place. However, there are some other differences and some more 
controversial issues that I have noticed during my research, and it is these that I am 
now going to sketch. 
4.4.1. Different implementations of agreed religious practices: 
The most visible difference among the Muslim community in Leeds is in the area of 
allocating the time for daily and Friday prayers, the start and end dates of Ramadan, 
religious feasts such as eid al-fitr (at the end of the holy month Ramadan in the 
Islamic calendar) and eid al-adha (held in the pilgrimage month, on the tenth day of 
Dhul-Hijjah). For daily and Friday prayers, each mosque has its own timetable 
according to the mainstream jurisprudential sect and calculation method,
42
 and these 
differ slightly from each other. However, where feast days are concerned, it is a big 
dilemma for the Muslim community. For example, I have observed two different 
days for eid al-adha in November 2010, and although at a glance the difference 
simply comes from their calculation method, nonetheless there are some other 
reasons for that which I will deal with in more detail in Chapter 5.  
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 For instance, traditionally, Hanafis differ from the other three schools about the time of asr 
(late afternoon) prayer that begins when the length of any object's shadow is twice the length 
of the object plus the length of that object's shadow at noon, while the others agree that asr 
time begins when the length of any object's shadow is equal to itself plus the length of that 
object’s shadow at noon. See http://praytimes.org/calculation and 
http://www.islamicfinder.org for more information on general calculation methods and 
institutions used by Muslims in Europe and America. 
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Among the selected mosques, there are noticeable differences in some religious 
practices. For instance, during Ramadan, Muslims prayed tarawih namaz of about 20 
rak‘ah in the LMM, the LIC, and the IC. However, in the LGM, Muslims did 8 
rak‘ah. This prayer is not compulsory as communal prayer, or not obligatory upon 
the person individually. Rather, it is a sunnah prayer in which the Prophet 
Muhammad prayed sometimes 8 rak’ah, and sometimes 20 rak’ah. The diversity 
stems from the application of the Prophet. Thereby, the communities practice that 
differently according to their madhab, whether Hanafi or Shafi’i. However, this 
different practice is not a major issue according to my informants, given that both 
figures were practiced by the Prophet Muhammad, and the prayer itself is not fard 
(obligatory).  
Another issue for religious practices is that of jam’ or amalgamation of two daily 
prayers, that is to say noon (duhr) and late afternoon (‘asr) prayers in the winter 
season; and sunset (maghrib) and late evening (ish’a) in summer. This 
implementation is generally made in the LGM by Arabs. It is well established by the 
Shafi‘i school of thought, and commonly used by its followers as well as by Malikis 
and Hanbalis; in the Hanafi school of thought it is only used twice a year during the 
pilgrimage due to the task of performing hajj duty and lack of time.  
The reason behind this implementation in Islamic jurisprudence is to make things 
easier for Muslims, if there are bad weather conditions, such as strong wind, rain, 
snow, flood, etc, and time constraints  in carrying out a religious duty or travel. As I 
shall discuss this practice in more detail in the context of Britain (see Chapter 6), I 
am content here simply to provide a very brief account about it. These are the main 
visibly different implementations among Sunni mosques as far as religious practices 
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are concerned. Such differences are commonly known and acceptable among the 
Sunni Muslim communities, whereas differences in belief lead to more genuine 
division within the communities. 
4.4.2. Differences in belief matters: 
Muslims from the Indian subcontinent brought their established debates with them to 
the UK. It can be seen from the history of Muslims in Leeds that as well as for 
reasons of ethnic hostility, traditional Barelwis (who happen also to be mainly 
Pakistanis) and reform-minded Deobandi/Tablighis (who also happen to be 
Bangladeshis) were reluctant to come together in Jinnah Mosque, even for prayers, 
and then each group started building up their own mosques. The most noticeable 
difference in beliefs among Muslims is the Barelwi-Deobandi conflict. There are still 
ongoing debates between the Barelwis and Deobandis, with the result that each group 
has its own arguments and justification for its belief and practices. The main 
discussion revolves around the perception of Prophet Muhammad, in matters such as 
celebration of his birthday, or his attributes as mentioned in the Qur’an (see Metcalf, 
1982: 301; Robinson, 1988: 9). On the one hand, the Barelwis identify themselves as 
true representatives of Sunni Islam in the UK. This allows them to counter the reform 
groups’ central criticism that their Islam is impure and full of innovations and 
cultural accretions, on the other. They also accuse the reform groups of being 
Wahhabis. The ‘ulama’ of Bareilly dar al’Ulum in general have issued fatwas that 
declare that Wahhabism is outside the fold of Islam (see Geaves, 1996: 103-4). 
When I was visiting the mosques in Leeds, I came across people vigorously talking 
about the opposing group’s religious understanding and rituals. For example, in the 
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LIC, a medical doctor associated with Deobandi-Tabligh-i Jama’at said to me, “Be 
careful with Ahmads from the Indian subcontinent: Sayyid Ahmed Khan, Ghulam 
Ahmed, and Ahmed Reza Barelwi”, highlighting the last one. For the doctor, the 
followers of Ahmed Barelwi created a number of bid’ah or innovations in Islamic 
belief and practices such as visiting graves and asking help from awliya, or saints 
who are dead. Thus, they are committing shirk (associating Allah with awliya or 
saints) according to the doctor. In similar vein, another attendee (a graduate from the 
Dewsbury dar al-‘ulum) of the LIC claims that “Barelwis have a belief that the 
Prophet Muhammad is hazir [present], nazir [observant], alimu’l ghayb [has 
knowledge of unknown], and is khayr al-besher [the best of humanity].” The debates 
in 19
th
 century India (Metcalf, 1982: 301) transferred to Britain are still alive among 
the South Asian Muslim communities. In this section, I propose to discuss the main 
divergence between the Deobandis and Barelwis, based on my observation and 
research in Leeds. 
Firstly, milad un-Nabi - also known as mavlid, the birthday of the Prophet 
Muhammad on the 12
th
 of Rabi‘ul-Awwal in the Islamic calendar - has been 
celebrated by many Muslims for hundreds of years. There are many poems written 
about the birthday of Prophet Muhammad, and known as mavlid-i sharif or sacred 
birth in the Islamic literature. From my observation in the LMM, I have witnessed a 
gathering similar to the programmes held in Turkey
43
 for celebrating the birthday of 
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 Süleyman Çelebi’s mavlid-i sharif, written in the 15th century, is still recited in the 
mosques throughout Turkey not only for the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad, but also for 
some special occasions such as a wedding, circumcision and  after the funeral while offering 
condolences. Each year since 1989, the middle of April has been dedicated as “happy 
birthday week” (Kutlu Doğum Haftası) by the Presidency of Turkish Religious Affairs and 
celebrated throughout Turkey, the Balkans, and wherever the Turkish communities live in 
the West. see http://diyanet.gov.tr 
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Prophet Muhammad. The top floor in the LMM was beautifully decorated with nice 
lights and big posters, and suitably dressed with perfumes. People entered the 
mosque one by one, and the imam of the mosque opened the programme by 
emphasising the importance of the celebration. Famous speakers and a qari (who 
recites poems or narrates examples from the life of Prophet Muhammad) from 
Pakistan were the guests for the programme. The programme began with reciting a 
passage from the holy Qur’an, and the guests took to the stage in turn. During the 
recitations, people donated money to the speakers, either dropping it in front of them 
or giving it to the imam after shaking his hand.       
The programme ended with an invocation with salawat (or darood, greetings to the 
Prophet Muhammad) performed by an elderly scholar. After the programme, the 
attendees were invited to a festive dinner in the basement; traditional Pakistani food 
was served for the attendees. This is the general picture from my observation, and the 
imam of LMM, Qari Asim (a 33-year-old), explains the claims of other religious 
groups, [such as Deobandis (Metcalf, 1989: 310) and Wahhabis] about the Barelwis:  
All these issues revolve around the personality of the Prophet Muhammad 
(pbuh). Of course, Barelwis do not say the Prophet is equal to Allah who is 
khaliq [creator] and the messenger is makhluq [creation], but he is not like 
other creations. He is like a jewel, for although a jewel is stone we still do 
not call it stone, since it is a jewel. That is the difference.  
It can be understood from the quotation that there is great love for the Prophet, not 
shirk, (to attribute a partner to Allah); otherwise they would become mushrik 
(someone who attributes a partner to Allah), thus turning their backs on the Islamic 
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religion. In Islamic belief, if someone says, “I bear witness that there is no God but 
Allah, and again I bear witness that Muhammad is His messenger and slave” nobody 
can say kafir (infidel) or mushrik about that person as he declares himself as a 
Muslim. If somebody says differently to this, he or she puts his/her belief in danger 
according to classical Islamic theology (kalam) sources.
44
  
Having described the major conflicts between Barelwis and Deobandis, it is 
worthwhile here to relate my experience of witnessing a sort of ‘unity’ between these 
two groups in a religious ritual. Once I was in the Islamic Centre, at a noon prayer, 
and there was an announcement that a young person had passed away and his janaza 
namaz or funeral prayer was going to be held in Masjid-e Bilal, a Barelwi mosque in 
Harehills. The imam of LIC encouraged the congregation to attend the funeral, so I 
attended too. It was surprising to me that a Deobandi congregation went to a Barelwi 
mosque for a prayer far removed from all religious tensions. While we were going to 
the cemetery, the driver informed us that Muslims from the Bangladeshi Community 
attended the funeral, too. They prayed together, made supplication together for the 
dead person to be forgiven by Allah, and went to the cemetery together. Although the 
funeral lasted several hours, the congregation from the Islamic Centre was there for 
that period. This religious ritual proves, in fact, that there are not too many 
differences between these two groups. Conversely, there are many commonalities 
between them, such as coming from the same ethnic background and culture, 
following the same school of thought, speaking the same language, living under the 
same circumstances, and so on. The incident is important in terms of contextualising 
                                               
44
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Imam Abu Hanifa; Aqidatu’t-Tahawiyya by Abu Ja’far at-Tahawi; Kitabu’t-Tawhid by 




different religious elements of the Muslim community in Leeds. To an extent, similar 
unities in the public sphere as well as in religious beliefs and practices could prove 
beneficial, not only “acting according to what Islamic faith requires” but also 
“representing Islam or tamsil to the wider society” (Ramadan, 1999: 146-7). 
However, according to an ordinary Muslim among the LGM’s congregation, 27-
year-old Hamid who describes himself as early Salafi or Ahl-e Hadith, both the 
Deobandis including Tablighis and Barelwis are ahl-i bid’ah. For the former group, 
he claims, “they invent things about awliya or Sufism, and the founder of Tablighi 
Jama’at, Muhammad Ilyas, had a dream and acted upon it by organising people 
around him.” He maintains, with regard to the Barelwis, that “they openly go to 
Shrines and ask help from dead people, and they are like the mushriks [pagans] of 
Mecca.” Thus, according to the informant, these groups invent bid’ah in religion and 
violate the creed of Muslims (interviewed on February 3, 2011). I also heard some 
Arab students saying that the reason for them not going to the LMM for prayer was 
simply that [the Barelwis] are mushrik. By contrast, I have witnessed the Barelwis 
describing the LGM as a Wahhabi mosque established in the city to foster its creed 
amongst the Muslim communities. 
4.5. Conclusion:  
This chapter has presented some insights into the religious life of Muslims in Leeds, 
where the number of Muslims is increasing day by day. I have attempted to show the 
multi-ethnic and religious diversity of Muslims in Leeds, a smaller scale of Britain’s 
overall Muslim picture, by mapping the most visible site for religious beliefs and 
practices, namely the mosque. I can conclude that the mosques in Leeds, from the 
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early, pioneering establishments until today, have been used for various functions 
such as religious, educational, social, sporting, and cultural activities. In all these 
aspects, the mosques are very similar to the description of the first mosque 
established in Madina, Masjid-i Nabawi, when the Prophet Muhammad migrated 
from Makkah. Thus, the mosques are found to be the central point and focus for 
Muslims who live in non-Muslim countries.   
Having studied four different mosques in terms of their ethnic and religious 
orientation in this chapter, I have tried to show the pluralism among the Muslim 
community that exists in terms of belief and practices at a local scale. In fact, having 
a multi-ethnic Muslim population with different religious orientations in the same 
locality is an opportunity for Muslims to know each other better and to be aware of 
other religious beliefs and practices among the whole Muslim community. This is 
one of the biggest advantages of living as Muslims in a non-Muslim country, and it 
teaches Muslims to learn about the flexibility of Islam and also its universality. At 
the same time, however, the absence of religious authority has had a crucial role and 
importance in bringing about the further fragmentation of Muslim communities in 









Muslim relations with other Muslims and the wider 
society 
In the previous chapter, we have seen from examples of the ethnic and religious 
diversity among Sunni Muslims in Leeds that being in a non-Muslim country like 
Britain enables Muslims to see ethnic, cultural, and religious components of Islam in 
the same place. These elements of Islam are barely visible in a Muslim country. 
Muslims have been used to seeing ethnic and religious diversity during the hajj 
(pilgrimage) season for a short term. Trade links and educational establishments have 
provided other exceptions (Eickelman and Piscatori, 1990:5) to this generalisation, 
too. However, I can argue that Muslims in Europe – numbering over twenty million 
(Nielsen, 2004:161) - have seen this diversity more routinely in the Muslim 
Diaspora. In Britain, the 2,706,066 Muslims (according to the 2011 census
45
) 
constitute a large portion of this total figure. 
Ethnic and religious diversity amongst Muslim communities can lead to 
‘exclusivism’, so that some Muslims may criticise other Muslims from different 
backgrounds, claiming that they show a type of deviancy from the true path. It is no 
exaggeration to say that this is the general character of Muslims living in Western 
countries. In an effort to counter such attitudes, contemporary reformist Tariq 
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286262 (Accessed on 13 December 2012) 
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Ramadan emphasises that one of the priorities for Muslims living in Europe is ‘intra-
community dialogue’. He maintains that: 
We must not be naive: the intentions of all the actors on the European scene 
are not always pure and innocent. Some are prompted by love of power and 
prestige, others are commissioned and controlled by foreign, if not 
sometimes national, governments to direct and master the process of 
organisations and the implantation of different Muslim 
communities...(1999: 219-20). 
While some of these forces are beyond the scope of this study, in this chapter I will 
explore the role of religious issues as an obstacle to good relations between Muslims, 
especially in relation to efforts to set up intra-faith dialogue between Muslims on 
matters of religious belief and practice.  
This chapter investigates the intra-faith dialogue of Sunni Muslim communities in 
Leeds. I begin by discussing the background to the problem, and then try to illustrate 
a local example to intra-Muslim relations for unity. To do so, I will examine the 
celebration of ‘eid al-adha (Festival of the Sacrifice) as a case study, and will 
illustrate the divergence between Sunni Muslim communities in celebrating this ‘eid, 
which in 2010 began in Leeds on two different days. In the light of my fieldwork 
research, I will continue with my approach of reflecting the opinions of both ordinary 
Muslims and religious experts from the selected mosques. I will demonstrate the 
handicaps faced by Muslims at the personal level and community organisational 
level when pursuing intra-faith dialogue. I will also describe what kinds of attempts 
are being made in order to achieve unity in such religious beliefs and practices. The 
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chapter concludes with a reflection on the Leeds Muslim Forum, which was 
established in 2001 as a vehicle for Muslim communities in Leeds to co-operate in 
communicating with the wider society. I argue that although the diversity of 
conventional religious practices (e.g. being Hanafi or Shafi‘i) is seen as normal 
among Sunni Muslim communities as shown in the previous chapter, nevertheless 
unity in faith matters is almost impossible and is only achieved temporarily in 
exceptional situations, as we shall see in the establishment of LMF later on in this 
chapter. 
5.1. Intra-Muslim interactions in Britain: 
A variety of social, ethnic and religious values and approaches means that Muslims 
can never be a homogeneous faith community in Britain. Customary and culturally 
mixed religious practices and beliefs, the power of ethnicity over religion, 
misconceptions and prejudices, all play a crucial role in this. Typically, in the early 
stages of settlement, Muslims of different backgrounds engaged in a temporary 
fusion of perspectives out of necessity, for example in terms of sharing the same 
mosque space. However, when communities grow, and material self-interest and 
competition for scarce resources are at stake, the common bonds of Islam are often 
trumped by other bonds, as can be seen in the conflict between Somalis and 
Bangladeshis in Tower Hamlets in East London (Ansari, 2004: 3-4). As far as ethnic 
interest is concerned, a similar tendency can be seen in divisions between Pakistanis 
and Bangladeshis in Leeds (see Chapter 4).  
Muslim identity represented in Britain or elsewhere does not necessarily mean 
‘Islam’ itself, for this is rather an understanding and expression that varies from one 
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culture, social group and individual to another. Anthony Cohen’s comparison 
between symbols and grammar makes sense in this context. According to him,  
Learning words, acquiring the components of language, gives you the 
capacity to communicate with other people, but does not tell you what to 
communicate. Similarly with symbols: they do not tell us what to mean, but 
give us the capacity to make meaning. ...But it must again be emphasized 
that the sharing of symbols is not necessarily the same as the sharing of 
meaning. People’s experience and understanding of their community thus 
resides in their orientation to its symbolism (Cohen, 2001: 16). 
Likewise, being members of a universal Muslim community (ummah) also exhibits 
“important aspects of self-awareness and understanding” (Geaves, 1996: 54) in 
religious identity. Thus, the representation of Islam in Britain at both local and 
national level is, in reality, quite far from the universal norms of the “ideal ummah” 
(see ibid, p.10). The name of the symbol (Islam) is being shared, but the meanings 
attached are diverse. 
Until reaching the third phase in Roger and Catherine Ballard’s migration model 
(1977: 51), Muslim communities generally shared Islamic symbols such as masjid, 
salat, jum‘ah congregation, sawm (fasting during the Ramadan), regardless of ethnic 
and linguistic differences. The main purpose was to preserve religious identity, by 
sharing the very fundamentals of religion with other Muslims regardless of 
differences. However, in the third phase, the arrival of families and children 
witnessed both a growth in numbers and a shift in “self-perception from being 
sojourners to settlers” (Lewis, 1994: 56) which increased the tendency to reproduce 
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“ethnic” and “sectarian” (Lewis, 1994: 56; Geaves, 1996: 160) fragmentations that 
already existed in the homeland. In Chapter 4, we have witnessed this feature in the 
settlement of Sunni Muslim communities in Leeds:  
The Muslim communities in Britain are still very localised. They are formed 
along local as well as national lines. They are often structured around a 
handful of families who have all migrated from the same small group of 
neighbouring villages. It is kinfolk, the village and the biradari network 
which command their attention...The above characteristics of the Muslim 
population in Britain have resulted in the presence and proliferation of a 
diverse range of ethnic concerns. These have kept the communities 
relatively closed since the migrants do not have to go outside their 
boundaries to satisfy everyday needs (Geaves, 1996: 72). 
Of course, Mirpuris, Bengalis or others are a small element of the universal Muslim 
community (ummah). However, even in a broader frame, the ummah can still be seen 
as comprising many discrete and particular local communities which share the 
symbols of Islam and identify themselves as Muslims in different ways. The 
influence of Western colonialism on the Muslim lands since the seventeenth century, 
with its consequent by-products such as nationalism and secularism, has also divided 
the whole Muslim community into nation-states (Donohue and Esposito, 2007: 3-4), 




As regards intra-Muslim interactions, there are undoubtedly a number of verses from 
the Qur’an and examples from the life of the Prophet Muhammad that refer to the 
natural differences among Muslims. 
O humankind! Surely We have created you from a single (pair of) male and 
female, and made you into tribes and families so that you may know one 
another (and so build mutuality and co-operative relationships, not so that 
you may take pride in your differences of race or social rank, and breed 
enmities). Surely the noblest, most honourable of you in God’s sight is the 




There are also some sayings of the Prophet Muhammad about equality within the 
Muslim community. For example, it is reported that in his farewell pilgrimage the 
Prophet said: “there is no superiority of an ‘Arab to an A’jem (non-Arab), nor an 
A’jem to an Arab. The superiority is only in taqwa (piety) in the sight of Allah.” In 
spite of these clear religious injunctions  from the Qur’an and Sunnah, there is still a 
tendency amongst some Muslims, and of course human beings more generally, to use 
differences in religion to exclude others, for example, from the so-called ‘own true 
path’. 
In Britain, the conflict amongst Sunni Muslim communities revolves mainly around 
anti-Sufis and Sufis, reformist thought and the Sufi way of life. The former always 
criticises the latter for innovating (bid‘ah) religious rituals. Geaves states:  
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 In this study, as a reference, I cite verses from one of the more recent translations of the 
Qur’an: The Quran with Annotated Interpretation in Modern English, trans. by Ali Unal 
(New Jersey: The Light, 2007). 
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Essentially, organisations that are critical of Sufism fall into two categories: 
those opposed to Sufism in any form such as the Wahhabi and Salafi 
movements, and those opposed to popular Sufism as represented in shrine 
worship such as Tabligh-i Jamaat and the Deobandis ...and some other 
reformed Sufi tariqas (some Naqshbandis and Tijaniyya) (2000: 53).  
The discussions and controversies between the Sunni Muslim communities revolve 
mainly around the labels of ‘Wahhabi’ and ‘Sufi’, though the terms used for each 
other are a misnomer. For example, as Geaves (2000: 54) has noted in terms of the 
former, “the variety of organisations so labelled may have little contact with each 
other and cannot be described as ‘Wahhabi’ in the strict use of the term.” Thus, the 
“so-called Wahhabi” term may include the movements that range from the 
Deobandis (who emerged in nineteenth-century India with an agenda to preserve 
Islam via correct religious education) and its offshoot preaching group Tabligh-i 
Jama‘at (Metcalf, 1982), to political and ideological movements such as Jama‘ati 
Islami (Nasr, 1979)and Hizbut Tahrir (Taji-Farouki, 1996). And more recently a new 
revival of the movement known as Salafiyya (Meijer, 2009), which was originally 
based on the teachings of Muhammad Abduh and Rashid Rida, “has emerged with a 
particularly virulent anti-Sufi rhetoric which has reopened the historic conflicts 
between the Barelwis and the Deobandis imported from the Indian subcontinent” 
(Geaves, 2000: 53-4). 
Based on my personal experience (of being here in the UK about five years) and 
based on fieldwork research carried out from 2010, I have barely come across fellow 
Muslims who say that “besides us, other Muslims are practicing true Islam.” Instead, 
what they claim is based on  simplistic  labels such as ‘innovators’, ‘imitators’, 
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‘Wahhabi’, ‘Deobandi’, ‘Barelvi’, ‘Salafi’, ‘secularist’, and so on. The reality is that 
many Muslims routinely define themselves in relation to ‘other Muslims’ who are 
presumed to be in error. Furthermore, the usage of “takfir language” to claim that 
other Muslims, who disagree with them, are in fact infidels, is the extreme form of 
such discourse. Yasir Suleiman, professor in the Centre of Islamic Studies, 
Cambridge, has carried out a project called Contextualising Islam in Britain: 
exploratory perspectives.
47
 The report emphasises the importance of getting away 
from this (takfir) language, and of being aware of religious pluralism within the 
Muslim community. The report further states: 
The political context for the “them and us” language is that many Muslims 
feel disempowered and experience a lack of confidence in their Muslim 
identity. It is important to have an internal mechanism that provides this 
confidence. There are two aspects to this. Internally, it is a question of 
accepting one’s own difference, working out a way to understand and be 
proud of oneself, without sealing oneself off from the rest of society. 
Externally, it means that Muslims need to participate in and play a role in 
forming the public debate on pluralism and moral engagement (2009: 42). 
A decade prior to this report, reformist Tariq Ramadan had also issued a general call 
for European Muslims to take the opportunities for ‘intra-community dialogue’ in 
Europe, where Muslims must live with Islamic difference. 
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It is becoming urgent, at least at the local level, to resume dialogue within 
the Muslim community. The stakes are far too important and the challenges 
far too serious for us to go on ignoring, criticising and fighting one another. 
Judgements on institutional or dress appearances, on real or supposed 
national allegiances, on genuine or contrived Islamic belonging, should no 
longer prevent those who advocate the idea that it is possible to live in 
harmony in Europe from holding a dialogue, acting in concert and 
exchanging views (Ramadan, 1999: 220).  
The possibility of intra-faith dialogue in the Muslim Diaspora is indeed subject to the 
necessity of a “culture of dialogue” (ibid, p.220) or an “ethics of how to disagree” 
(Suleiman, 2009: 42). This is because sustained attempts at interaction across the 
most significant Muslim religious and ethnic divides in the context of national level 
representation of Muslim communities have so far failed, as we have witnessed in 
Chapter 2. However, Islam still becomes the main identity for many Muslims in 
Britain at times when they have been attacked as such by others, for instance during 
the Rushdie affair (Ansari, 2004: 4) but also more significantly since ‘9/11’ and 
‘7/7’, or to a lesser extent whenever there is a strong need to communicate on an 
issue of rights or recognition with the wider society. 
In such contexts, there have been instances of co-operation between Muslims, 
although rather than dialogue there has been a strategic stepping away from religious 
differences to enable the greater good of the community. For example, like councils 
of mosques up and down the country, the Bradford Council for Mosques (BCM) was 
constituted in 1981 as an elected body to represent Muslim congregations in the city 
comprising the aforementioned ethnic and sectarian components (Lewis, 1994: 143). 
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Advocating Muslim rights, especially concerning education, halal food and the 
Honeyford Affair (ibid, p.147), the BCM played a vital role in temporarily 
transcending the Deobandi-Barelwi split, and during the Rushdie Affair launched a 
national-level campaign (ibid, p.160). Nonetheless, the BCM could not bring all 
Sunni Muslim communities together on religious practices, such as the salat 
timetable and the dates for starting Ramadan or celebrating the ‘eids (see ibid, 
p.171). This clarifies the reality that, while representing a space ‘beyond 
sectarianism,’ it lacked the religious authority to allocate a precise time for very 
common religious practices in the same locality. The same could be argued, too, of 
Muslim umbrella organisations on the national level, such as the Muslim Council of 
Britain, although it represents an alliance of reformists (McLoughlin, 2005c, 2010). 
In what follows is a case study examining the disagreement within the Sunni Muslim 
community on such religious practices in Leeds.  
5.2. Local-level presentation of Muslims’ intra-faith relations and 
interactions with the wider society: 
As regards religious belief and practices, the most visible aspect of diversity amongst 
Sunni Muslims in Leeds can be seen in terms of the timetable for rituals, for example 
daily, Friday and the ‘eid prayers. Despite sharing a madhab and living in the same 
locality, ethnicity and particular religious orientations ensure that there are 
divergences in belief and practice as well as over authority. For instance, a religious 
expert, Sheikh Muhammad (42), describes the ethnic character of the Muslim 
communities in Leeds: 
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The Muslims are not united in religious practices. They are disunited 
because it is the way they have grown up. Typically, here, they follow 
imams of the masjid, the local community. I mean the majority of the 
Muslim community is Pakistani, and they are from the same origin, so they 
are relatives, uncles, nephews, nieces, and this is how they are mixed. So if 
they are praying in a local masjid, and the imam says to them: tomorrow is 
eid and we are going to celebrate eid, they feel okay, and they do not care 
about what others are doing because they are connected, they are family. 
For example, [this is the case] in Beeston. In Dewsbury they are mainly 
Gujarati Indian background and they feel okay because they will celebrate 
in Dewsbury and they do not care about the rest (interviewed on May 31, 
2011). 
As clearly indicated in the above quotation, the Muslim community in Diaspora, 
wherever its country of origin, still emphasises ethno-cultural aspects of the religion 
as far as religious belief, practice, and authority are concerned. In Chapter 4 I have 
presented an overview of the local Sunni Muslim communities by introducing four 
different mosques representing the ethnic and religious diversity. I have also 
discussed some key points in differences of religious beliefs and practices. Here, in 
this section, in order to understand the religious diversity more comprehensively, as a 
case study, I have examined an important celebration and congregational prayer,  
namely the ‘eid al-adha, in the life of Sunni Muslims in Leeds. In the first section 
(5.2.1), I will reflect different attitudes of selected mosques towards defining the time 
for the ‘eid prayer. I will also reflect the views of ordinary Muslims regarding that 
difference. In the subsequent section (5.2.2), I will examine the views of ‘ulama 
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including the mosque imams and religious experts on the diversity of times set for 
such a ritual. I will also investigate what attempts have been made so far to create 
unanimity in celebrating such a ritual and starting Ramadan at the same time, in the 
same locality. 
5.2.1. A dilemma for the Muslim community in Leeds: When shall 
we celebrate ‘eid al-adha this year? 
The disagreement over the day of ‘eid al-adha is a regularly occurring conflict 
amongst Muslim countries, and hence there is an implication for that in the UK too. 
In 2010, Leeds Grand Mosque (LGM), Leeds Islamic Centre (LIC), and Leeds Iqra 
Centre (IC) prayed and celebrated the ‘eid along with Saudi Arabia, on 16 
November. In contrast to these mosques, Leeds Makkah Masjid (LMM), and 
consequently other Barelwi mosques, prayed a day later, on 17 November. The 
controversy over the day of ‘eid al-adha for Leeds’s Sunni Muslims turns on the 
Barelwi-Deobandi and Sufi-Wahhabi conflict elaborated briefly above (see more 
details in Chapter 2).  
On the one hand, the LGM, LIC, and IC simultaneously announced that Saudi Arabia 
had confirmed the day of Arafat, the ninth of the month of Dhul-Hijjah (in the 
Islamic calendar) on which one of the obligatory (fard) parts of the hajj is held, as 
being 15 November according to the hajj authority in Saudi Arabia.
48
 Therefore, the 
claim was made that the day after would be ‘eid, and so it should be celebrated on 16 
November. On the other hand, the LMM justified itself with an explanation about the 
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 http://theislamicnews.com/saudi-arabia-announced-eid-al-adha-on16th-november/ 
(Accessed 15 November 2010) 
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sighting of the new moon for Dhul-Hijjah, the first day for this month. After listing a 
number of different countries with Muslim populations that celebrate the ‘eid on the 
same day as LMM, its website says:  
This is not an exhaustive list but confirms that the majority of Muslims are 
celebrating Eid on Wednesday 17th November. This includes the Muslims 
of Pakistan, Malaysia, Indonesia, Morocco, India and Bangladesh, where 
moon sighting rather than calculation for the presence of the new moon is 
used to determine the start of the new months, in accordance with the 
Prophetic Sunnah. Of note, the 10 official Saudi sighting committees did 
NOT see the new moon on Saturday 6th November (which is not surprising 
as it was scientifically impossible to do so, and means that the first of Dhul 
Hijjah should have been Monday 8th November and thus Eid on Wednesday 
17th) but as usual some spurious reports of sighting were accepted.
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Thus it was that Muslims in Leeds who have different ethnic and religious and 
geographic backgrounds prayed and celebrated the same ritual on two different days. 
It is noticeable that, despite the majority of the congregation in the LIC and IC being 
of South Asian ethnicity, these mosques united with the Arabs in following Saudi 
Arabia in the hajj timing there. Here, I attempt to find answers to what has been done 
by Muslim communities in order to be united in the time of ‘eid al-adha or ‘eid al-
fitr (the end of Ramadan), and whether any dialogue or initiative has been held to 
prevent disagreement in the city. This was something I discussed with the imams of 
the aforementioned mosques in Leeds. 
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The imams confirmed that there is a debate about the methodology of identifying the 
time for the start of Ramadan, and then for the two ‘eids. Concerning Muslims in the 
UK Diaspora: a) some follow the closest Muslim country’s method of sighting the 
moon, which is Morocco; b) some follow Saudi Arabia since it is the home of 
Islam’s two holiest cities, and is the location within which the hajj pilgrimage is 
actually performed;
50
 c) some rely on a combination of more local sighting and 
scientific calculation;
51
 and d) some follow their country of origin (such as Pakistan, 
Bangladesh, Iraq, etc.). In Leeds Muslims currently tend to follow b, c, and d. 
However, two points are key.  
Firstly, the sighting of the new moon methodology (ru’yat-i hilal) is based on a 
Prophetic tradition that suggests “when you see the crescent, begin fasting; and when 
you see the crescent again break the fast (‘eid). If the weather is cloudy, complete 30 
days of Sha‘ban, then begin fasting.”52 In fact, there are a number of controversial 
views about physical moon sighting that branch out into the question of whether only 
one sighting anywhere in the world is enough for the whole Muslim community, or 
whether each locality should have its own local sighting (Shah, 2009: 9-13). 
Secondly, as to the astronomic calculation, it differs from one country to another 
because of the globe’s shape, as can be seen in the diversity of local times. Islam is 
not incompatible with positive science and astronomy, so if it is scientifically proved 
that the days of Ramadan commence and finish at a certain time, then it should not 
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 www.croydonmosque.com/pdf/The_History_of_the_UK_following_the_Saudi_Arabia.pdf 
(Accessed on 21 April 2011) 
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 See some well-known moon-sighting organisations such as www.moonsighting.com; 
www.islamicmoon.com; and www.icoproject.org. 
52
 Compare the prominent hadith books: Sahih al- Bukhari, 2 Vols. (Miṣr [Egypt]: al-
Maṭbaʻah al-Bahīyah, 1343 [1924]), Vol.1 p.215; Sahih al-Muslim, (al-Qāhirah: Dār Iḥyāʼ 
al-Kutub al-ʻArabīyah, 1955), Vol.2, p.757-8; and Al-Muwatta, (Cairo: Dār Iḥyaʼ al-Kutub 
al-ʻArabīyah, 1951) p. 286. 
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be a problem for Muslims to abide by local timing in every part of the world as they 
do five times daily for prayer (salat). As a result, the first point is the fundamental 
method for Muslims since it based on the Prophet’s application. For the second, 
despite there being no specific rule forbidding the use of scientific calculation, 
Muslims avoid using it.  
Historically, the early jurists, including Hanafis, Malikis, Hanbalis and some 
Shafi‘is, agreed upon ‘the unity of horizons’ [only one sighting anywhere in the 
world is enough for all Muslims in different places], but later on the majority of 
Shafi‘i scholars stated that each locality has its own local sighting, like having its 
five times daily prayer timings, namely fajr, zuhr, asr, maghrib, and ‘isha (see Shah, 
2009: 9-11). The last view, ‘the diversity of horizons’ (ikhtilaf-e metali‘) gained 
more credibility over the centuries until the twentieth century. However, in the 
second half of that century, religious affairs ministries of the majority of Muslim 
countries organised international meetings to reach a resolution for beginning the 
month of Ramadan and ‘eid days. A number of discussions were held at meetings in 
Kuala Lumpur (1969), Kuwait (1973), Istanbul (1978), Dakar (1985), Jeddah (1985), 
and finally in Amman (1986), with the decision shown below being agreed in the last 
meeting: 
1) All Muslims should abide by this decision if the crescent is seen 
anywhere in the world, since the relevant Prophetic traditions (on starting 
Ramadan and announcing the two ‘eids) are addressed to all the Muslim 
community, and the ikhtilaf-e matali‘ (diversity of horizons) is not 
considered valid anymore. 2) The determination (of the beginning and 
ending for the fasting and the feasts) must be based on ru’yati hilal (moon 
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sighting), but one may benefit from astronomic calculations and data which 
do not contradict the Prophetic tradition.
53
 
However, despite the above ‘decision’, in reality the majority of participant countries 
still apply their own rules, as can be seen by the different ‘eid day celebrations across 
the Muslim world. Nonetheless, within a Muslim country, different practices on the 
timing of eid are rarely seen since there is a national religious authority, whether the 
state itself or the related presidency of religious affairs, and so Muslims follow the 
decision taken. Local sighting of the new moon or astronomic calculation binds 
Muslims who live in the same country. However, amongst the Muslim communities 
living as a minority in non-Muslim countries, following the decisions taken in their 
home countries makes the situation even more complex. 
General calls by “the Fiqh Council of North America (2006) and the European 
Council for Fatwa and Research (2007)” to use astronomical calculations for precise 
dates (Shah, 2009: p. 87 and p.140, respectively) alongside the sighting of the new 
moon with the naked eye have not yet solved the timing issue. As a result, for a 
Muslim who lives in the West, the situation is more problematic and confusing: 
whose ‘eid day is correct? What if I am in the wrong? These and similar questions 
are naturally raised by the Muslims. 
In terms of Islamic law, during Ramadan, a believer must not break the fast, neither 
the first day nor the last, since it breaches the Qur’an- based rule “Whoever of you is 
present this month (Ramadan), must fast during it” (2: 185) and its implementation 
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 See full list of the participant countries in 'Hilal', in Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı İslam 
Ansiklopedisi (Turkish Religious Foundation Encyclopaedia of Islam), ed. by the Foundation 
Committee (İstanbul: Türkiye Diyanet Vakfı, 1998). 
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by the Prophet. However, a believer must not fast on the first day of the two festivals 
(‘eid al-fitr and al-adha) according to the Prophetic tradition (Sahih Al-Bukhari, 
p.223; Sahih Al-Muslim, p.803-4; Al-Muwatta‘, p. 300), either. Furthermore, 
regarding the sacrifice, the Prophet ordered anyone who had slaughtered an animal 
before ‘eid salat (prayer) to slaughter another, as the previous one had no religious 
value, but was merely normal meat.
54
 As a result, a religious person might ask this 
question: I live in the same city as other Muslims; I am going to celebrate ‘eid al-
adha a day earlier than other Muslims do. If I am wrong about the determination of 
the correct date, my sacrifice will be invalid. Thus, Muslims in the same locality put 
their religious rituals in danger if there is confusion. However, if all Muslims are 
united in the same locality and yet are mistaken, it would not be a problem when we 
consider the objectives of Islamic law (maqasid al-shari‘a).55 
5.2.2. The views of ordinary Muslims and religious experts on 
celebrating ‘eid al-adha on different days: 
After giving this theological overview, I can go back to my case study in Leeds 
where the situation of Muslim communities conforms to the general patterns 
mentioned above. Typically, ethno-cultural and religious diversity shows itself in 
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 A couple of traditions are narrated in this regard: “Anybody who slaughtered (his 
sacrifice) before the prayer should slaughter another animal in lieu of it, and the one who has 
not yet slaughtered should slaughter the sacrifice chanting Allah's name on it,” and “The first 
thing to be done on this day (first day of Eid al Adha) is to pray; and after returning from the 
prayer we slaughter our sacrifices (in the name of Allah) and whoever does so, he acts 
according to our Sunna (traditions) and whosoever slaughters before the prayer, then his 
performance of the rite is nullified and he has presented just the meat to his family.” See, 
Sahih Al-Bukhari, p.114. 
55
 Muslims in a Muslim country must obey the rulings and decision taken by the religious 
authority. Different dates for the eids between Muslim countries is normal. However, if there 
is a disagreement within the same country, it will be problematic in the sense that creating 
schism in the same religious practice, as far as Islamic law is concerned.  
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following a particular country for religious rites. Arabs follow Saudi Arabia; South 
Asians follow Pakistan, Bangladesh, or India. However, in terms of religious 
orientation, within the community of South Asians, reformists at the LIC (Deobandi 
and Tabligh-i Jama‘at) and the IC (Jama‘ati Islami) prefer to follow Saudi Arabia 
like the LGM, because the hajj duty is performed in this country according to its 
calendar. A week before ‘eid-al-adha, the websites belonging to the above-
mentioned mosques announce that the ‘eid day is to be confirmed when Saudi Arabia 
declares it. The 63-year-old religious expert, Dr. Hasan al-Katib, a member of the 
congregation at LGM and one describing himself as an active member of the Muslim 
Brotherhood, says: 
Of course, we should be united in localities; we should be united in Leeds 
and Britain, since as one country we have one timing. [But], there are some 
hierarchies, you know, leaders who might lose their respect or command of 
the people if they follow others. ... ‘eid al fitr is isolated, but [with] ‘eid al-
adha they should try more to agree with the rest, so this is unfortunate and 
this indicates how traditional they are. 
This quotation suggests that Muslims in Leeds are divided in terms of competing 
religious authorities and between reformists who follow Saudi Arabia and 
traditionalists who do not. Another religious expert from a reformist background, 
Ershad (42) from the IC, argues that: 
This is the problem that every Muslim, whether a common person, a 
scholar, a labourer, or very highly educated person, feels the need to solve, 
and, what I think is that we should have some sort of mechanism to make it 
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together. There is a lot of discussion about how we do it, but this is not right 
because we are giving the wrong message towards children and the wider 
society as well, so it is not a good message of Islam, either. Because people 
make jokes a lot by saying, you know, ‘there is the moon’, ‘we cannot see 
the moon still’, or ‘when is your moon coming’?   
Especially “in local schools non-Muslims are really confused with different days for 
the ‘eid, and, as a result, religious holidays for Muslim pupils ... it is a shame for us” 
says taxi driver, Haji Abdurrauf (54-year-old), a member of the congregation at the 
LIC (interviewed on 19 March 2011). Another ordinary Muslim from the Sufi-
Barelwi tradition, Shahsat (a 24- year-old working in a supermarket), states: 
I think Muslims should leave their practical agendas aside and for the sake 
of the community, not community for the sake of akhirah (the hereafter), 
leave their differences aside and come together... I am shocked that in Great 
Britain we have three different starting days for Ramadan (interviewed on 
February 10, 2011).  
As mentioned earlier, the Muslim communities in Britain use different reference 
points in identifying the time for religious practices. Following the Prophetic sunnah 
method, sighting the new moon with a naked eye, a problem occurs because clear 
visibility of the moon is almost impossible in Britain as the weather is frequently 
overcast. Alternatively, the nearest Muslim country is made a reference point for 
timing of religious practices. One of the leading religious experts in Leeds, Qari 
Asim (34), from a Sufi-Barelwi background, states that: 
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Muslims in Britain used to follow Morocco about 25 years ago. You look at 
astronomy here that says it would have been visible; albeit you cannot see it 
with the naked eye because of the clouds. Others say, you know, it comes to 
schools of thought, because of the very strong Saudi followers, who say 
forget Morocco, forget science - just follow Saudi Arabia. Now it is hard to 
believe, but if Saudi Arabia is right, if they do everything fine then it is not 
[going to] become an issue here. Because Saudi Arabia is in the east the sun 
rises there and the moon in the west, and astronomic data says that there is 
no chance, you know, it would have been seen in Saudi Arabia. And Saudi 
Arabia, I think, has 14 committees, one in Riyadh, one in Makkah, one in 
Madina, and others, and all of them say, “No, we have not seen the moon,” 
but then one person goes to court and says, “I have seen it” and they say the 
shahadah (testimony) of a Muslim testimony and that is the end of it... 
And there are no logical people to ask why we have all [the] technology and 
why are people in these committees here [Why we rely on only one person's 
observation]. That is again because of the other divisions: people are blind, 
following their own school of thought or groups, they do not want to hear 
someone else, and they do not care what others do. That is the key issue 
affecting representation of Muslims in this country. 
This quotation summarises what is going on among the Muslim community in Leeds, 
and more broadly in the UK. Every Muslim community knows that there is 
something wrong in terms of implementation, but the problem is over whose 
argument is correct and who is going to decide that. The absence of a single religious 
authority is the main factor. In addition, ‘blindly’ sticking to traditions and close 
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links to home countries are other factors that have influenced Sunni Muslims in 
Leeds.  
According to the above statement of Qari Asim, Muslims follow Saudi Arabia 
blindly, or because of their school of thought. It is true that, according to prominent 
scholars in Saudi Arabia, (apart from the method of the Prophet Muhammad in 
identifying the beginning of Ramadan), other methods, for instance astronomic 
calculation, is in the category of an innovation (bid‘ah)56. Meanwhile, however, the 
Saudi scholars do not necessarily say that all the Muslim community or other 
countries must follow Saudi Arabia on that day. Rather they advise that Muslims 
should follow the opinion of their Muslim ruler if there is a disagreement on seeing 
the moon; and that in a non-Muslim country, they should follow the decision taken 
by the local Islamic centre.
57
 
On the other hand, although the European Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR) 
rejects a lay person's sighting of the new moon (2007, fatwa book 2, fatwa 8) and 
encourages the communities to utilise modern scientific calculations in accordance 
with the Prophetic method, Muslim communities (e.g. the LGM) insist on following 
Saudi Arabia, not only during Ramadan, but also eid al-adha. The statement of 
                                               
56 The Permanent Committee for Scholarly Research and Ifta' has issued a relevant fatwa, 
and concluded that to use another method would be an innovation while there is clear 
evidence from the sources of the Islamic religion. Therefore, in practice, the Prophet 
Muhammad never linked moon sighting to any astronomical calculations or the movements 
of the stars. This methodology has also been applied by the Rightly-Guided Caliphs and the 
Four Imams (Abu Hanifah, Malik, Al-Shafi’i, and Ahmad), and the Salaf, the early pious 




 Ibid, see more fatwas under Group 1, Volume 10: Zakah and Sawm, Sawm, The new 
moons, different places of sighting the new moon and astronomical calculations. 
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another religious expert, Mawlana Yousef, ex-imam of the LIC, reflects some other 
facts affecting South Asian Muslims: 
History and family traditions have value; many Muslims here prioritise 
family and culture other than the religion. Islam on the TV and Google, 
these are really jahalet (ignorance) contradictory to Islam. Regarding ‘eid 
al-adha, two years ago we tried to solve this problem. Followers of the 
Tablighis and Barelwis, moon community or moon sighting, we only 
discussed [these] but no solution came out. 
No matter who they are, whether Barelwi, Deobandi, or any other orientation, every 
Muslim complains about the practice of sticking to the customs and tradition blindly 
in the context of Britain. Certainly, there have been attempts to come together and 
solve the timing problem for the beginning and ending of Ramadan, and the day of 
sacrifice, as Mawlana Yousef pointed out. From an ordinary Muslim’s point of view, 
that of Mukarram (37), a self employed and regular  member of the congregation at 
the IC, it is difficult to come and negotiate with other Muslims in order to solve such 
problems. He further states:  
To be honest, the organisation that I work with, this is Jama’ati Islami, we 
try our best to sort these differences out, like I said, we try to provide a 
platform like an umbrella organisation for all the organisations to come 
together and, you know, solve the problems... For example we have about 
two or three eids every year, so last couple of years we have been trying 
hard to sort these differences out. Okay, fine, one is saying that we should 
follow Saudi Arabia; the other one is saying that no, we should go with the 
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local observatory. You know, we do not call these two different views as 
wrong. Okay, the only difference is a scholarly matter, but why cannot we 
sit on the table and sort these out? We tried that, a couple of years ago, we 
held a kind of meeting for all the scholars, but is not easy, not very easy to 
solve problems, we tried our best, but inshallah [if Allah wishes] one day 
they will... (interviewed on April 18, 2011). 
One such meeting, on 11 October 2006, was held in the LMM with the attendance of 
delegates from 12 different mosques (including the other three mosques selected for 
this research). It brought together Pakistanis, Indians, Bangladeshis, and Arabs. The 
delegates included the imams and the committee members of those mosques, as well 
as Muslim councillors from Leeds City Council, including Councillor Javaid Akhtar, 
Councillor Kabeer Hussain, Councillor Mohammed Rafique and the Lord Mayor of 
Leeds (2006-2007), Councillor Mohammed Iqbal, as well as  public attendees 
numbering in total 200 people.
58
 The attendance of local politicians illustrates that 
having different ‘eid days in the city is not only a religious matter, but also a social 
problem that needs to be resolved. 
The meeting was also aired live on Radio Islam FM, which was broadcasting Islamic 
programmes in Leeds during the month of Ramadan, and played a central role in 
organising and inviting the mosques to this meeting. Initially, the delegates agreed on 
following the formula which takes the closest Muslim country, Morocco, as 
reference point. This country also uses the methodology of sighting the new moon as 
an indication of the start and end of the month of Ramadan. In the first session, 
                                               
58
 See www.makkahmasjid.co.uk/wp/index.php/2006/10/16/a-meeting-for-a-united-eid/ 
(Accessed on 20 November 2011). 
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which lasted about one hour and a half, all participants agreed to apply the new 
formula. However, in the second session some mosque delegates (the LIC and Shah 
Jalal Masjid) suggested that the new formula should not be followed for this ‘eid, but 
for the next one, because the meeting was held within Ramadan and these mosques 
had started fasting by following Saudi Arabia. Thus, they disagreed on the feast day 
(‘eid al-fitr) for that particular Ramadan (with the other mosques).  
Jurisprudential aspects of fasting 31 days were also discussed, in terms of the 
scenario that would arise if the new crescent moon was to be seen on 22 October in 
Morocco. In that case, the representatives of the LIC and Shah Jalal Masjid 
suggested that the congregation in their mosques would have fasted 31 days if they 
agreed to celebrate ‘eid with the others. In the Islamic calendar, a month might be 29 
or 30 days, never 31 days. As a result, the delegates proposed another meeting to 
come together and solve this issue after ‘eid al-fitr. However, they were 
unsuccessful. Since then, like the international-level meetings mentioned earlier, the 
mosques have been utilising their own formula, whether following Saudi Arabia, 
Morocco, Pakistan, and so on. Furthermore, Sheikh Muhammad (42), from the LGM, 
narrates his own observation and experience:  
We tried to meet with the mosque imams and religious experts, in the 
Islamic Centre and Makkah Masjid. And straight away from the first hour, 
they started discussing things and disagreed, straight away. Because they 
came with [the intention] not to agree, they love to discuss it, Deobandi, 




I tried to establish a working [agreement] between [us and] Makkah Masjid. 
We agreed to start the Ramadan on the same day and celebrate ‘eid al-fitr 
accordingly, and ‘eid al-adha together. They said, “Okay”, but after a while, 
they said, “Oh, hang on a minute, will you celebrate ‘eid al-adha with us or 
with Saudi Arabia?” We said, “If the hajj day is on Saudi Arabia we 
celebrate ‘eid al-adha”, and they said, “Okay, we will not follow Saudi 
Arabia”, so we could not establish an agreement on unity over one single 
prayer timetable. 
From the other side, one of the deputy imams of LMM, Qari Qasim (32), also 
describes this situation in a similar vein:  
It is quite sad that the differences exist on such an important matter, ‘eid or 
fasting, which is so fundamental. Two-three years ago we tried to get all 
different mosque imams and leaders, community members to have one ‘eid 
that would be ‘eid al-fitr. The meeting took place in Ramadan, so we had a 
big discussion that concluded that we are going to follow this, you are going 
to follow that. Those dialogues have been taking place, but no one is willing 
to leave their point of view. I do not know how this problem is going to be 
got over. 
Nobody wants to abandon their own point of view; nobody is satisfied with the 
situation, either. However, every single community is a part of this dichotomy. In 
fact, Muslims in Leeds feel uncomfortable having different days for the ‘eids, but are 
hopeful that one day this problem will be solved, even if they do not know how. 
While everybody has a bias and justification for whatever they believe and practice, 
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there is no binding religious authority for them as the case in any other cities, such as 
Birmingham, Bradford, and London, in Britain. Some religious experts suggest, and 
for example, Sheikh Muhammad (42) argues, “the problem I think should be 
resolved through the community leaders, imams, scholars and the chairmen of the 
Islamic centres”. Qari Asim (34) points to current problems Muslims have in Britain: 
Muslims really need to focus on their education, they need more intra-
dialogue, but [there is] lack of knowledge, ignorance of each other which is 
breeding hatred and causing animosity. Intra-dialogue will be improved; 
Muslims need to show, you know, they are one community and that others 
(the wider society) [should] take notice of them. Blind imitation, because 
you are not strong enough, you are afraid to lose what you have, can only be 
destroyed with education.   
To sum up, despite efforts to hold intra-faith dialogue on the timing issue for 
commencing the month of Ramadan, and determining ‘eid days, such efforts have 
resulted in disappointment. In the year following my fieldwork research, 2011, 
mosques and organisations did the same thing, and started fasting and celebrating 
‘eids on different days. An obvious point to make is that there is no organisation or 
body which encapsulates all Muslim groups in Leeds, even though Leeds Muslim 
Forum (established in 2001) may suggest itself as a unifying organisation at first 
glance. However, as we shall see in the following section, in the same way as the 
Bradford Council for Mosques (Lewis, 1994: 145), it was mainly an attempt to 
communicate a common Muslim point of view to the wider society and local 
authorities. Sunni Muslim communities have also formed organisations which seem 
to include all Muslims in Leeds, such as “Leeds Muslim Council (established as a 
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charity in 1982)”59 and the “Muslim Society of Leeds (founded in 2003, as a 
charity),”60 but they are not as inclusive as their names suggest. 
5.2.3. Leeds Muslim Forum: an umbrella body for interactions 
with the wider society at the local level 
In this section, my aim is not to investigate interfaith activities in Leeds, nor to 
discuss theoretical and theological issues, as a recent research project (Prideaux, 
2008) has thoroughly investigated these. Rather, my concern focuses on the history 
of the formation of a local representative body to manage Muslim interactions with 
the wider society. Leeds Muslim Forum (the LMF) is an establishment similar to the 
BCM (Lewis, 1994: 143), in that it seeks public recognition by putting aside 
religious and ethnic differences; however, it is not a very active body compared to 
the BCM, as we shall see below. 
In the aftermath of the 9/11 bombing events, the frequent visits of non-Muslims and 
especially the media to Muslim places of worship compelled Muslim communities to 
form an organisation to address issues raised by the wider society. The first chairman 
of LMF, Dr. Hasan al-Katib from LGM, describes the formation process:  
The Muslim community found themselves generally under attack by the 
media, which were accusing Muslims of doing the bombings, and as such 
newspaper representatives and reporters used to visit the mosques and 
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 It is the management committee of al-Madina Masjid and Leeds Makkah Masjid, and 
mainly focuses on children’s education in Leeds, LS6 and surrounding areas. See more 
information at http://www.makkahmasjid.co.uk/ 
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 It is aiming to “develop and implement initiatives which shall enhance and enrich the 
education, training, employment, health, cultural recreational needs of the local and wider 




question their imams about the event. Most of the imams are not equipped 
to handle the media, and even most of them do not speak fluent English, but 
have only concentrated on the duty of leading prayers and being concerned 
with the circle of Islam. ...So, when the media come to the imam, the imam 
refers them to the management committee, and the management are not 
necessarily fully aware of Islamic teachings, you know. ...the mosque 
committees called for a meeting and they sent representatives for the 
meeting, and they decided the best thing to do is to form a group that will 
take care of the media, answer their questions, and possibly organise other 
activities if they find it necessary. The group used to meet at the Pakistani 
Community Centre, next to Bilal Mosque but independently of that.  
Dr. al-Katib himself in fact attended the second meeting, which was held in the same 
place, and he was elected as chairperson for the Forum, in 2001. Although there were 
other candidates from the Pakistani Muslim community for this role, the votes cast 
were substantially in favour of Dr. al-Katib. At that time, Arabs were considered as 
being far removed from the Deobandi-Barelwi conflicts. According to Dr. al-Katib,  
they found it a safe selection to have a representative from Arab ethnicity, 
and as well as being Arab, someone active in the mosque, it was ideal. I was 
active amongst the Asian Muslims since I came to Leeds in 1991; you know 
I had about 10 years’ experience and contacts. Amongst the Arabs, I was 
possibly the most known to them. 
After having a number of weekly meetings, the LMF’s constitution began to take 
shape, consisting of four sub-groups. One group would deal with the media, either 
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writing articles or answering the reporters’ enquiries. The second would handle 
issues concerning children’s education, including communicating with local 
education authorities. The third one concerned activities for Muslim women, and the 
last one inter-faith activities. There was no fixed venue for the forum meetings, 
which took place sometimes in the Pakistani Community Centre, or in the Arshad 
Chaudry accountants’ office on Roundhay Road, and sometimes at the homes of the 
group members. There was an attempt to establish a centre for the forum on 
Roundhay Road, but since the activities declined in parallel with the interest of 
Muslim communities, this idea did not go any further. Financially, the forum was 
supported by local businessmen.  
The forum only attracted interest among Muslims in its early days, and later on with 
the 7/7 London bombing events; otherwise interest and participation gradually 
declined. Dr. al-Katib maintains,  
we really wanted to get involved and organise functions at each of the 
mosques, but the members of the mosques also pulled out, not attending the 
meeting, so they lost interest. They felt that we were taking over their role 
by functioning in the mosques through organisations and events. Because of 
the background and their different way of thinking, you know, that is why 
they have become like ghettos, you know... We came back to life again with 
the 7
th
 July event, which was far more dynamic than the event of 9/11, 
because the suspects in this event came from Leeds... 
It was the personal endeavours of Dr. al-Katib to interact with other faith group 
representatives within Leeds Faith Forum (the LFF, a local interfaith organisation 
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established in 1997 to promote better understanding of the diverse ethnic and 
religious communities of Leeds) that initiated a public meeting in the Millennium 
Square to condemn the terrorist attacks. He states further, 
the Faith Forum stood beside us, defending our community, because we are 
all against such kinds of acts and our principles are against it, and this is in 
general how we showed that we share a lot of values.  
The LMF was involved in inter-faith activities with the LFF at the organisational 
level, because the latter is not open to the public. There is another interfaith group in 
Leeds, Concord (www.concord-leeds.org.uk) that is open to individuals from any 
faith group. Generally, the selected mosques for this research, except the LIC, are 
involved in interfaith activities with this group. To mention a few activities for 
interfaith, they  consist of visiting the worship places, exchanging knowledge about 
belief and practices, holding school exhibitions and carrying out other common acts 
of goodness  in local neighbourhoods such as visiting elderly and sick  people. 
It was the LMF that acted as the representative body for Sunni Muslim communities 
in Leeds in participating in interfaith activities throughout the city. According to 
Prideaux (2008: 211), the most notable formal interfaith activity across the city was 
in the form of the ‘Trust or Terror’ meetings between Christians and Muslims in the 
aftermath of the 7/7 bombings event. Later on, the interfaith activities focused on 
knowing more about each other’s faith.  For example, one such event was held in the 
LGM on 24 November 2010. There were two representatives: one, the Catholic 
David Jackson, introduced a report called “Meeting God In Friend and Stranger” 
written by Catholic bishops; and the other, the Muslim, Dr. Hasan al-Katib, 
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introduced a book called “A Common Word”, written by 100 prominent Muslim 
scholars around the world. Both representatives focused on commonalities as human 
beings being challenged by the same circumstances in the world.  
The LMF’s activities gradually decreased because of the lack of interest from the 
Muslim community in general and the inactivity of the subsequent chairpersons, 
according to Dr. al-Katib. He maintains that: 
Many others and I thought to select someone to inject new ideas and put life 
in the LMF, so we elected someone who was originally from Malaysia. He 
never called any meeting nor did anything. I even tried to involve Leeds 
Faith Forum, and managed to get a Chair[person] on the board to come 
together and create ideas, and again he pulled away due to his busy work 
commitments... So we carried on about 10 years, and it [the LMF] closed 
down...Possibly it was being the chairman of the [Leeds Faith] forum that 
made me more known to the community and when I got more known to the 
local authority, Leeds Faith Forum at one stage was asked to send a 
delegation to represent the faith in the city. They had an executive board 
representing all the leadership in the city, like the vice-chancellor, the 
director of housing and commerce, so all were represent there. And I was 
there, and another priest representing faith in the city. So we became more 
known to the people who are involved in politics, so I am still getting 




The life of the LMF lasted about ten years as the representative body for Muslim 
communities in Leeds, and the only legacy remaining from that period is the person 
of Dr. Hasan al-Katib and his efforts and activities in the cause of interaction with 
the wider society. 
5.3. Conclusion 
This chapter has sought to describe the place of intra-Muslim interactions in the life 
of Sunni Muslims in terms of religious beliefs, practices, and the representation of 
Muslim communities to the wider society. We have reviewed the reality of religion 
in the context of Britain where the Muslim society consists of multi-ethnic and 
diverse religious components. Ethno-cultural differences and different religious 
orientations prevent Muslims from pursuing any possible intra-faith dialogue at the 
local level.  The need for ‘an ethic of how to disagree’ is the key element for the 
Muslim communities to practise intra-faith dialogue. To sum up with the statement 
of Qari Asim: 
We should understand each other’s position better. If we disagree with the 
people we should disagree in a [certain] way, [but] we should not try to cut 
them off. Actually we have a register of exclusion, we very quickly exclude 
people, and takfir [blame for being infidel] is very common, yeah, [but] we 
do not have a register of inclusion, and we do not include people. Although 
he is not doing the same thing as me, he is still a Muslim, is [the meaning 
of] that inclusion.     
The case study conducted in Leeds during ‘eid al-adha in 2010 has indicated that 
Muslim communities find it extremely difficult to unite over the timing of a religious 
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practice, which must be fulfilled at the same time by people living in the same 
geographical location, according to Islamic Law. Moreover, in the absence of one 
single religious authority for all, nobody wants to abandon his own point of view. 
Attempts at ‘united Ramadan and ‘eid’ meetings in Leeds culminated in 
disappointments for the organisers and the society generally. As for the interactions 
with the wider society, the creation of the LMF was merely a product of push-pull 
factors, given that the wider society’s demands compelled the Muslim community to 
form it. Once it had completed its immediate mission after the 9/11 and 7/7 bombing 











Religious authority among Sunni Muslims in Leeds 
In Islam, the ultimate source of religious authority is unambiguous. As a guide to 
how believers should behave, the Qur’an proclaims its religious and moral authority 
based on its being the very word of Allah (kalamullah). The word ‘kalam’ is one of 
the attributes of Allah according to Islamic theology, meaning that Allah talks with 
the believers via His books, and explains the books by sending the prophets amongst 
the believers. Consequently, the supreme religious authority is Allah; and the 
messengers deliver the message, interpret the verses, and apply that teaching to their 
own and their followers’ lives. After the death of the Prophet Muhammad, it was his 
sunnah including his sayings, approvals, and advice to the Muslim community, that 
continued with this mediator role. As far as producing religious rulings or deriving 
the rules from the Qur’an and the Sunnah is concerned, the ‘ulama bear in mind first 
that they should do as the prophet said: “the scholars are the heirs of the 
prophets.”61 
Although there is no clergy class in Sunni Islam, the ‘ulama include the imam or 
sheikh (who leads the prayer and gives sermons), the mufti (who gives fatwas), the 
‘alim (scholar), the mujtahid (who derives rules from the sources and updates 
existing ones in line with the current age), and others
62
 all play a pivotal role as 
religious authorities for Muslims. In non-Muslim countries, like Britain, mosques 
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have a special institutional importance in terms of observance of religious duties, as 
we witnessed in Chapter 4. Consequently, mosque imams as the first line of religious 
authority for the congregation are often the leading voices to guide Muslims and 
direct them in practicing their religion, though their qualifications to do so can differ 
quite dramatically (Barton, 1986; Lewis, 1993 and 1994).    
In this chapter, I shall begin with a discussion of religious authority in Islam in an 
historical context, examining key developments from the early days of Islam until 
today. To discover what religious authority is for Sunni Muslims in Britain, I will 
first introduce the four imams of the selected mosques, whose different ethnic and 
religious orientations were reflected in Chapter 4. I will compare them in terms of the 
functions they perform at the mosque and their impact on the mosque attendees as 
sources of religious authority. Thereafter, I will review the content of religious 
rulings and advice given by the imams to the Sunni Muslim community in Leeds, 
and give some examples of fatawa (plural of fatwa) issued in the context of Britain. 
In particular, I will benefit from the fatawa of two important religious figures who 
reside in the vicinity of Leeds, namely Sheikh Abdullah al-Judai and Sheikh 
Abdurrahman.
63
 The former has issued fatawa as a member of the ECFR, and is also 
official mufti of the LGM. The latter is a Deobandi scholar and I will reflect on my 
observation of his conference presentation at the LIC on 12 December 2010. I shall 
also include a section about the usage of the internet as a source for religious 
authority. In all of the above, I am going to provide an account of the patterns of 
religious authority among Sunni Muslim communities in Leeds. 
                                               
63 This is not real name of the sheikh, it has been created to anonymise him.   
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6.1. Religious authority in Islam: 
The primary sources of Islam, the Qur’an and the Prophet Muhammad’s Sunnah, 
have been the religious and moral authority for believers since the religion was 
revealed to the Prophet Muhammad in 610 A.D. However, for the last two centuries, 
debates and disputes over the ‘ulama as traditional representatives of religious 
authority have been common, especially amongst reformists. As I discussed in the 
first chapter of this thesis, Muslims have faced a number of economic, political, 
social and cultural as well as religious transformations in their encounter with 
modernity, and certainly from the 20
th
 century religious authority has been 
challenged and reshaped with the formation of nation states, mass education, 
individualisation, scientific secular thinking, and so on (Rahman, 1979; Kurzman, 
2002; Rippin 2003). Some legal positions, such as those of legal jurists, qadis or 
juristconsults, and muftis under the religious banner, either disappeared or were much 
reduced from their earlier authoritative roles in Muslim lands. Subsequently, a 
number of disputes arose between modern state structures as a new source of legal 
authority and a segment of traditional authority (the ‘ulama). 
Moreover, as Zaman (2009: 2007) has pointed out, “the [position of the] ‘ulama was 
scarcely uncontested before the emergence of the college- and university-educated 
new religious intellectuals” who tried to “re-form” Islamic thought by emphasising 
reopening the closed ijtihad gate. In fact, this contestation is not limited to the 
modern era, or with the ‘ulama; it goes further back to the death of the Prophet 
Muhammad in 632 and the question of who was eligible to succeed Him as a 
religious and political authority. The first four caliphs, Abu Bakr, ‘Omar, Othman, 
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and ‘Ali, held both religious and political authority. Until the first decades of the 8th 
century, according to Hallaq (2005: 178), the main legal experts were “proto-qadis”, 
who were employees and administrators in governmental institutions but non-
professionals. Hallaq states:  
they had no particular legal training...they adjudicated cases on the basis of 
their ra’y [view], which was based in turn on either a sunna madiya (past 
exemplary actions, including those of the Prophet and the caliphs) or 
commonsense (2005: 178). 
When Islam spread out of the Arabian Peninsula, the burden of the caliph’s role as 
both a religious and political authority lessened with the emergence of provincial 
governors and ministers. However, most of these did not have legal training because 
there was no legislation system or legal code. Additionally, the embrace of non-Arab 
traditions and local cultures by Islam is another factor that promoted the emergence 
of “legal specialists or jurists who initiated the formation of Islamic Law” (ibid, 
p.179). From the beginning of the 8
th
 century to the first half of the 9
th
, the four 
Sunni legal specialists, namely Imam Abu Hanifa (703-67), Imam Malik (717-801), 
Imam Shafi‘i (769-820), and Imam Ahmad Ibn Hanbal (778-855), began to introduce 
their regionally distinctive jurisprudential methodologies to derive specialist rules 
from the Islamic sources and so guide the Muslim community.  
Thus, orthodoxy and orthopraxy in Islamic beliefs and practices based on the legal 
sources of Islam, the Qur’an, the Sunnah, Ijma (consensus), and Qiyas (reasoning by 
analogy), was institutionalised and developed into plural Sunni madhahib or schools 
of law. In practical terms, the different classes of ‘ulama, as indicated above, 
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obtained positions in the judiciary (shari‘a courts), educational institutions (general 
and Islamic learning), and in places of worship, or Sufi orders (Waardenburg, 2002: 
387-390). “[At] the heart of the process of shaping Muslim societies” (Robinson, 
2009: 341), they diffused knowledge of Islam to their pupils and followers, and as a 
result became the central point of religious authority in every cluster of the society, 
whether in a madrasa as a teacher, or in a Sufi group as a Sufi Sheikh.  
This situation lasted until the 19
th
 century, since when “the authoritative transmission 
of Islamic knowledge and its authoritative interpretation has broken down” 
(Robinson, 2009: 345). The advent of colonialism gave rise to a number of 
transformations in military matters, education, law, and politics at the hands of the 
British, French, Dutch, Germans, and Italians. For instance in India, as Muhammad 
Q. Zaman notes:  
New judicial institutions began to be established on a British model from 
the late eighteenth century, and, though Islamic and Hindu law was retained 
in matters of personal status (notably marriage, divorce, and inheritance), it 
was by judges trained not in the shari‘a but in English common law that it 
was implemented (2009: 212). 
Furthermore, the governmental support for the ‘ulama was abolished for the sake of 
modernisation. “New forms of knowledge had to be mastered for success in the 
world of western dominance” (Robinson, 2009: 346), by sending students to the 
western universities rather than to al-Azhar and other educational centres in Arabia 
and Asia. According to Robinson (2009: 347), there was an overwhelming feeling 
that Muslims had failed, and particularly the ‘ulama. Furthermore, he argues that in 
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addition to the ‘ulama’s power being lost, which precipitated a crisis of authority, 
their response to the questions posed by western power exacerbated this crisis in the 
Indian context. The ‘ulama of Lucknow Farangi Mahall and Barelwis insisted on 
traditional scholarship; Deobandis opposed some aspects of Sufi practices; the Ahle 
Hadith rejected almost all classical scholarship like the Salafiyya movement in the 
Middle East (Robinson, 2009: 348). In a similar vein, Zaman (2006: 153-80) 
discusses in detail the lack of consensus among the ‘ulama and intellectuals in both 
the Middle East and Indian subcontinent, in the modern age. According to Robinson 
(2009: 348-9), from the beginnings of reform in the 19
th
 century, the heart of the 
‘ulama’s authority (the oral, person-to-person transmission of knowledge) was 
attacked by the use of the print media and the translation of the Qur’an. They were 
compelled to do this because of being in competition both with missionaries from 
Christianity and other faiths and with the secular western educational system backed 
by the governmental support. The result was “the emergence of protestant Islam with 
a growth in literacy and non-‘ulama or lay interpreters leading to further 
fragmentations and individualisation in religious authority” (ibid, 349-50). The 
contrast between the method and sources of religious authority in pre-modern and 
modern times is well summarised in Dale Eickelman’s statement: 
Religious authority in earlier generations derived from the mastery of 
authoritative texts studied under recognized scholars. Mass education fosters 
a direct, albeit selective, access to the printed word and a break with earlier 
traditions of authority (1992: 646). 
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In fact, the transformation of religious authority from the traditional form to a 
modern one produced, as Rahman (1979: 222) has argued, a split into two different 
directions: one towards “pure westernism”, and the other towards “revivalism”. 
In the late modern and post-modern period, the fragmentation accelerated more with 
the “transformations of economy and society, creating new spheres of activity, 
classes of the population and relations to power” (Zubaida, 2009: 65) that culminated 
in the emergence of a new public sphere. Armando Salvatore (2009: 193-5) 
articulates an emerging public sphere in this reform project with its four conceptual 
elements, “islah, maslaha, the place of Shari‘a, and ijtihad” that subsequently 
became interrelated with each other in the reformation process. Over the last two 
centuries, these notions have been discussed, both by ‘ulama, intellectuals, and lay 
people, as a result of gradual advancements of “wild growth interpretation, mass 
education, new media, and transnational developments” (Robinson, 2009: 350-53) in 
the Muslim world.  
Of course, the ‘ulama have also been benefiting from the usage of mass 
communication technologies and education facilities, initially the circulation of 
printed media, then audio-video cassettes, and television broadcasts both  locally and 
internationally, and recently internet facilities (websites, discussion forums, video 
blogs, and so on). However, the proliferation of education and communication 
technologies makes religious authority more ambiguous. Sedgwick describes the 
current situation: 
Across the Muslim world, recordings of preachers are popular listening for 
many. There are no exact figures, but at a rough estimate more than three 
165 
 
quarters of such recordings are by preachers who are not Ulema. Equally, 
there are no exact figures for the sales of books on religious subjects, but 
probably only one in ten of the best-selling authors on religious topics are 
from the Ulema. Instead, they are journalists, or lawyers, or physicians, and 
occasionally university professors. Increasingly, even engineers and 
computer scientists are coming to the fore (2006: 31). 
Therefore, ‘Who speaks for Islam?’ and ‘Who is reliable in the sense of guiding 
towards the correct path?’ are only a couple of questions to bear in mind as far as 
religious belief and practices are concerned. The secularisation of social institutions 
throughout the Muslim world has left very little room for traditional religious 
authority to practice within the community. Thus, to borrow a useful expression from 
Robinson (2009: 353), “religious authority, in the helpful image of the French 
political scientist, Olivier Roy, has become a ‘bricolage’, a do-it-yourself-project.” 
Not only does individualisation of religious authority matter, but so also does 
individualisation in the implementation of religious belief and practices. The latter 
kind of individualisation is felt more acutely among the immigrant Muslim 
communities in non-Muslim countries, especially in Europe (see Peter, 2006: 105-
118). Later in this chapter, we will witness instances of this sentiment among 
Muslims in Britain.  
The ‘ulama’s assertion of their  religious authority has shown itself in the formation  
of a number of institutions, such as fatwa centres in Egypt and India (Deoband) in 
the late 19
th
 century; the All India Muslim Personal Law Board and Indian Fiqh 
Academy in the 1970s and 1980s; and more recently the International Union for 
Muslim Scholars (Zaman, 2009: 226-7). In the European context, considering all the 
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aforementioned developments relating to religious authority over the last few 
decades, the ‘ulama have formed institutions in order to create an authoritative body 
for Muslims living in Europe. For example, the European Council for Fatwa and 
Research (ECFR) was established in 1997, with the general call by the Qatar-based 
Egyptian scholar Yusuf al-Qaradawi for forming a scholarly platform to lessen the 
ambiguity of religious authority as well as to address the European Muslim’s unique 
religious needs that differ from those of Muslims residing in Islamic countries. The 
aims and objectives of ECFR are: 
to promote a uniform Fatwa in Europe and to prevent controversy and 
intellectual conflicts regarding the respective issues wherever possible. In its 
endeavour to achieve this objective, it will use means of consultation, joint 
research as well as group Ijtihad, which has today become an Islamic 
obligation and necessity. The Council is also designed to become an 
approved religious authority before local governments and private 




The necessity for “a systematic formulation of the status of being in a minority” 
(Badawi, 1981: 27), and later on termed as “minority fiqh” as a legal doctrine -Fiqh 
al-Aqalliyyat- introduced in the 1990s by Taha Jabir Al-Alwani and Yusuf Al-
Qaradawi (Parray, 2012: 88) has been strengthened with the establishment of the 
ECFR. With its various member profiles, which consist of 32 prominent scholars 
from all over the Muslim world, it asserts a religious authority for European Muslims 
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 Derived from the first fatwa book of the ECFR, Fatwas of European Council for Fatwa 
and Research (Qararat Wa-Fatawa Al-Majlis Al-Urubbi Lil-Iftaʼ Wa-Al-Buhuth), translated 
by Anas Osama Al-Tikriti and Shakir Nasif Al-Ubaydi (Cairo: Islamic INC, 2000), p.9. 
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with annual meetings and fatwa collections.
65
 With regard to individual legal 
deductions, according to Al-Qaradawi: 
immunity from error has not been guaranteed to any individual within the 
community, no matter who that might be, but rather to the community as a 
whole is [it] guaranteed, based on the recorded saying of the Prophet 
Muhammad (cited in Zaman, 2006: 171) . 
That makes him very ambitious to bring proficient scholars together to find solutions 
to the current problems Muslims face. Al-Qaradawi is generally described as the 
most influential of the ‘ulama in the contemporary Muslim world because he uses the 
print and electronic media, including satellite television and the internet, to 
disseminate his views and ideas all over the world. In doing so, as Mandaville (2007: 
109) has claimed, he attempts to “re-center religious authority.” He always 
emphasises the necessity of being in the mood of “wasatiyya”, or finding the middle 
way in every sphere of life. The concept of the “middle way is one of the main 
features of Islamic law” according to him (Dien, 2004: 135). In the contemporary 
world, the contribution of current ‘ulama to Islamic law should be based on what Al-
Qaradawi has explained regarding the content and method of ijtihad in his book, 
Contemporary Ijtihad, Between Regulation and Disintegration: 
1) Selective ijtihad based on preference: the legal opinion is chosen from 
inherited Islamic Juridical legacy in order to stipulate rulings on it or to 
judge through it, to choose the stronger proof. 2) New rulings based on 
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Ireland. See more information at www.e-cfr.org/ 
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original analyses, it is the inference and extraction of a new ruling regarding 
a specific legal question that has never been stipulated by previous ‘ulama. 
3) The necessity for collective ijtihad, ijtihad jamai (cited in Ramadan, 
1999: 96-7). 
In fact, “collective ijtihad” is not a new term in Islamic thought. Rather, it is identical 
with the notion of ijma or consensus, one of the fundamental principles of Islamic 
legislation. Furthermore, it was the method of the companions of the Prophet that 
when they could not find any proof about an issue in the Qur’an and the Sunna, they 
used to come together and express opinions, and come to a collective decision. 
According to M. Q. Zaman (2006: 170), this establishment (the ECFR) is “old 
consensus in a new garb, (the West).” However, the proliferation of mujtahids and 
poor guidance among the Muslim community might have compelled al-Qaradawi to 
re-emphasise this notion. He may also have defined the term ijtihad in its 
contemporary context or necessity. I shall discuss this notion in more detail in 
Chapter 7. While the above developments are ongoing, in the life of Muslims in 
Europe traditional religious authority still has a crucial importance, as we shall see in 
the following section.  
6.2. The patterns of religious authority in Leeds: 
The following chart (Table 2) illustrates the preferences among a small sample of 





Table 2: Sources of religious authority for Sunni Muslims in Leeds as a 
response to an interview question: Who/what do you consult when you come 
across any problem regarding faith and practice? 
 
It is clear from the above chart that the accessibility of religious authority in person is 
the more preferable option for these Muslims, and that mainly local mosque imams 
are consulted on any matter regarding religious belief and practices. In second place 
come the sheikh or mufti; it must be borne in mind here that the expert sheikh and 
mufti are not available all the time like mosque imams. In addition, the internet also 
































 I shall now unpack in turn each of these three sources of 
religious authority for Sunni Muslims in Leeds, beginning with the mosque imams. 
6.2.1 Mosque imams: 
In Islam, the first masjid imam was the Prophet Muhammad, and then, since Islam 
had spread into a wider geographical area, it was the companions who had gained 
their religious education directly from the Prophet, and later on the body of ulama 
with its various components who succeeded him in this role. The term imam, as the 
most prominent term associated with the ‘ulama, has been used for both religious 
and political leadership in Islam since its establishment.
67
 Nevertheless, today the 
meaning of imam in Sunni Islam is generally restricted to prayer leadership at 
mosques. Some synonyms are sheikh in the Arab world, “mulla, mawla, Mawlana, 
maulvi, khari [qari], and munshi” (Barton, 1986: 112) in the Indian subcontinent and 
Afghanistan; and hoca or imam-hatip in Turkey and the Balkans. While imams are 
mainly associated with leading prayers (namaz or salat) and delivering the khutba 
(sermon), knowledge of the Qur’anic sciences (tafseer, qira’at), hadith, fiqh, usul 
(methodology) and other relevant subjects may differ from one imam to another. As 
a successor to the Prophet Muhammad, an imam represents such a position as best he 
can in terms of knowledge and behaviour.  
The role of imams in British mosques can be summarised thus: they lead the 
congregational prayers - including the five daily, Friday, two ‘eid prayers (al-fitr and 
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al-adha), and tarawih during Ramadan; in addition, they deliver the jum‘ah and ‘eid 
khutbah (Friday and festive sermons). They also conduct other religious services 
such as nikah (marriage contract) and janazah (funeral), and provide mentoring in 
divorce and family matters, or any other social problems. They are also involved in 
teaching activities, whether in a madrasa attached to the mosque as a supplementary 
school or within the mosque itself, not only for children but also adults, as well as 
preaching and religious guidance activities outside the mosque in hospitals, schools, 
and prisons. As elsewhere in the Muslim world, imams in Britain accompany 
congregations on hajj (pilgrimage) and provide guidance while pilgrims perform this 
religious obligation. In addition, imams take part in community events such as 
seminars and deliver speeches accordingly (see Barton, 1986: 112-6; Lewis, 1994: 
114 and 1996). In religious life, belief and practices, the imam has a key role as 
‘religious authority’ at the local level and exercises great influence on the 
congregation. In what follows, I introduce the imams of the four selected mosques in 
Leeds. 
Firstly, Imam Qari Asim, as a British citizen with Pakistani ethnicity who has been in 
the UK over 15 years, serves as the main imam of the LMM. Aged 34, Imam Asim is 
a solicitor by profession, but he succeeds to the role of his late father. The imam is a 
hafiz, who has memorised the whole Qur’an by heart, and he describes himself as a 
‘Sufi-Barelvi’ Muslim. Not only is he very active in the mosque itself in organising 
various events and programmes, as well as appearing on satellite television giving 
speeches (the Ummah Channel), but he also involves himself in interfaith dialogue 
events with the wider society. He has a good command of English, and while the 
Barelwi ‘ulama appear on the Ummah channel using the medium of Urdu, Imam 
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Asim is exceptional in using English, with the result that one viewer phoned the 
channel to congratulate the imam (Ummah Channel, 23 April 2010). 
Imam Asim is also a member of the executive board of the Mosques and Imams 
National Advisory Board (MINAB),
68
 an umbrella organisation established in 2006.  
Recently, he has been awarded the MBE honour, for his local and national level 
activities,
69
 since, for example, according to one of the national broadcasting news 
channels: 
After the 7/7 terrorist atrocities, he was the first Imam to hold an open day 
at his Mosque to engage the community on preventing extremism and 
Islamophobia, despite a lot of opposition by many people in his community 
to this initiative.
70
   
With the above characteristics, Imam Asim projects an exceptional image when we 
consider the general roles of Britain’s mosque imams, especially those who 
originated from the Indian subcontinent. The statement of a young British-born 
Muslim from the congregation, Shahsat (a 25-year-old), who lived in Bristol and 
Birmingham before coming to Leeds, confirms that: 
Many communities have imams who do not speak in English and whom 
many youngsters cannot understand, but in Leeds Makkah Masjid, 
alhamdulillah [praise be to Allah], the imam speaks Arabic, Urdu, English; 
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he is in touch with the Muslim community, he is in touch with the local 
community, and wider society (interviewed on 10 February 2011).    
Imam Asim combines both religious and community leadership. In terms of religion, 
within the LMM’s congregation, he is seen as a religious authority for religious 
belief and practices. On any occasion, if Muslims have trouble in any matter as 
regards their religion, they firstly go to the imam. If they consult any other sources 
such as primary books of the religion, and the internet, they need to hear 
confirmation or further explanation from the imam. Thus, the imam becomes the 
nerve centre for religious authority for the congregation. Imam Asim reflects that 
from an insider’s perspective: 
Asking local imams is a good thing, since at the end of the day even if they 
consulted everyone else [more expert scholars] they [will] still consult the 
local imams because they do not know when asking others whether the 
answer they are given [will] actually fit in with how they practice the rest of 
the things [whether they practice whatever they say or not] (27 March 
2011).    
It can be concluded from the above statement that the rapport between ordinary 
Muslims and the local mosque imam, in terms of knowing each other, is an important 
factor for the efficiency of fatwa. On the one hand, while the imam who gives a 
fatwa considers the ordinary Muslim’s situation (e.g. age, education, religiosity), the 
ordinary Muslim, on the other hand, feels comfortable when taking advice from the 
local imam since he knows about the imam. Therefore, the reliability of ‘everyone 
else’ becomes an issue here as regards to how the religious expert actually practices 
174 
 
his own daily life. For example, if a mufti advises an ordinary Muslim not to take 
bank interest but takes it himself, the ordinary Muslim does not rely on the mufti’s 
ruling. 
If people find difficulty in accessing the imam in person, there is a link on the 
mosque website enabling Muslims to contact him, asking questions either by 
completing an enquiry form or by telephoning him. In the absence of Imam Asim, 
his younger brother, Qari Qasim, a teacher in the supplementary school of LMM, 
leads the prayers in the mosque. 
During my interview with him, I asked Imam Asim: “In what matters do other 
Muslims consult you to get a fatwa?” According to him, requests mainly concern 
faith and practice, then family, and then social and financial matters.  
Faith and practice is mainly in the mosque about prayer, the main issues are 
about how to pray. People generally ask questions about performing the 
rituals. For example, if someone is late and misses one or two rak’ah [parts] 
from the fard [obligatory] prayer, what is it that the person needs to do? 
Whereas people who are not regular attendees in this mosque ask generally 
about faith matters such as shafaat u awliyaullah [intercession of the friends 
of Allah, a common belief among Sufi-Barelwi followers (see Lewis, 1994: 
83; Geaves, 1996: 95)].  
It is significant that someone may ask questions about the above Barelwi belief and 
get first hand information from the imam. It also reflects a dialogue involvement 
between a non-Barelwi Muslim and a Barelwi imam. In the context of Britain, some 
questions about social and financial issues also arise: ‘Can we sit at the same table 
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while people are drinking alcohol?’ or ‘Is someone’s income purely halal if he is a 
taxi driver and carries drunken people or has a shop and sells alcohol?’ Imam Asim 
said that he had encouraged people (who asked these questions about halal income) 
to spend their profits (after their living expenses) either by going on the hajj 
(pilgrimage) or giving sadaqa (charity). He also reports that when he issues fatawa, 
he benefits from consulting the Fatawa Ridawiyya or Rizviyya (30 volumes) written 
by Ahmad Rida Barelwi (d.1921). 
Turning to Leeds Grand Mosque (LGM), Sheikh Muhammad Taher is originally 
from Libya but is a British citizen who has been in the UK for about 14 years. The 
Sheikh (aged 42) is the only imam in LGM, and is reputed to recite the Holy Qur’an 
so beautifully that this is a key factor for many international students at the university 
in selecting which mosque to attend. He describes himself as a sheikh or scholar and 
refers to his being an imam “as an employee position in the mosque”. He is also a 
PhD candidate in Islamic law at the University of Leeds. He memorised the Holy 
Qur’an by heart in his childhood and gained a classical religious education by 
completing studies in the Shari‘a law faculty in his home country. He is bilingual, 
but uses mainly Arabic inside the mosque, and occasionally explains some matters 
(mistakes in religious practices, such as ablution and prayer) in English during the 
second part of his sermons. However, he gives talks and seminars using the medium 
of English, especially in the study circles held for the benefit of newly converted 
Muslims, which take place in the Cardigan Centre, LS6. He also teaches tajweed 
(reciting the holy book properly) to adults and children on Friday evenings. Unlike 
Imam Asim, he is not actively involved in interfaith activities as there is another 





 In the absence of Sheikh Muhammad, Sheikh al-Judai and Dr. Hasan 
lead jum‘ah prayers and deliver sermons. 
In addition to his main duty, leading prayer and delivering sermons on Friday,  
Sheikh Muhammad is available at 6pm-7pm from Monday to Friday, to answer any 
question related to religious advice or fatawa on the telephone, or via an online query 
form. This is the case if he is not asked face to face after the congregational prayers, 
the traditional practice of Muslims being to ask such questions after the prayer. The 
existence of a renowned Muslim scholar at the LGM, Sheikh Abdullah al-Judai, 
makes Sheikh Muhammad’s job easier, because the former is more engaged with 
giving fatawa and current issues about the religion, as the official mufti of the LGM. 
In asking for a fatwa, people tend to go to first Sheikh al-Judai, and then to Sheikh 
Muhammad in the absence of the former. Sheikh Muhammad explains that “fatwa is 
a big thing, and I am not giving a fatwa, I am trying to answer [basic] questions and 
find solutions”. Hamid, a 28-year-old PhD student from Jordan, states:  
when I had some problems about religious beliefs and practices, especially 
different implementations like prayer timetables, I went to the Grand 
Mosque and found answers to my questions. I think Sheikh Muhammad is 
very knowledgeable as a scholar (3 February 2011). 
Sheikh Muhammad reports that he is consulted mainly in terms of beliefs and 
practices, and also family matters. He maintains: 
                                               
71
 At the time of writing, a new committee of the mosque has appointed Dr. Zunaid Karim 




Regarding beliefs and practices, people ask questions about mistakes in 
salat, and some misunderstandings about religious rituals. For example, a 
brother asked me about joining two prayers [duhr and ‘asr] during winter. 
Another one asked me about different madhahib in fiqh [Hanafiyya, 
Shafi‘iyya, Malikiyya, and Hanbaliyya] when he noticed different 
implementations in the mosque (31 May 2011). 
Sheikh Muhammad informed me that in such situations he is not giving a fatwa, but 
rather interpreting the situation within the limits of his knowledge. He further says 
that to issue a fatwa is a significant matter appropriate to someone of Sheikh al-
Judai’s standing. In the context of Britain, according to Sheikh Muhammad, it is for 
someone with his learning to determine and publish new authoritative fatwas to fill 
the gap in minority fiqh. 
At the Iqra Centre (IC), Imam  Ershad is originally from Pakistan and holds British 
citizenship. The imam is 42 years old, and has lived in Britain for the last 12 years. 
He is a hafiz, as are the other imams mentioned above, having memorised the Qur’an 
at an early age in his life. He gained his religious education in Pakistan and came to 
the UK to serve the United Kingdom Islamic Mission (UKIM) as an imam or teacher 
in its centres across the UK. He has completed his Master’s degree in Islamic studies 
at Birmingham University, and was then appointed as the imam of the Moortown-
based IC. 
Imam Ershad is the only imam in the IC leading prayers and delivering sermons. He 
is a unique imam amongst the Sunni Muslim mosques in Leeds in terms of using 
English in the jum‘ah khutbah (Friday sermon).  Apart from reciting some verses 
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from the Holy Qur’an and sayings of the Prophet Muhammad in Arabic, the imam 
uses only English in delivering his sermons. When I asked him about that, he replied:  
It should be [so] in every mosque. We live here in Britain, and sometimes, 
the young generation does not understand what the sermons are about, and 
even we have here Muslims from different ethnic backgrounds. Hence, we 
should use English to deliver our sermons and preachings so as to enable the 
message of khutba to be understood (22 April 2012).  
Imam Ershad is also one of the teachers at the IC’s supplementary school during 
weekdays after formal school hours and at weekends. He teaches the basic Arabic 
alphabet to children so that they can read the Qur’an and pray. He also teaches basic 
Islamic knowledge, the principles of faith and the pillars of Islam. For adults, he 
gives tajweed courses and tafseer classes. As with the other imams mentioned above, 
Imam Ershad is the first point for consulting on religious practices and social 
problems, mainly concerning family matters. As in the case of LGM, the IC has 
someone dealing with inter-faith activities. Thus, Imam Ershad devotes himself to 
the main functions of an imam at the mosque. 
Imam Ershad informed me that questions he is asked generally concern faith and 
practice, as well as family matters. For instance, he says: 
a day before someone asked me about the women, is it permissible to use 
make-up things, or cut their hair? Why should a woman be obedient to her 
husband, what is the religious aspect of that? People also ask relevant 
questions about living in a modern age. For example, can a woman pray 
while she has worn make-up, and put on perfume? ...In social life, can 
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Muslims give salam [greetings] to non-Muslims, or how should Muslims 
deal with them, to the extent that they have to mix with them? 
Imam Ershad encourages the congregation to integrate into British society, and that 
is clearly visible in his usage of the medium of English in Friday sermons and 
speeches. He says “I am not giving a fatwa, just expressing my opinions about the 
questions.” Regarding social life, he thinks “representation of Islam in Britain is very 
weak and Muslims need to act.” According to Imam Ershad, living in this country is 
a great opportunity to present Islam to non-Muslims, and the aim to establish UKIM 
is a move in that direction as a “da’wa enterprise” (McLoughlin, 2005b: 62).  
Fourthly, Mawlana Yousef is a British-born young man and the ex-imam of Leeds 
Islamic Centre (LIC) in Chapeltown. It should be noted here that I was hoping to 
discuss here the current imams of LIC. However, they were so reluctant to participate 
in this research that I decided to focus on the ex-imam of LIC, Mawlana Yousef. He 
gained his traditional religious education in a nearby Deobandi seminar, the very 
well-known dar al-‘ulum of Dewsbury. Mawlana Yousef is 24 years old, and from a 
middle class family who migrated from Pakistan to England in the 1960s. He was 
selected for the dar al-‘ulum in Dewsbury after a long process of examination, and 
he completed the famous 18
th
-century Indian syllabus, the “dars-i nizami” (Lewis, 
1994: 135-6; Geaves, 1996: 148), eventually finding himself as imam in the largest 
Deobandi-Tablighi Jama’at masjid in Leeds. During that time, he gained two 
Master’s degrees, one in Healthcare and the other in Islamic sciences and Arabic 
literature, from Leeds University. 
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Unlike the other three imams introduced above, Mawlana Yousef confidently 
describes himself as an ‘alim (a scholar). However, despite his training, he is still 
currently one of the senior teachers in the supplementary school of LIC. He 
occasionally teaches Islamic RE classes in local schools in Harehills by appointment 
from the local authorities. Mawlana Yousef is very busy in terms of teaching and 
playing a role as a religious expert. For instance, once (on Thursday, 30 March 2011) 
I found a chance to visit the Dewsbury Dar al-ulum with him. During the car journey 
from Leeds to Dewsbury, he answered many questions from the other three people 
travelling to the bay’an (conference) with us. They mainly communicated in Urdu, 
but Mawlana Yousef later on explained to me some of the contents of the questions, 
such as Barelwi beliefs in visiting cemeteries of saints (maqbara-e pir), and daily 
religious rites generally. According to Mawlana Yousef, 
in the eyes of ordinary Muslims, graduates from religious seminars (dar al-
ulums) have a deep knowledge in religion and have the tools to interpret the 
current situation in Britain. 
It is also worth mentioning briefly the role played by the formal imams of the Islamic 
centre. The two imams in turn lead the prayers and give the khutbah on Friday 
prayers. In addition, Mawlana Omar generally gives tafseer classes in Urdu at the 
weekends after the noon (duhr) prayers. According to my observation, the imams in 
the centre do not give any Qur’an classes to ordinary people, while some elders help 
people who want to correct their readings of the Qur’an. However, the imams 
involve themselves in teaching in supplementary schools, just like Mawlana Yousef. 
181 
 
To summarise, while not always being the most qualified, because of their 
involvement in the daily life of mosques and their congregations, imams in Leeds are 
at the very centre of the exercise of everyday religious authority. The imams partly 
meet the expectation of the first and second generation of British-born Muslims that 
their imams should lecture and teach in English and, unlike imams in some Muslim 
countries, depending on their attributes, they sometimes take on more social roles 
within the society (Birt and Lewis, 2010: 101). Interfaith, youth, and social work 
services are sometimes carried out by people who are not imams, although it is true, 
too, that some imams in the UK are beginning to couple their religious studies with 
professional training oriented to chaplaincy and other areas of public ministry as an 
imam. Nonetheless, overall, various conditions including the rapid growth of a very 
youthful community, issues around proficiency in English, modern methods (Lewis, 
1994: 122) and the willingness of mosque committees to employ well-qualified 
British imams who are paid accordingly (McLoughlin, 2005c), together with socio-
economic factors (Barton, 1986: 112) and the overall social capital of some segments 
of the community should be considered as other reasons why the influence of 
mosque imams has been somewhat circumscribed in the British context (see Birt, 
2006). 
As individuals with particular skills and abilities, Leeds’s mosque imams fulfil 
different roles. Imam Ershad’s full English sermons and teaching are very influential 
in delivering the message to young and multicultural British communities, but his 
mosque serves a more middle class constituency in the suburb of Moortown. Sheikh 
Muhammad not only serves an ethnically mixed migrant and international student 
community but also converts Muslims with his traditional style of delivering the 
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sermons and his appealing standard of Qur’an recitation. Mawlana Yousef focuses 
more on children’s education at the mosque supplementary school. However, Imam 
Qari Asim combines religious functions with those of a community leader, and uses 
mixed languages (Urdu and English) for his sermons and speeches. His engagement 
with the various segments of local society (youth, and non-Muslims) has rewarded 
him with the MBE.  
Overall, the imams introduced above as being the nerve point of religious authority, 
provide religious guidance with regard to religious beliefs and practices in the 
context of Britain. The easy access to and availability of the imams at least five times 
a day make it the first preference of ordinary Muslims to consult the imams. Thus, 
Leeds’s imams have become a crucial factor in directing the socio-religious life of 
Muslims in the city.  
6.2.2. Religious experts: 
Besides the imams, religious experts also play an important role as religious 
authorities for Sunni Muslims in Leeds. Now I propose to illustrate the influence of 
two famous Muslim scholars, Sheikh Abdullah al-Judai and Sheikh Abdurrahman. 
The former is official mufti of the LGM, where he gives a tafseer (Qur’anic exegesis) 
class weekly, while the latter is based in the LIC, where he speaks in seminars or 
conferences. Not only do they both seem to exercise great religious authority over 
Muslims and their imams in different ethnic and cultural circles in different mosques, 
but they are also well-known and influential figures at a national level. In this 
section, my purpose is to introduce these two scholars, offer a case study of how each 
deals with a particular topic, and then to investigate their religious authority within 
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the Sunni Muslim community in Leeds. Despite my several attempts to interview 
these scholars, it did not happen because of their busy diary. Instead, I reflect here on 
my observation during their speeches and talks. 
Sheikh al-Judai (b.1959) is one of the founding members of the European Council 
for Fatwa and Research (ECFR), having served as its general secretary from 1998-
2000, and now as its deputy leader.
72
 He is originally from Iraq where he studied a 
traditional Islamic education and received his ijazah
73
 from the leading scholars of 
al-Basra, the southern province of Iraq. He specialised in the hadith studies and has 
published several books. He took up some teaching positions in Middle Eastern 
countries such as Iraq and Kuwait, and then in 1993 moved to the UK (for reasons 
not known to me), where he has maintained his research and teaching.
74
 He has a 
PhD degree in Islamic Economics from the University of Wales. He is also a member 
of the European Institute of Human Sciences in Paris. In Leeds, he is the director of 
the Islamic Research Centre,
75
 leading studies on hadith and other Islamic sciences. 
At the local level, he thus serves as consultant in Islamic fiqh for the LGM. More 
broadly, as one of the influential members of the ECFR, he has issued a number of 
fatawa about religious belief and practices in the context of Britain. For example, to 
recall a topic from Chapter 4, joining ‘isha (late evening) prayer to the maghrib 
(sunset) one in the summer season is only one of his well-known fatawa about 
religious practices. 
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After giving this very brief biography about Sheikh al-Judai, it is useful to reflect on 
his role at the LGM on the basis of my observations there. Every Monday evening 
after ‘isha prayer, he gives lectures called halaqatu’t-tafseer or Qur’anic exegesis 
circle. General attendance at the class is about 25-30 people, varying from university 
students to the regular attendees in the mosque, and some elites including academics, 
doctors, university staff, and businessmen. He gives his talk in Arabic, mainly 
commencing with recitation of a passage from the Qur’an or the sayings of the 
Prophet Muhammad. This exposition takes at least one hour. Then the Sheikh moves 
into a question-and-answer section in which he is asked about current issues related 
to the topic. Sometimes, the Sheikh does not deliver a speech, but just replies directly 
to the questions raised by the audience. Finally, he finishes the session with a 
supplication prayer. At this point, I am going to demonstrate a fatwa issued by al-
Judai in the context of Britain that has had influence mainly upon the practice of the 
LGM’s congregation, and some other Sunni Muslims such as university students and 
some Muslims in the IC, which shares a reformist sensibility with LGM despite its 
Pakistani heritage. 
In 1995, al-Judai gave a fatwa about the permissibility of joining two of the five 
compulsory daily prayers. He explained that in the British context ish’a prayer is 
delayed nearly until midnight during summer time: 
It is true that Islam strongly encourages that the prayer be performed on 
time and the basic rule is that the rulings for the times of the prayers have 
been made clear and that through these rulings the time of each prayer can 
be known by certain signs. The time of Eisha for example does not begin 
until the red twilight disappears from the sky. And so, according to Islamic 
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law if the red twilight doesn't disappear until twelve o'clock at night then the 
time of Eisha doesn't start until that time (capitals and transliteration in 
original).  
However, there are only 2-3 hours between ish’a and fajr (dawn of next day) prayers, 
so this constitutes a hardship for Muslims in Britain. If people wait until midnight to 
pray, there will be a major risk of missing the dawn prayer simply because people do 
not wake from their sleep a few hours later. For people who go to work in the early 
hours, it is especially difficult for them to adjust their rest time sufficiently. Thus, the 
sheikh suggests joining two prayers in this context. He cites examples from the life 
of Prophet Muhammad showing in what circumstances the Prophet combined the 
two prayers. Indeed, even without any reason, the Prophet sometimes joined two 
prayers at the same time while he was in Madina to make matters easier for his 
ummah or community. As a result, the sheikh claims that: 
Joining two prayers because of need is acceptable and permitted and this is 
the most correct position of the scholars and it is what the provision of 
concessions within the religion dictates - the joining of either of the two 
prayers with the other at either of the two times, for example joining 
Maghrib with Eisha at the time of Eisha or joining Eisha with Maghrib at 
the time of Maghrib (capitals and transliteration in original).
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Considering the Muslim Diaspora and the need for a minority fiqh, this fatwa is 
important since al-Judai attempts to find a solution for a Muslim community living in 
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particular circumstances. Combining two prayers makes daily life easier while 
adhering to the law. Among university students attending LGM, most of those to 
whom I spoke (mainly Hanafis) said that they were also combining dhuhr and asr 
when exams coincide with prayer times. If they do not combine two prayers, one of 
the prayers will be missed. Mukarram, a 37-year-old self employed and regular 
attendee at the IC, says, “Yes, combining two prayers is unusual but is a sunnah of 
the Prophet, whose implementation is well-known”. Furthermore, he maintains that 
in the British context, time shortage is really difficult and people suffer from that: 
“Muslim communities in Leeds might have different understanding about that, but in 
this masjid (the IC) we prayed by combining two prayers. It is [something that 
produces] easiness for us.” Another ordinary Muslim from a Sufi-Barelwi 
background, Jaweed (a 21-year-old university student), states: “If you know what 
you are doing, there is no problem. Several occasions, I combined or joined.” 
Consequently, most Sunnis at LGM and some Muslims represented above outside 
this mosque agree that it is better to join two prayers than to miss one of them as far 
as the British context is concerned. Nothing is against the main principles of Islamic 
belief and practices; rather it is a form of easiness and flexibility for Muslims living 
in the UK. Thereby, the LGM flexibly applies this fatwa regarding joining dhuhr and 
‘asr prayers during winter time, and maghrib and ‘isha prayers during summer time. 
The fact that the mosque actually organises its prayer times thus illustrates that al-
Judai is an important religious authority for the LGM’s congregation, helping them 
to interpret the sources according to its own circumstances. 
Another famous Muslim scholar in Britain is Sheikh Abdurrahman, originally from 
Pakistan. Sheikh Abdurrahman, based in the Bury Dar al-ulum, is one example of a 
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pioneering scholar amongst the Deobandis in Britain. Although he has a website,
77
 
and commonly appears in the media (‘www.halaldawarecords.com’ and ‘Hanafi fiqh 
Channel’), there is hardly any biographical information about him in the public 
realm. He is currently a senior lecturer of Hadith at Dar-al Ulum in Bury. 
The sheikh travels throughout the UK giving lectures and seminars on current issues 
that challenge Muslims today. He has given both written and audio-video responses 
to a number of questions, from the status of women to the place of tawassul 
(supplicating Allah through an intermediary), and sometimes his speeches can be 
listened to live on the internet. I shall now discuss one of his speeches on a topic 
closely related to the issue of religious authority, “following a particular madhab, 
school of law” in the contemporary world at a time when taqlid (imitation, following 
a madhab) has been challenged by some reformers.  
In LIC, as I mentioned in Chapter 4, there are occasionally seminars and public 
lecturers given by the Deobandi ‘ulama. On 12 December 2010, there was a seminar 
entitled “The legacy of Imam Abu Hanifa and following a particular madhab” 
delivered by two important Deobandi ‘ulama. Both scholars mainly focused on why 
Muslims should follow a school of law, particularly the Hanafiyya which 
predominates in South Asia. The first speaker emphasised the legacy and method of 
Imam Abu Hanifa. The second speaker was Sheikh Abdurrahman, who explained the 
necessity of following a particular madhab for lay people. He started by greeting the 
audience in Urdu, then moved into English, summarising what the main theme was 
in his speech:  
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Why is it important or essential to follow a madhab? I will try to explain 
that to you by using three reasons: because following a madhab is easier, it 
is safer, and billions of people who have followed a school of law since the 
second century of the Islamic calendar cannot be wrong.  
The Sheikh gave some brief background on the Qur’an and sayings of the Prophet 
Muhammad, then emphasised the place of Imam Abu Hanifa in terms of introducing 
the methodology of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh), saying that:  
When Imam Abu Hanifa saw that people were interpreting things 
differently, he developed usul al-fiqh, in a methodology stating that if 
something comes from the Qur’an and the Hadith, they are upon my ra’s 
and ayn;
78
 and if there is nothing in the Qur’an and the Hadith, look at the 
usage of companions, ijma (consensus); and if not there, use qiyas 
(analogy). So these are the rules taken out [through] masail (topics) from the 
Qur’an and the Hadith. Today many masail are not in the Qur’an and the 
Hadith, so we have to use analogy to derive rules from the sources. For 
example, drugs are not mentioned in the Qur’an, or the Hadith, but they, 
just like alcohol, intoxicate human consciousness, so it is haram [forbidden] 
when we make analogy. As a result you do not need to do research, leave it 
to the ulama since it is easier for you. Otherwise, you must memorise the 
Qur’an, and the Hadith, know Arabic very well, have deep knowledge in 
methodology (usul)... it is easier for you to follow a school of law. It is also 
safer, because we do not have ikhlas (sincerity) and taqwa (piety) like the 
first three generations had. That is why it is safer for us to follow a 
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madhab...so you should trust the ulama that deal with the masail, and follow 
whatever they update in fiqh according to day and age.  
As we mentioned in the first section of this chapter, the formative period of Islamic 
law resulted in four schools of law which Muslims from different parts of the world 
follow. The sheikh points out that it was the early legal jurists’ piety and sincerity 
that motivated them to work for the benefit of the Muslim community without the 
assistance of any state mechanism (see Hallaq, 2005: 204). Furthermore, the sheikh 
quoted a verse from the Qur’an (Chapter 4, An-Nisa, verse 59) that says, “Obey 
Allah, and obey the messenger and those of you who are in authority”, and he 
interpreted the last element of this verse, referring to “those of you who are in 
authority” as ‘ulama, not political rulers.79 According to the sheikh, the four imams 
and their pupils made research upon research, and established schools of law. Then 
he re-emphasised the safety of following the ‘ulama before moving into a question-
and-answer session: 
Today, people must be confident in the ulama that have done research for 
the Muslim community. It is safer for you to follow because you will be 
asked in the day of judgement:  did you have ability to research from the 
Qur’an and the Sunna, or did you do research out of your own intention and 
for your own benefit, especially in this era. I do not trust myself because I 
do not have ikhlas and taqwa, so I am following a madhab, and Muslims 
should trust their ulama and follow a school of law. 
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 However, in Islamic resources, for example in al-Mufradat fi Garib al-Qur'an by al-Ragib 
al-Isfahani, the last part of this verse is interpreted as three groups: the governors (wulat), the 
scholars (hukama), and the preachers (waaza). See al-Isfahani, (al-Mufradat fi Garib al-
Qur'an), Dar al-Ma’refah, Beirut: h.506, p.25.  
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The sheikh maintained his emphasis on the importance of following a school of law, 
regardless of whether it is Hanafi, Shafi‘i, Maliki, or Hanbali. Otherwise, the 
believers may interpret sources based on their own logic and for their own benefit. 
Consequently, lay interpreters can destroy a religious life that is surrounded by 
secular and material values.  
The presenter then asked the audience to raise questions by writing them down on a 
piece of paper and passing them to him so that the sheikh could give answers to 
them. The sheikh initially read some questions
80
 raised by the audience, and he 
referred to his website in which he had already replied to similar questions in detail, 
so as not to waste time. The sheikh then read out another question, which I had 
asked, namely whether it was “lawful or permissible to transit from one madhab to 
another, for example, in the act of combining two prayers?” He answered as follows: 
Yes, if you have ikhlas, taqwa, and if necessary, you can do that, but you 
must have knowledge about both schools of law…for instance, in the India-
Pakistan partition in 1947, many husbands disappeared. According to 
Hanafiyya, a wife must wait for her husband till such time as he reaches the 
age of 90, to marry somebody else or distribute his property. For instance, if 
a man disappeared when he was 70, the wife must wait 20 years for that to 
happen. The ulama gathered and decided to use the fatwa of Imam Malik 
that a wife has to wait for 4 years. After this period, she can distribute his 
estate and can marry another person. Because of the extreme necessity, the 
ulama agreed on that fatwa. 
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The sheikh discussed this matter further and said, “You can completely change your 
madhab from one to another”, and he gave some examples of Ibn Abidin and 
Tahawi, who changed their madhab from Shafi‘iyya into Hanafiyya. However, he 
had the attention of the audience when he warned that “If you take something from 
one madhab, one from another, and one from others, you will invalidate your 
prayers”. He explained this through a scenario in which, if somebody follows the 
Hanafi school of law, and his wife follows the Shafi‘i, (in the former school, 
bleeding from any part of the body breaks wudu’ or ablution, but for the latter it does 
not) and if this person intermittently changes his madhab from one to another, he 
invalidates his prayers. Touching women breaks wudu’ for a man according to the 
Shafi‘i, but for the Hanafi it does not. Take the case of a person who comes home 
and kisses his wife and says, “Oh, my wudu’ is not broken according to Hanafiyya”, 
and then he notices that his finger is bleeding for some reason, and he says, “Oh, my 
wudu’ is not broken according to Shafi‘iyya”. In both situations, his prayer is not 
valid because his wudu’ is broken. “As a result, you cannot pick and choose on the 
basis of your own ‘aql or logic, for the ‘ulama have to decide this, not you as a lay 
person,” states the sheikh at the end of his explanation.  
It is worthwhile mentioning here that he advised the audience to read a book called 
‘Bahishti Zewar’ or ‘Heavenly Ornaments’,81 when he was asked “Should the public 
read some books about the authenticity of ahadith [plural of hadith]?” The sheikh 
emphasised the importance of the ‘ulama as a traditional religious authority for 
ordinary Muslims in what follows:  
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 A comprehensive handbook of fiqh, especially for the education of girls and women, 
written by Ashraf Ali Thanwi (d.1943), see full translation of this book: Bahishti Zewar 
(Heavenly Ornaments), trans. by Maulana Muhammad Mahomedy, Third Authorized 
Edition (South Africa: Zam Zam Publishers, 2007). 
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As with other worldly matters, leave these issues to the scholars of Islam. 
For example, if you are ill, you will go to a doctor, or if your car is broken, 
you will go to a mechanic. Similarly, if you have a problem in 
understanding a mas’ala [topic or matter] go to a qualified scholar and ask. 
If you take a strong medicine without consulting a doctor, you may kill 
yourself. For the religion, it is the same, and you may put your faith in 
danger by dealing with any religious matter in which you do not have 
enough proficiency.  
As the sheikh pointed out above, there is a tendency among reformist Muslims, 
especially those who advocated returning to faith and practices of the first three-
generation Muslims, to look at a book and give an opinion about religious problems, 
but to attempt this should entail certain proficiency and deep knowledge. I will 
discuss these issues of ijtihad (using individual effort in interpretation) and taqlid 
(following a madhab) in more detail in the next chapter. The sheikh’s general advice 
to Muslims conforms to the typical teaching of the Deobandi tradition (Metcalf, 
1982) which emerged in the second half of the 19
th
 century in India, and aimed at 
recovering the ‘ulama’s role within the society in the face of modernity and 
modernist critiques. For ordinary people, as we have seen, to follow a school of law, 
and especially the Hanafi madhab, is encouraged for their own benefit so as not to 
invalidate their religious practices in the complex contexts of contemporary life. To 
deal with the religious issues and find necessary solutions (ijtihad) is the job of 
religious experts, according to the sheikh. 
In summary, both Sheikh al-Judai and Sheikh Abdurrahman deal with the current 
issues regarding religious belief and practices. The influence of Sheikh al-Judai as a 
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religious authority can be seen in daily prayers in the LGM in Leeds and more 
broadly amongst Arab and reformist communities via the ECFR in the UK and 
Europe. For example, the practice of combining dhuhr and ‘asr prayers in winter 
time and maghrib and ‘isha in summer time is implemented according to his fatwa. 
Sheikh Abdurrahman is a senior lecturer at Dar al-Ulum in Bury, as mentioned 
above. The graduates from the dar al-‘ulums generally take imamate positions in the 
mosques and schools throughout the UK (see more in Birt and Lewis, 2010: 101-6), 
as in the case of Mawlana Yousef, and they disseminate what they have learnt from 
their tutors. Thus, Sheikh Abdurrahman always encourages ordinary Muslims to trust 
the ‘ulama in matters of religious belief and practices, which reflects more of a 
traditionalist position. 
6.2.3. The internet: 
The internet is being used as a popular research medium by ordinary Muslims and 
experts alike (Bunt, 2000). Its growing accessibility enables everyone to get 
information easily. In the life of Muslims, it has a great significance in terms of 
online fatawa and discourses about religious life although, depending on whether the 
source is personalised or depersonalised, it does not necessarily reproduce the close 
relationships of personal trust on which an imam’s face-to-face advice is typically 
based. 
Interestingly, and reflecting a development of the last decade, all the four mosques 
featured in this study now have websites that enable communication with their 
congregations by announcing important events, prayer timetables, and so on. 
Additionally, these websites exhibit fatawa in a specific section or in the form of 
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frequently asked questions (FAQs), as well as providing links to other fatwa 
websites. This facility enables Muslims, both men and women, to ask questions 
varying from sexual relations and marriage to women’s menstruation, and so on. 
Indeed, a more depersonalised source of advice on certain topics can sometimes be 
welcome. 
Table 2 suggests that some Muslims seek fatawa and resolutions through the internet. 
In ‘iMuslims’ Bunt claims that “the extension of Internet-technology access is 
opening up new markets for specific forms of religious authority, challenging norms” 
(2009: 113). However, the internet itself is of course not a source of religious 
authority, but a medium. In the end, it is from a scholar or mufti that web surfers get 
the fatawa they seek. Therefore, according to my informants who seek fatawa and 
religious guidance on the internet, issues such as knowledge pollution and reliable 
information are extremely important. For example, a young male British-born 
university student named Fadlullah (a 23-year-old) says, “if you know the website’s 
reliability, then you look at it, otherwise there are lots of websites and information 
may confuse you, even you go astray” (interviewed on February 2, 2011). 
Furthermore, another young Muslim named Irshad (27), an estate agent attending the 
LIC, says that: 
I think we should only consult a website which we know about, because 
people claim themselves as Muslims and give rulings on a website, but they 
are not. ...If I know a website and the ruling is straightforward, I might not 
speak to a scholar. But, most of the time I consult a religious expert because, 
you know, the fatawa can differ from people to people depending on their 
situations (interviewed on 18 April 2011). 
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Easy access to the internet, especially in Britain, encourages many Muslims to search 
fatawa online. My informants gave several websites’ names, such as www.al-
huda.com, www.askimam.com, www.Sunnipath.com, www.al-islam.com, and 
www.islamonline.net. The four mosque websites link to some other websites for 
further research or more information: for instance, the LGM refers to www.e-
cfr.org/en/ (the ECFR); the LMM to www.Sunnipath.com; the LIC to www.central-
mosque.com; and the IC to www.ukim.org/dawah/askimam. 
6.3. Conclusion: 
This chapter has investigated the key roles of ‘ulama – both imams and scholars - as 
religious authorities amongst the Sunni Muslims in four Leeds mosques. In the 
absence of any sole state or community-based religious authority for all Muslims in 
Britain, religious authority has become localised and is affirmed by different 
segments of the community. According to my findings, mosque imams are the 
frontline and focal point for Muslims, as they are elsewhere in the Muslim world. 
Personal familiarity with the imam or sheikh and his knowledge about how fatawa 
might be applicable to a particular Muslim’s life are key factors in seeking religious 
advice and acknowledging religious authority.  
Those ‘ulama who have proficiency in Islamic law and related sciences manage the 
process of updating and promoting authoritative interpretations, as in the case of 
Sheikh al-Judai, whose fatwa on  combining two prayers is a crucial attempt to 
contribute to ‘minority fiqh’ in the context of Britain. As a prototype of reformist 
‘ulama, he has important influence among the congregation of LGM. By contrast, as 
a representative of traditionalist ‘ulama, Sheikh Abdurrahman takes a stand on  
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advocating that people should  follow one of the four mujtahids (Imams Abu Hanifa, 
Malik, Shafi’i, and Hanbali) as a religious authority since they reached the peak of 
knowledge, piety, and sincerity (‘ilm, taqwa, and ikhlas, respectively). The 
accessibility of ‘ulama through the internet further enables ordinary Muslims to 
contact famous scholars and ask questions on religious life. Anonymous identity, for 
example in the form of aliases, offers a kind of confidence and comfort for these 











The meanings and functions of ijtihad, taqlid, and 
fatwa for Sunni Muslims in Leeds 
Since the beginnings of modernity in the Muslim world, ordinary Muslims have 
begun to raise their voices with the aid of the mass communication and education 
facilities that “protestant Islam” has shaped in the hands of “non-ulama or lay 
interpreters” (Robinson, 2009: 349). The intersection of emerging public spheres 
with processes of reform (Salvatore, 2009: 193) has paved the way for individuals to 
articulate more opinions about religious beliefs and practices. Furthermore, mass 
immigration to Europe from Muslim lands has compelled Muslim communities in 
the Diaspora to tackle issues connected with “the secularization, individualization, 
and privatization” (Cesari, 2003: 260) of religious life in the process of adaptation to 
the western environment. As Cesari (2005: 4) has pointed out, the individualisation 
of Islamic practice is accompanied by a growing distrust of religious authority 
amongst believers, whether of a particular religious leader or an institution. 
However, Chapter 6 has documented the fact that mosque imams and religious 
experts remain crucially important as religious authorities for Leeds’s Sunni 
Muslims. Contrary to Cesari’s claim, I can argue that trust in traditional religious 
authority remains fairly strong in the city, perhaps because of the predominance of 
Muslims of South Asian heritage (e.g. the Deobandis and Barelwis) who are 




In this chapter, I propose to deal with the interrelated notions of ijtihad (independent 
legal reasoning), taqlid (following a school of law), and fatwa (legal verdict, 
opinion). In the process of ijtihad, a legal jurist or religious expert (mujtahid) makes 
efforts to derive rulings from the sources of religion or interpret the sources in 
changing circumstances, and so produce fatwa. As a result, ordinary Muslims follow 
(taqlid) the fatawa of religious experts in their religious life. In the British context, 
both ordinary Muslims and scholars are discussing whether following one of the four 
Islamic schools of law (taqlid) is necessary or not. The debate over following a 
particular madhab is very popular. The common Salafi rejectionist approach towards 
taqlid (Hamid, 2009: 356) is met with strong opposition from traditionalist South 
Asian religious groups such as the Deobandis (Usmani, 2006: 66) and Barelwis 
(Ammar, 2001: 74). The aim of this chapter is to demonstrate how taqlid is perceived 
by Sunni Muslims in Leeds. My research unpacks the attitudes of both ordinary 
Muslims and the ‘ulama, including the mosque imams and religious experts, towards 
the meaning and functions of ijtihad, taqlid and fatwa in the UK Muslim Diaspora.  
7.1. Ijtihad, taqlid, and fatwa in Islam: 
Literally, ijtihad means “exerting oneself”; while in the terminology of Islamic law it 
is used for “individual reasoning in general and a more restricted meaning, reasoning 
by analogy (qiyas).”82 The Islamic legal expert who is qualified to exercise ijtihad is 
called a “mujtahid”. The four jurists who founded the main madhahib are all 
accepted by Sunnis as absolute mujtahids, because they introduced the main methods 
for understanding the sources of Islamic religion, the Qur’an and the Sunnah. They 
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also used analogy to derive rulings from the sources in the absence of clear texts 
from the Qur’an and authentic Sunnah.  
Until the tenth century, any scholar or legal jurist in Islamic Law could claim to be a 
mujtahid, but at that point the majority of scholars from all schools of jurisprudence 
agreed that “all essential topics of Islamic Law had been thoroughly discussed and 
finally settled” (Kamali, 2008: 94). Contrary to these assumptions as to the closure of 
the ijtihad gate, Wael B. Hallaq (1984) argues in his seminal article, Was the gate of 
ijtihad closed?, that the gate of ijtihad had never been closed - neither theoretically, 
nor practically. Furthermore, he states that 
by chronologically analyzing the relevant literature on the subject from the 
fourth/tenth century onwards, it will become clear that (1) jurists who were 
capable of ijtihad existed at nearly all times; (2) ijtihad was used in 
developing positive law after the formation of the schools; (3) up to ca. 500 
A.H. there was no mention whatsoever of the phrase 'insidad bab al-ijtihad' 
or of any expression that may have alluded to the notion of the closure; (4) 
the controversy about the closure of the gate and the extinction of mujtahids 
prevented jurists from reaching a consensus to that effect (Hallaq, 1984: 4). 
However, a gradual decline in creative legal theory (usul al-fiqh) has been felt 




 centuries, the 
formative period of Islamic law. Thus, a decline in creative legal theory gave way to 
taqlid (the Arabic word means literally to follow, imitate, obey), which means 
“acceptance of or submission to authority” (Kamali, 2008: 94). Accordingly, 
someone who follows a particular line of thought or way is called a muqallid, not 
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necessarily because of blind imitation. Since then, as Kamali (2008: 94) has argued, 
“every Muslim was an imitator (muqallid) who had to belong to one of the 
recognized schools,” although some limited ijtihad was practiced in positive law, as 
pointed out by Hallaq (1984: 12). As a result, taqlid has become the hallmark of the 




 centuries, and which 
produced a number of questions (such as the matters of waqf of cash or donation, 
coffee, music etc) that had never been asked by that time but were crucial to 
economic and social life in the Ottoman Empire (Hallaq, 1984: 31).   
Another key concept in Islamic law, fatwa, fills the gap between doctrine and 
practice as an instrument of religious authority from the formation phase until today. 
Fatwa means “legal opinion on a point of law, the term ‘law’ applying, in Islam, to 
all civil and religious matters.”83 The person who gives a fatwa is called a mufti and 
is mainly involved in specific cases and generally transmits the old views and 
precedents or concludes an opinion based on the main principles of Islam. To recall 
Hallaq’s claim against the closure of the ijtihad gate, ijtihad has continued to exist 
mainly through the work of muftis and their fatawa. Hussein Ali Agrama states: 
even without ijtihad, muftis have always been quietly, creatively adapting 
ostensibly rigid doctrine to everyday needs under the guise of taqlid, of 
simply reproducing previous rulings. It is through fatwas, then, that the gap 
between the fixed past and a constantly changing present and future is 
bridged (2010: 8).  
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However, the functions of traditional religious law were transformed with the advent 
of colonialism. Western encroachment in the Muslim lands and its direct influence 
over the government laws as well as social institutions made “the nation-state a 
central player in the moral and political life of subject peoples” (Moosa, 2009: 167). 
For example, in India new judicial institutions began to be established on a British 
model from the late 18
th
 century. As Zaman (2009: 212) has pointed out, “it was by 
judges trained not in the Shari‘a but in English common law that it was 
implemented.” In the meantime, the ‘ulama, on the one hand, challenged this by 
aiming at reforming Islamic tradition and re-establishing social institutions in order 
to meet the needs of society. On the other hand, however, they found themselves in 
conflict with “new religious intellectuals” who were the product of Westernised 
colleges and universities students, often with no formal grounding in the Islamic 
sciences but with a tendency to interpret the foundational texts (see Zaman, 2009: 
212). 
When modernity and Muslims met, some prominent figures, for instance Shah 
Waliullah (d.1762), harshly criticised the ‘ulama for being pure muqallid and 
“argued that unquestioning adherence to late compilations of legal decisions was an 
inadequate guide to religious truth” (Metcalf 1982: 37). Shah Waliullah’s summons 
and influence on renewal movements in the Indian subcontinent, such as 
Deobandism, Ahle-Hadis, and Barelwism (Metcalf, 1982; Sanyal, 1996: 35-37; 
Lewis, 1994: 36-40; Geaves, 1996: 146-151), played an important role in the shaping 
of these movements. In addition to Shah Waliullah, other pre-modern reformists such 
as Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab (d.1787), Ibn Mu‘ammar (d.1810), and Shawkani 
(d.1839) were “against the very essence of taqlid, the implementation of which had 
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become a firmly rooted practice among the populace, including the great majority of 
its intellectuals” (Hallaq, 1984: 32). In short, pre-modern reform movements such as 
Wahhabism that appeared in Arabia insisted on the right of ijtihad and condemned 
the practice of taqlid (Rahman, 1979: 199). 
Subsequently, Muslims began challenging the questions and issues which modernity 
had imposed in the nineteenth century. From that point on, revivalist and modernist 
Muslims have started questioning the place of taqlid in the social life of Muslims as 
well as in Islamic law, and have made efforts to re-open the closed gate of ijtihad. In 
the pre-modern Muslim world, as Rahman (1982: 43) has argued, a kind of 
secularism appeared because of the stagnation of Islamic thinking in general and, 
more particularly, because of the failure of Shari‘a law and institutions to undergo 
development in order to meet the needs of the society. Thus, since the modernisation 
process was involved in various aspects of life, from politics and the army to religion 
and education, intellectuals were consumed in discussing the compatibility of 
western values with Islam and debating politics. As Fazlur Rahman has noted (1979: 
222), the ‘ulama were incapable of carrying the process forward from the basis 
provided by the early modernists. According to him, “this is why modernism, in so 
far as it existed at all, has been the work of lay Muslims with liberal education” (ibid, 
p.222). Furthermore, as Rahman (1982: 137) has argued, neo-
revivalism/fundamentalism as the heir of the pre-modern reform movements has 
been unable to devise any methodology, any structural strategy, for understanding 
Islam or for interpreting the Qur’an. In Chapter 1, I discussed how because of social 
and religious transformations throughout the Muslim world, traditional religious 
authority and Islamic law had begun to disappear from the public arena, with the 
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substitutions of nation-states and western law codes. Hallaq rightly observes the 
situation of the Muslim world and concludes that: 
The rise of modern dictatorships in the wake of the colonial experiences of 
the Muslim world is merely one tragic result of the process in which 
modernity wreaked violence on venerated traditional cultures (Hallaq, 2005: 
206). 
Technically, the process of ijtihad is fundamentally a text-related activity embracing 
two principal tasks: the authentication of texts and the interpretation of texts. The 
Qur’anic text is considered incontestable by the vast majority of Muslim scholars; 
consequently, the overwhelming majority of mujtahids have focused on textual 
analysis of the hadith literature, not necessarily the hadith text and content, rather the 
chain of transmitters (isnad).
84
 As a result, in addition to the main sources of the 
Islamic religion (the Qur’an and Hadith), ijma‘ (a scholarly consensus) and qiyas (a 
process of analogical reasoning) were developed and became the most fundamental 
part of the methodology of Islamic law (usul al-fiqh).  Furthermore, every school of 
law contributed to that by exercising ijtihad and bringing in supplementary 
methodologies, such as istihsan (a process of legal preference) among the Hanafis; 
istislah (seeking the greater benefit to act on public interest) among the Malikis; ‘urf 
(custom or precedents) among the Hanbalis; and istishab (presumption of continuity) 
among the Shafi‘is.  
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In order to exercise ijtihad, one must attain all necessary qualifications proposed by 
Muslim scholars (in the classical era
85
 as well as in modern times). The 
contemporary reformist, Tariq Ramadan, gives a synthesis of these prerequisites in 
seven points: In order to exercise ijtihad in the Muslim world in general, and more 
specifically in Europe, the mujtahid must attain: 
1) A knowledge of Arabic to the extent that it enables him to correctly 
understand the Qur’an and the Sunna and, especially, the verses and ahadith 
containing rulings (ayat and ahadith al-ahkam). 2) A knowledge of 
Qur’anic and Hadith sciences in order to know how to understand and 
identify the evidences within the text (adilla) and, moreover, to infer and 
extract rulings. 3) A deep comprehension of the maqasid al-Shari’a, their 
classification and priorities they subsequently bring to the fore. 4) A 
knowledge of the questions on which there was ijma: this requires 
knowledge of the works on secondary questions (furu’). 5) A knowledge of 
the principles of analogical reasoning (qiyas) along with its methodology 
(the causes – ‘ilal or circumstances – asbab ofa specific ruling, conditions – 
shurut etc.). 6)  A knowledge of his historical, social, and political context; 
that is, the situation of the people around him (ahwal an-nas) and the state 
of affairs, their traditions, customs, and the like. 7) Recognition of his 
competency, honesty, reliability, and uprightness (Ramadan, 1999: 87-88). 
It can be noted from this quotation that the process of ijtihad entails specific 
scholarship and expertise, and it is not open to everyone, as has been discussed for 
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the last two centuries. Of course, for those involved this expertise constantly requires 
more research and updating of the relevant corpus to be in line with the needs of the 
particular day and age. Nonetheless, it does not necessarily mean putting the entire 
heritage aside and embarking upon new rules and discourses. Like the mujtahid, the 
mufti is required to have certain qualities: “Islam, integrity (‘adala), legal knowledge 
(ijtihad), and the ability to reach, by personal reasoning, the solution of a problem.”86  
A fatwa is generally used for specific circumstances in which there is no clear text 
and similar precedent available, and it mainly binds the person who asks for legal 
opinion in a specific matter. In the past, fatawa were issued for both civil and 
religious matters; however, in the late modern era, they are mostly limited to the 
latter, as the majority of the Muslim world does not use Islamic law for civil matters 
(see Chapters 1 and 6). The terms fatwa and ijtihad are generally used 
synonymously, but a fatwa is often the result of the ijtihad process, and plays a 
mediator role between the theory and practice. Indeed, as a result of this role, the 
mufti, “within the community stands in for the Prophet” (Ramadan, 1999: 89). 
Although the transformations in Islamic law happened throughout the Muslim world, 
the ifta (the act of issuing fatwa) is still a dynamic institution as a vehicle of religious 
authority. Alexandre Caeiro (2006) examines the tradition of ifta in a “diachronic 
style, speaking of of transformations in conceptualizations of religious authority, 
subjectivity, and agency,” and shows the continuity and change of this tradition in 
legal and socio-political contexts. He states (2006: 669) that until the 20
th
 century, 
fatwas provided both religious guidance and legal expertise, but they have gradually 
lost their juridical importance since the legal systems of Muslim countries became 
                                               
86
 'Fatwa', in The Encyclopaedia of Islam, New edition (Brill, 2009), p.866. 
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secularised. However, fatwas are generally an instrument for learning rules and 
procedures, and tools in creating pious Muslim identities (ibid, p.663). As I discussed 
in the previous chapter, the establishment of fatwa centres in Egypt and India 
(Zaman, 2009: 226-7), and the ECFR in Europe is part of the endeavour on the part 
of ‘ulama to regain religious authority by providing religious and moral guidance for 
Muslims in such a way that lessens ambiguity. Furthermore, as the ethnographic 
study of Agrama (2010: 13) observes, “the fatwa is involved in a process of 
tarbawiyah, ethical cultivation, care of the self.” 
It is worthwhile illustrating the thinking of Al-Qaradawi (b.1926), one of the most 
influential reformist figures among the contemporary ‘ulama (Mandaville, 2007: 
109), on taqlid,
87
 Al-Qaradawi classifies three opinions on the issue of taqlid: i) 
requiring following a madhhab strictly and rejecting ijtihad; ii) prohibiting taqlid and 
requiring ijtihad as obligatory for every Muslim, with legal rulings taken directly 
from the Qur’an and Sunnah; iii) permitting taqlid for anyone who has not reached 
the level of ijtihad. For the last opinion, al-Qaradawi quotes the view of Imam Hasan 
al-Banna (d.1949), the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood:  
In his wisdom, Hassan al-Banna prefers the word ittiba‘ (to follow) over 
taqlid (to blindly imitate) in his principle, stating Muslims are to follow 
(yattabi‘u) one of the great imams of Islamic jurisprudence. 
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 Between Absolutism and Negligence: Taqlid and Following a Juristic School, This article 
is translated from Sh. Qaradawi’s work, Kayfa Nata`mal Ma`a’l-Turath wa`l Tamadhhub 
wa`l-Ikhtilāf (pp. 62-73), by Muslema Purmul. 
http://www.onislam.net/english/shariah/contemporary-issues/islamic-themes/451734-taqlid-
and-following-a-madhhab.html (Accessed on 16 April 2012). 
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He sees this opinion as best fitting the usage in Qur’anic contexts88 which makes it 
praiseworthy and legally acceptable in his view. His conclusion is that ittiba‘ is the 
most suitable term. It is this term that leads Hallaq, after reviewing several articles
89
 
on ijtihad and taqlid, to complain about how the study of Islamic legal theory is 
suffering from “terminological confusion syndrome and an absent syndrome” 
(Hallaq, 1996: 136) The concept of ittiba‘ is generally absent from  current studies, 
and according to him: 
such an important concept is ittiba‘, the ijtihadic re-creation, justification 
and re-enactment of the madhab. In this concept lies the solution to many of 
the problems outlined in this theme (ijtihad, taqlid, and madhab), for ittiba‘ 
represents the middle ground between ijtihad and taqlid, and constitutes the 
genuinely “intellectual play” that reflected the loyalty to the madhab (ibid, 
p. 136). 
It can be concluded from the above that taqlid is generally seen as imitation, and 
mostly by reformists as blind imitation since they oppose this notion; by contrast, the 
term ittiba‘ is following one of the legal schools as well as sustaining ijtihad 
according to the novelties of the time and place. Fatawa play an integral part in this 
process. However, how do such things play out in the context of contemporary 
Leeds? This is the focus of my next section. 
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 Maryam 19: 43 and Al-Kahf 18: 65-66. 
89
 See Islamic Law and Society, Volume 3, Number 2, Brill, Leiden: 1996. 
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7.2. Ijtihad, taqlid, and fatawa among Sunni Muslims in Leeds: 
In a semi-structured interview, I put closed and open-ended questions both to 33 
ordinary Muslims and to 8 religious experts (consisting of 10 from the LIC; 11 
LGM; 9 IC; 9 LMM; and 2 independent from these mosques). The questions were as 
follows:  
1. Which Islamic school of law do you follow in practice (a‘mal and ibadat or 
religious deeds and observances)? 
2. What is the reason for you to follow this (........) school of law?  
a) It is the common madhab in my country (national and local area). 
b) It was taught to me by my parents, teacher, and others (...........). 
c) I chose the madhab after a comprehensive research that answered my 
needs more accurately than the other three schools of law. 
d) If none of the above, please specify. 
3. Is it necessary to follow any of these schools of law in the contemporary 
world, where human beings can easily access every kind of knowledge? 
I received various responses from the interviewees showing the religious diversity 
within the Sunni Muslim community in Leeds. Table 3 below illustrates generational 
and expertise-based attitudes towards following a particular madhab, taqlid, and 
ijtihad. I classify those up to 40 years old as the younger generation and those older 
than that as elders, and I am interested in whether generational differences affect the 
perception of following a school of law in the UK Muslim Diaspora. Experts include 
both the imams in the selected mosques and freelance experts active within their own 




Table 3: A comparison of attitudes towards taqlid and ijtihad 
 
Firstly, as regards following a particular madhab in practice (a‘mal and ibadat), 
seven out of eleven of the older Muslims among my interviewees follow a particular 
madhab: one Maliki, one Shafi‘i, one Hanbali, and four Hanafi. The remainder do 
not follow any particular madhab. For the younger generation, fifteen people out of 
twenty-two follow a particular school of jurisprudence. The Hanafi madhab has ten 
followers; the Shafi‘i has two; while the other two madhabs have one follower for 
each. Within the remainder, one follows Ahle Hadith; one is Salafi; and three do not 
follow any particular madhab, apart from the Qur’an and Sunnah. Unlike the older 
and younger generations, all mosque imams and religious experts follow a particular 












Old generation Young generation Mosque Imams and 
religious experts 
   





Secondly, the majority of informants regard contemporary ijtihad as necessary. 
Religious experts wholly agree with that, but the views of the older and younger 
generation overlap for this category. Thirdly, those who are against taqlid, as we 
shall see below, argue that everything is clear in the Qur’an, Sunnah and the 
applications of the companions (sahabah) of the Prophet. Thus, it is not necessary to 
follow any particular madhab in religious practices. 
In brief, the majority of my informants follow a particular madhab that confirms the 
general patterns of Sunni Muslim communities in Britain, since the overwhelming 
majority of Muslim communities come from the Indian subcontinent. Moreover, as 
clearly mentioned above, the prevalent madhab is Hanafi. Regarding Question 2 (see 
above), which has multiple options, I include only those people who follow a 
particular school of law.  The main reasons for the respondents to follow a particular 
madhab were options a) and b): the prevalence of a madhab in a country, and family 
guidance in religious education. Unsurprisingly, option c) (comprehensive research) 
was scarcely chosen at all. Additionally, some added other reasons for following a 
particular madhab, such as “it is easier to practice” and “provides stronger evidence 
than the others.” All of the respondents, however, said that all four schools of law are 
equally valid and offer a kind of flexibility and blessing from Allah, when we 
consider geographical and cultural difference. 
As reflected in the previous chapter, where Sheikh Abdurrahman’s speech on 
madhahib was discussed, Deobandis (see Metcalf 1982: 141, 297) as well as 
Barelwis (Sanyal, 1996: 176-177) strongly encourage adherence to the schools of 
law. Literature such as The Legal Status of Following a Madhab by Justice 
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Muhammad Taqi Usmani (b.1943)
90
 is also influential for ordinary Deobandi and 
Tablighi Muslims in the LIC. In the case of the Barelwis (LMM), Traditional 
Scholarship and Modern Misunderstandings: Understanding the Ahl Al-Sunna,
91
 
written by Abu Ammar, is an important book for them, in terms of explaining 
Barelwi beliefs and practices including taqlid. 
Most Sunnis in Leeds follow a madhab, but a significant minority do not. Some of 
my informants in LGM and Leeds IC are reformists who are against following a 
particular madhab. Within this group of people, a great deal of respect is generally 
shown to the leaders of the four schools of law, but it is pointed out that during the 
Prophet’s era none of these schools existed; there were just the Qur’an and the model 
of the Prophet Muhammad. This reformist discourse is especially popular among 
members of the Muslim Brotherhood at LGM, while the IC is a branch of UKIM 
which is affiliated to Jama’ati Islami, and “the criticism of Abul A’la Maududi 
(d.1979) on taqlid” (Lewis, 1994: 41) can be seen there. 
As a result, both a ‘traditionalist’ and a ‘reformist’ position towards following a 
particular madhab is noticeable among Sunni Muslim communities in Leeds. I shall 
now illustrate the views of ordinary Muslims in each of the selected mosques in turn. 
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 It was originally published as an article in a monthly journal, Faran, in 1963. Later on, in 
1976, the author expanded its content and published it as a book. The above-mentioned book 
is a translation by Afzal Hoosen Elias, and is the third edition (Karachi: Zam Zam 
Publishers, 2006).   
91




7.2.1. Leeds Islamic Centre (LIC): 
As I mentioned in Chapter 4, the LIC is mainly dominated by South Asian Muslims 
with their Deobandi-Tablighi religious orientation. The strong traditionalist 
orientation of Deobandi-Tablighis towards following a particular madhab shows 
itself in that 10 research participants from this mosque including the ex-imam all 
report that they follow the Hanafi madhab. Regarding Question 2, a) country of 
origin and b) family are the factors that have most influence on choosing this 
madhab. For Question 3, regarding the necessity of following a school of law in the 
contemporary world, the respondents agreed that the four founders of the Sunni 
schools of law had such a knowledge and piety that in modern times nobody can 
reach that level. It is worth citing a couple of examples here. Ahmed, a 47-year-old 
taxi-driver who graduated from a university in Pakistan and came to Britain 19 years 
ago, says that: 
I think, today we should follow any school of law. Because it is better to 
know what you are doing, and following a madhab enables us more to 
concentrate on religiosity, otherwise it would be confusing (interviewed on 
20 March 2011). 
Irshad, a 26-year-old estate agent, states that: 
Yes, nowadays it is very important to follow one of these, because as a lay 
person it is very hard for me to open a religious book, Qur’an and Hadith 
book in order to derive fiqhi rulings, you know jurisdiction, from there. For 
example, if I pick up a pathology or neurology book and derive medicines 
from that book, so in order for me to derive the diagnosis and treatments 
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from that book, I have to have the knowledge to the level that I can do so. 
However, what I do, I go to the doctor, say and so on, so forth...the doctor 
diagnoses my illness, and gives the necessary treatment or medicine. It is 
easier, safer, you know free of risk. So likewise, following a mujtahid is 
coming on from the life of the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) since in that era, 
not every person was able to derive rulings based on the Qur’an and 
Shari‘ah. Therefore, a mujtahid who is a specialist is like a doctor, yeah, so 
I think we should stick to a mujtahid (interviewed on 18 March 2011). 
Similar responses were given in terms of following a madhab. Religious scholarship 
is seen as a job for ‘ulama and not the laity in this institution and the tradition it is 
associated with. Following a madhab secures the truth of particular religious 
practices because it is based on accumulated tradition, continuity with the past and 
has been tested over the centuries. 
7.2.2. Leeds Grand Mosque (LGM): 
The multi-ethnic and religious congregation of the LGM exhibits different tendencies 
in following a particular madhab. Eleven people including the mosque imam and a 
religious expert were interviewed and five of them report that they do not follow any 
particular madhab - which is relatively high as compared to the overall pattern of my 
results. Among the ‘followers’, there were 2 Shafi’i, 2 Maliki, 1 Hanbali, and 1 
Hanafi. Geographical location (a) and family (b) are the main factors that have an 
impact on ‘choosing’ a madhab. The remainder who do not follow any particular 
madhab differ from each other in terms of preferences. For example, one claims that 
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he follows ahle-hadith. This is 27-year-old Hamid, who is from Jordan and is a PhD 
candidate at Leeds University. Based on the prophetic tradition, he says:  
The Prophet Muhammad (pbuh) said, “the best of people are my 
companions, then next to them, and then next to them.” I follow the ahle-
hadith because they were the closest to the time of the Prophet and the 
companions, so the closest means being correct (interviewed on 3 February 
2011).  
In fact, the early salaf (the first three generations) includes great jurists who played 
vital roles in the formation of Islamic jurisprudence. When I reminded my informant 
of this, he replied, “Indeed, I follow, not any of these, but all and other jurists.” It 
means following a mixture of these schools and the early companions or the 
consensus of the scholars (ijma), the third source of Islamic law. Another informant, 
Saleh (a 33-year-old), also follows salafi thought, and he relies on the proofs from 
the main sources (the Qur’an and Sunnah) as well as his own interpretation. If he has 
any problem, he consults another scholar (interviewed on 7 February 2011). 
Regarding Question 3, on the necessity of following a madhab in the contemporary 
world, the ‘followers’ say that the four jurists reached the peak of Islamic law by 
deriving the rules and issuing legal opinions. Thus, benefiting from the existent 
methodology of jurisprudence (usul al-fiqh), new approaches meeting the needs of 
contemporary age should be made. For instance, Masud (40 years old), a regular 
member of the congregation and working in a private company as an accountant, 
expresses his opinion: 
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It is true that information is easily accessed, but it is better to have someone 
who has deep religious knowledge. Fortunately, we have Sheikh al-Judai in 
this mosque. As the prophet of Allah (pbuh) said, in a period of hundred 
years there will be a scholar who could revive the ummah. It is better to 
have a mujaddid [‘reviver’] than following these schools. Of course you will 
not disagree with them on the basics of religion, but look for example at 
what is happening now with revolutions in our countries. Some schools of 
thought say that it is prohibited to revolt against the ruler. And we have 
heard that Sheikh al-Judai and Sheikh al-Qaradawi have given their fatwa 
that we are in a different time, that it used to be prohibited because the 
people at that time were armed, and that is the norm. But in our time, there 
is no fear for a group of people to go out on the streets and protest against 
the rulers for their rights. However, the rulers have killed many innocent 
people so far, and there is no ‘adala [justice]. But again, it is better to have 
someone who gives you a fresh interpretation, because it is contemporary 
and goes with the time we are in now (interviewed on 7 March 2011).  
The informant emphasises the importance of having contemporary ‘ulama who have 
the tools and methodology to give fatawa according to the present-day conditions. In 
the contemporary world, everything is dynamic and changing day by day, so the 
religious guidance and fatawa need to be updated to meet the needs of society. Of 
course, as the informant has pointed out above, the basics of Islam are already 
established, and hence the ‘ulama should approach Islamic law to update it in order 
to find solutions to the current problems, considering socio-political facts. 
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7.2.3. Leeds Iqra Centre (IC): 
The UKIM-affiliated mosque has a mainly Pakistani Muslim congregation, and nine 
people including the imam were intervieweed. Five Muslims among the participants 
follow Hanafi fiqh in their religious practices. The remainder report that they do not 
follow any particular madhab, but only the Qur’an and Sunnah of the Prophet, since 
everything is clear from these two sources of Islamic law. Again, this might be seen 
as relatively high but, like LGM, reflects both a reformist orientation and an 
associated social profile which tends to be more educated, professional and middle 
class than the majority of Muslims in Leeds, although individuals’ stories are always 
complex. For example, 56-year-old Munir came to the UK about 33 years ago and 
holds dual citizenship. Despite graduating from a university in Pakistan he works as 
a taxi driver in Leeds. He claims that: 
It is not necessary to follow any of them, since everything is clear to me 
from the Qur’an and the Sunnah, and I am simply a Muslim. Personally, I 
do not like even people being segregated as Sunni or Shi‘a. Our Prophet 
(pbuh) was not either Sunni or Shi‘a. I do not follow any school of law. I am 
just Muslim like our beloved Prophet was. I do not look at schools of 
thought, everybody has the right to think whatever way they like and there 
is no right to insult them. In my case, I have no specific leader to follow 
other than the holy Prophet (interviewed on 15 April 2011).   
Additionally, a 33-year-old self-employed university graduate, Firdews, says that:  
First of all, I do not agree with this terminology, about being Hanafi, or 
Shafi’i, because Islam did not give any terminology in this world to follow 
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specifically these imams, basically. I think I have not heard or read about 
anything that the scholars said about how “You have to follow these 
schools.” But, unfortunately the elder Muslims just followed these imams, 
not the messages that they want to convey to Muslims ...One word in the 
Qur’an we hear is the word Muslim, but those words like Hanafi, Maliki, 
are not allowed in Islam, to be honest. That is why I should not say I am not 
following these things, but I should say that I follow the Qur’an and the 
Sunnah, I follow these mixed scholars, not just one of them, because they 
worked very hard for Islam and they did a good job for every Muslim 
(interviewed on 15 April 2011). 
Like some at LGM, these respondents are against any attribute other than ‘Muslim’. 
They pay tribute to the work of the early jurists, but accuse the muqallid (‘follower’) 
as not having understood their message properly. Mukarram, a 37-year-old self 
employed who came to the UK about twenty years ago and gained a Bachelor’s 
degree in Bioscience from Leeds University, expresses a similar sentiment:  
When Islam emerged, there was only the Qur’an and the Prophet’s Sunnah. 
So we need to go to our original sources, the Qur’an and the Sunnah. Yes, 
there are issues where you have to seek some scholarly advice, based on 
their ijtihad, but personally, I do not follow any school of law. I implement 
the methodology of Imam Abu Hanifa, and if anything contradicts the 
Sunnah of the Prophet Muhammad (pbuh), then leave it. Anything which I 
have problems with, I mean finding the hadith or answer from the Sunnah, 
then I would refer to different scholars. I would not follow any scholar just 
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because my parents are following him, or because my local area follows him 
(interviewed on 18 April 2011)  
This informant questions traditional religious authority and applies what he 
understands from the sources; in case of any problem, he consults a scholar. Contrary 
to the main tendency among Pakistani Muslims, he does not follow a particular 
madhab because of family, or location. This is because he does his own research and 
relies on his understanding from the sources. However, the other participants who 
follow a madhab in this mosque vigorously express the need to follow a madhab, 
especially in the contemporary age. “If we follow any of these schools of law, it 
would be more easy and reliable to practise our religion” says self-employed taxi-
driver, 52-year-old Haji Sadiq, a college graduate in Pakistan who has been in Britain 
over 35 years (interviewed on 15 March 2011).  
As can be seen from the above statements, the informants in this mosque gave 
different responses to following a particular madhab in the contemporary world. 
Contrary to other mosques, in which the origins of congregation are mainly from the 
Indian subcontinent (LIC and LMM) and almost all follow a madhab, Muslims in the 
IC have different views on that. Indeed, it depends on the informant’s religious 
knowledge or background whether he declares himself as not being a follower of a 
madhab. For example, in the case of Mukarram, he stated once that he was going to a 
tafseer circle when I entered the mosque. Several of his friends created a reading 
group, and regularly they come together and read chapters from the Qur’an and 
discuss the importance of the themes revealed. This reveals the informant’s level in 
religious knowledge, as he can attempt to interpret the sources. This is arguably an 
exception from the expected typical ordinary Muslim’s religious life.     
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7.2.4. Leeds Makkah Masjid (LMM): 
Like with the LIC, all participants at LMM report that they follow a particular 
madhab, the Hanafi. In this mosque, I conducted interviews with nine people, 
including two religious experts. Similar to the LIC, strong adherence to traditional 
religious authority is noticeable in this mosque, too. Regarding Question 2, on factors 
encouraging the following of a madhab, all participants informed me that a) location 
and b) family were important. Additionally, some younger participants added that 
they had researched the other three madhahib after seeing the different ways in 
which they implemented the law. Indeed, some challenges for the younger generation 
arise when they have contact with other Muslim ethnicities, for example, when on 
holiday in Muslim countries or on Hajj (pilgrimage). More routinely, if they attend 
university and share the prayer room with others from diverse cultural and sectarian 
backgrounds they also encounter Muslim difference more than their parents’ 
generation. For example, 23-year-old British-born Fadlullah, an undergraduate 
student, says: 
Before coming to the university, I was not aware of the existence of the 
other madhabs, Shafi‘iyya, Malikiyya, and Hanbaliyya. However, I am still 
learning the difference between them, asking either my classmates or fellow 
Muslims, who are from different ethnic and religious backgrounds, in the 
Green Room [the university prayer hall] (interviewed on 02 February 2011). 
Another informant, British-born Jaweed (21), says:  
When I read books about the other three imams and their methodology, I 
noticed that all used the views of Imam Abu Hanifa [the oldest of the 
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scholars] and I am very comfortable about following him (interviewed on 09 
February 2011). 
Regarding Question 3, on the necessity of following a madhab today, not only 
ordinary Muslims but also religious experts, as we shall see in the proceeding 
section, undoubtedly see it as necessary to follow a madhab in the contemporary 
world. Another British-born attendee at LMM named Shahsat (24), who is an 
employee in a supermarket, states:  
It is best to adhere to a particular madhab. Unfortunately, there are many 
people who have the wrong interpretation; they simply open a hadith book 
and interpret things out of context. I saw many people who deviated from 
the true path in favour of their own interpretations. Gradually they began not 
to practice religion in daily and jum’ah [contexts] but to abandon it 
(interviewed on 10 February 2011).  
According to this informant, the trend among some Muslims not to follow a 
particular madhab underestimates the importance of religious beliefs and practices 
and eventually causes many people to abandon their religious practices. When people 
who claim not to follow any school of law face difficulties in religious practices, they 
interpret the facts in favour of their desires and wishes. Thus, they put their religious 
life and consequently their afterlife in danger by not following a particular traditional 
religious authority, according to the informant. Some informants have claimed that 
the continuity of the four schools over more than a millennium shows their 
reliability. British-born Rida, a 30-year-old information technologist, argues that: 
221 
 
If you look at the life of all these scholars [the four jurists], they were really 
pious people with high levels of morality dispersed among the community 
and they improved the society, not only Muslims but also non-Muslims 
including Jews and Christians. So, I think it is still necessary to follow them, 
because the four imams and other great scholars are like the jewel of Islam, 
the light of Islam... Today, they are still followed by many Muslims, they 
are still shining, and they are great scholars (interviewed on 25 February 
2011). 
The continuity of the four schools of law over the millennium, providing agelong 
solutions to religious life, gives further confidence to this informant and other 
ordinary Muslims, as reported above. The choice of the overwhelming majority of 
the Muslim population in the world to follow a madhab is another factor that should 
be stated here.  
7.2.5. Mosque imams and religious experts: 
The same set of questions was asked of the imams of the selected mosques and of 
religious experts. They were also asked about the status of the contemporary 
mujtahid, and the possible contribution to Islamic Law of such a scholar in light of 
the needs of Muslims in Britain. I shall start by examining their responses to the first 
group of questions as I have done above, and then in the following section, I will 
move onto the supplementary questions about mujtahids. 
Firstly, regarding the responses regarding following a madhab, the imams of the four 
selected mosques are all implicitly following one of the schools of jurisprudence. 
Seven out of eight experts have chosen to follow a particular school of law. Unlike 
222 
 
the congregation interviewed in the LGM and IC, interestingly, the imams of both 
mosques follow a madhab, Maliki and Hanafi, respectively. The attitudes of the other 
two mosque imams (from LMM and LIC), Barelwi and Deobandi respectively, as 
can be predicted from the above discussion, both follow Hanafi fiqh. 
The one religious expert who does not follow any particular madhab is Dr. Hassan 
al-Khatib (63), a committee member of the LGM. He is from Iraq and came to the 
UK about 40 years ago for post-graduate study, and describes himself as a da‘iyah 
(preacher). As the chair of Leeds Muslim Forum (see Chapter 5), he is very active in 
terms of representing Muslims in the city. He states that he follows the Muslim 
Brotherhood (al-ikhwan al-muslimin, founded by Hassan al-Banna (d.1949) in 
Egypt), which is committed to applying the Qur’an and the Sunnah to social life. 
Furthermore, he says that:  
We follow contemporary imams, those who are living amongst us, and we 
learn from them. The books of all the four imams are available, but we have 
our own different challenges that need a living imam to understand and 
direct us (interviewed on 8 February 2011). 
I asked Dr. Hassan his reason for following the Muslim Brotherhood, and he replied: 
“Well, because they are intellectual and closest to practising the true message of 
Islam.”  
Secondly, the reasons the imams and religious experts give for following a madhab 
generally combine all the first three options in the relevant question. Thus, 
comprehensive research about all the schools of law (option c) strengthens what has 
been learnt from family and local precedents (options a and b, which are typical of 
223 
 
the congregation). For the four selected mosque imams, while the official imams of 
the LIC, IC, and LMM, all follow the Hanafi madhab in practice, the imam of LGM 
is Maliki. This reflects the preferences in their relevant countries of origin, as I 
demonstrated in Chapter 4. Of the remaining experts, two are Hanafi (Imam Qasim, 
deputy imam of LMM; current imam of LIC) and one is Shafi‘i (Sheikh Hasan, a 
religious expert in Britain for over 20 years). 
Thirdly, as regards following a particular madhab in the contemporary age, the 
overwhelming majority of religious experts follow one of the four schools of law, 
and agree on the necessity of following a madhab. The current imam of LMM (Sufi-
Barelwi oriented), Qari Asim, aged 34, says: 
Because you do not know anything, a lay person who does not know 
anything will be following someone - either perhaps at the beginning you 
learnt from your family or from the environment. You cannot do it without 
taqlid (imitation), for instance you are following your father perhaps at an 
early age, or the local imam. And the father or the local imam is following 
someone at the end of the day. So it is acknowledging someone, otherwise 
hadith books are like a pharmacy which has different medicines for a cold. 
So it’s as though, first, you go to the doctor to find out which medicine you 
want from the pharmacist. Moreover, that is why what the imams have 
established, the four madhabs, they did like doctors. So they have gone 
through all the hadith, they have known what is in the market and have 
selected these (interviewed on 27 March 2011). 
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As I have illustrated in the above sections, generally a believer follows a school of 
law because of parents or the culture of a geographic location. The doctor and 
pharmacy example given by Imam Asim confirms that the topic has been perceived 
by both ordinary and religious experts in more or less the same way. Another 
religious expert, 24-year-old Mawlana Yousef, supports the above quotation by 
saying: 
In this day and age, people are not capable of studying all the necessary 
Islamic sciences, or interpreting the Qur’an and the Hadith. From my own 
experience, it takes at least ten years to reach some certain level to 
understand the theoretical issues and methodology in deriving rulings from 
the sources (interviewed on 28 March 2011). 
Mawlana Yousef describes himself as a Deobandi ‘alim, who has gained about ten 
years’ educational experience from Dewsbury Dar al-Ulum, one of the most 
prominent centres of the Deobandi tradition in Britain (see Birt and Lewis, 2010). In 
the view of many religious experts, such prerequisites are essential qualifications and 
represent a challenge to anyone who says that it is not necessary to follow a school of 
law today. In addition to the required knowledge, according to 42-year-old Ershad, 
the imam of IC (Jama’ati Islami- affiliated UKIM’s branch), 
someone has to be well aware of the current social facts and must have 
ability to deploy a certain methodology to understand and interpret the 
sources for the needs of society.  
Furthermore, he says that:  
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The knowledge is available, the internet, books cannot give you the true 
meaning, you need a teacher to understand, interpret, and relate to the 
current situation ...if you have all hadith in your laptop, read them, and you 
do not know how to compare, understand background context, and situation, 
you cannot decide. That is why you still need wise, learned scholars to 
guide... (interviewed on 22 April 2011).   
This quotation sheds light on our discussion in terms of how ijtihad and taqlid are 
perceived by many Muslims. Contrary to the mass education theory, which “fosters a 
direct, albeit selective, access to the printed word and a break with earlier traditions 
of authority” (Eickelman 1992: 646), the process of assessment by qualified scholars 
is a key factor which must not be forgotten by a believer if s/he feels that it is not 
necessary to follow a madhab. The imam of LGM (multi-ethnic and multi-sect), 
Sheikh Muhammad (aged 42), who initially answered the question about the 
necessity of following a madhab negatively, then explained its importance: 
It is not necessary to follow a madhab, except if you want to understand and 
study Islamic Law. The best thing is to start with following a madhab until 
you become knowledgeable in that school of law, understand the major 
rules, you know, how to deal with the fiqh. And after that you are required 
to study the others, their evidence and methodology. After evaluating the 
others’ rulings you can argue something not contradicting the Qur’an and 
Sunnah (interviewed on 31 May 2011).       
Obviously, this route is for a researcher or potential mujtahid, but the sheikh 
maintains that for a lay person or non-specialist is not necessary to involve oneself in 
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this education process. Even in the case of the candidate mujtahid described above, at 
the beginning of study s/he follows a particular madhab to a certain level.  
To conclude this section, then, the mosque imams in the selected mosques follow a 
particular madhab, choosing as the reasons a) geographic location, b) family, and c) 
some research about all schools of law. Regarding the third question, following a 
particular madhab in the contemporary age, religious experts see that someone 
attempts not to follow a particular madhab in contemporary age must have 
proficiency in Islamic sciences and law; ability to relate current social facts when 
interpreting the sources; knowledge of methodology and tools and how they are to be 
used in the production of legal rulings. These are the conditional requirements raised 
by the imams of the four mosques, LMM, LIC, IC and LGM, for lay people to be 
able to judge by their own analogy if they do not follow a madhab. As a result, it 
seems inevitable for a lay person to follow a particular madhab as far as the mosque 
imams and religious experts are concerned. Nonetheless, some ordinary people as 
discussed above prefer not to follow any particular madhab. Among the participants, 
even if the number of such Muslims is low, it is nonetheless an important fact in 
terms of individual approaches (Salvatore, 2009: 193; Cesari, 2005:4-5) towards 
religious beliefs, practices, and authority. 
7.3. Towards a contemporary mujtahid in the British context: 
Ijtihad will remain a dynamic institution in Islamic law as long as Muslim 
communities confront changing dynamics and eligible scholars are available. The 
majority of Muslims face many difficulties and challenges in the implementation of 
religious belief and practices (see Chapter 6) and so, while it is an issue that many 
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will defer to the scholars, one would expect them to see the necessity for ijtihad. The 
“challenges of Muslim Diaspora law” (Khan and Ramadan, 2011:215) consist of a 
number of elements, from zakah (alms-giving) and its relationship to tax given to the 
host country, to benefits taken from the state; from the Islamic way of life to the 
Western one, and engaged citizenship; from inter-faith marriages to halal foods and 
interest in the sphere of mortgages and banking (ibid, p.221-238). 
In Britain, the anxiety  of first-generation Muslims in their religious feeling “from 
total lapse of religious observance” (Barton, 1986: 177) eventually shifted their “self-
perception from being sojourners to settlers” (Lewis, 1994: 56) and they established 
mosque and educational organisations in an effort to preserve religious identity. 
However, despite being a dynamic process, this transplantation routinely witnessed a 
reproduction of “ethnic” and “sectarian” (Lewis, 1994: 56; Geaves, 1996: 160) 
divisions that already existed in the homeland. As Ramadan (1999:100) has pointed 
out, fundamental contemporary problems are intertwined with emotion, feeling, fear 
and other psychological and social inferences which often make it difficult to 
identify the exact and objective nature of the problems themselves. The inter-
generational stress between first-generation migrants and the second and third 
generations (Geaves, 1996:218) has contributed to this.  
He has warned of “sectarian influences endangering any effort towards creating a 
truly indigenous Islam” (Geaves, 1996:218), and together with the lack of a single 
religious authority for all Muslims in Britain (see Chapter 5 and 6), this seems to be 




The simple and natural contrast between the first generation of Muslim 
immigrants who tried to protect their religious identity by being discreet and 
invisible as possible and increasing number of their children who have 
become assertive and self confident about their rights (for they understand 
they are at home in the West) has brought about a fundamental disruption in 
the thought of some prominent ‘ulama who considered, only 15 or 20 years 
ago, that to come back home (returning to Muslim countries) was the only 
solution to the seemingly inextricable religious and legal problems arising 
from living as Muslims in the West (1999:100).  
The increasing “religiosity amongst the young British Muslims” and demand for 
developing “a distinct compassionate British Islam” (Lewis, 2007: 11-63) has 
compelled the ‘ulama to rethink the matter and to return to the sources in an attempt 
to provide Muslim communities with an appropriate Islamic framework and a set of 
rulings fitting their new situation (Ramadan, 1999:101).  
As we noted in the previous chapter, the establishment of the European Council for 
Fatwa and Research (ECFR) in 1997 (Zaman, 2009: 226) is a collective effort by the 
‘ulama to meet  that need, though most ordinary Muslims know almost nothing about 
the ECFR.  
In this section, I focus on the concept and perception of the ‘contemporary mujtahid’ 
and on such a scholar’s contribution to minority fiqh. For that purpose, during my 
interviews with religious experts in Leeds I asked some additional questions:  
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 In the contemporary era, what should the characteristics of a religious expert 
or mujtahid be, and what kind of status should be given to such a religious 
expert so that s/he can be more effective in this religious role?  
 How could Muslim scholars in Europe, particularly in the UK, contribute to 
Islamic heritage in terms of producing a new methodology and solutions to 
current problems? 
In the first place, all eight religious experts agreed that a mujtahid must be equipped 
with knowledge of the main sources of Islamic law and other relevant conditions 
elaborated above (see Hallaq, 1984: 4-7; Ramadan, 1999: 87-88). Additionally, they 
also agree on the necessity of knowledge about the circumstances of the society in 
which the mujtahid is living. However, a number of personal opinions are worthy of 
brief reflection; they not only give useful insights into the topic, but also provide 
insiders’ views about what sorts of handicap Muslim scholarship has in the context 
of Britain. These handicaps, namely imposing a particular dogma (Deobandi, 
Barelwi, or Salafi), disunity among the ‘ulama as a result of this ‘sectarianism’, and 
lack of the tools developed for current situations, are some of challenges mujtahids 
face vis-a-vis exercising ijtihad. Thus, according to the religious experts, in the 
British context a mujtahid: 
- must not impose a particular dogma, because ijtihad means taking a multi-
dimensional view. A mujtahid is also leading by example, and is somebody 
who makes sense to rational people (Mohsin, a 54-year-old activist among 
the congregation in the IC, interviewed on 21 March 2011); 
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- should issue a Fatwa according to real-life conditions, practically. He 
should not be affected by previous teachers and tutors. I think currently they 
(‘ulama) are still influenced by where they come from. So, that influence is 
still alive, and even the new students, because they are students of them, are 
still influenced as to how to carry on (Qari Asim (34), the imam of LMM); 
- must, in addition to the knowledge of Islamic sciences, have a 
methodology of jurisprudence [usul al-fiqh] and tools to relate the 
knowledge of Islamic fiqh to the modern needs of the society. Knowledge, 
methodology, and the language are keywords in this process (Ershad (42), 
the imam of IC); 
- should be a group of scholars [ijma or consensus] so that the ijtihad and 
fatwa would be more effective (Sheikh Muhammad (42), the imam of 
LGM). 
Secondly, the status of a mujtahid is an ambiguous matter. The absence of centralised 
religious authority makes it almost impossible to pinpoint who is a mujtahid within 
the Sunni Muslim community. For instance, Qari Asim says that: 
No status should be given, for even if a status is given by the state, it would 
be difficult. Not only schools of law, but also faith diversity, Deobandi, 
Barelwi, Ahle-Hadith, will come [into it].      
On the one hand, it is true that there is a general fear among religious experts that a 
mujtahid could abuse his position in order to impose a particular dogma. On the other 
hand, they see that there is an urgent necessity for the ‘ulama to end fruitless 
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discussions and debates stemming from “sectarian” conflicts. Sheikh Muhammad 
proposes an election system about how the ‘ulama would be appointed, and the 
outcome of this would be “fatwa jama‘iyya” (collective fatwa), similar to the 
establishment of the ECFR. He maintains that:  
So if we have a kind of system to elect muftis and they are representatives of 
our communities, we have different communities, and different schools of 
thought, Sunni, Shi‘a, even, Barelwi, Deobandi, Ahle Hadith, and others. 
They should sit in a symbolic association of fatwa giving and they will 
answer the major and serious things [not about taharat (preparation for 
prayers) or salat (prayer)] about the challenges of the Muslim community in 
the UK and how to respond to them. This is what is required in our time. In 
the past, one mufti was enough for a city, but now because people are 
different in their knowledge and background, I cannot force them to follow 
me. 
Subsequently, I put another question to the imam: ‘Do you think the ECFR is the 
best candidate for this role in Britain?’ He replied: 
This is really a good attempt to create the ECFR, but if the whole Muslim 
community in Europe can agree to follow them, then this will bring 
Muslims to unity, but we are still suffering from disunity...sometimes when 
you talk about the ECFR, some people say, “Who are they?”, since they do 
not know anything about the ECFR. Although the ECFR brings the muftis 
from different nationalities, Pakistanis, Arabs, Turks, Indians, and others are 
there; many Muslims only listen to local imams, not to anybody else.  
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As we have witnessed in Chapter 6, local imams are the key religious authority in 
Muslim communities. However, in the British context, most of the time imams are 
actually appointed for certain roles within the mosque, such as leading prayers, 
delivering sermons, and tutoring in supplementary schools (Barton, 1986:113). 
Often, too, their function within the mosque is circumscribed by the influence of the 
mosque committee and ‘sectarian’ boundaries, even though a few pioneers have 
begun changing this limited role (Lewis, 2007: 94-104). Arguably, this explains why 
Mawlana Yousef (24) insists that it should be understood by the society that they 
[mujtahids] have a hierarchical superiority compared to mosque imams. It seems that 
the current habit of Muslim communities, particularly amongst South Asians 
(Deobandis and Barelwis), in seeking and following religious rulings is another task 
awaiting the contemporary mujtahid’s effort to solve current problems. 
As regards producing a new methodology in Islamic law to meet the needs of the 
Muslim society living in Britain, the mosque imams and religious experts responded 
that, while well established already, the methodology of Islamic law developed 
according to the majority status of Muslims does need to be understood in light of 
minority status. The typical response was that in the past the scholars established the 
principles of Islamic law based on the Qur’an, Sunnah, Ijma (consensus), and Qiyas 
(analogy). They also deployed supplementary methods like istihsan, istislah, ‘urf, 
and istishab, and such tools, according to my interviewees, are ready for scholars to 
apply in different times and places. For example, Sheikh Muhammad said that: 
I disagree with those who say, “Let us have a new methodology to reform”. 
I believe Islam is able to deal with things what we have already and the 
scholars have the right to think about things and give rulings about them, 
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using what our scholars used before. We have the principles of Islamic fiqh, 
so we have plenty of methodologies like qiyas and maslaha, to use rather 
than saying, “Okay, let us have a new methodology to reform for Muslims 
living out of Muslim countries”. Maybe we need to update the old 
methodology.   
In similar vein, the imam of IC, Imam Ershad says, 
Fiqh of minority, there is not much word about it in Islamic fiqh, but you 
cannot say this is a new thing. It is already in Islamic law but we have to 
develop it. Because Muslims had experience in the past just living in 
Muslim countries, and today, Muslims are living as minorities. This is a new 
phenomenon that has not happened in the past in our history. Because it is a 
new phenomenon, we have to develop more the fiqh of minority, and bring 
it up to standard. People are still consulting old books written in the context 
of Muslim majority. That is why they sometimes cannot solve the problems. 
Because where you are living, it changes your situation in the fiqh issues, so 
you will have flexibility.   
According to both imams, seeking new methodology does not mean disregarding the 
well-established past. The situations and circumstances may change from time to 
time, and place to place. Thus, deploying the established methods and applying them 
to the current situations would be more reliable since they have already been tested. 
Muslim Diaspora law mainly deals with worldly matters (mu‘amalat), and is not 
exempt from primary obligations of ibadat (acts of worship) including daily prayers, 
fasting in Ramadan, and so on (Khan and Ramadan, 2011: 215). However, for 
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Muslims in Europe worldly matters are obviously different from classical Islamic 
norms in Shari‘a law. Thus, bringing in new rulings and fatawa in the light of 
objectives of Islamic Law, maqasid al-Shari‘a to protect religion, life, intellect, 
lineage, and property, and considering the norms of daruriyyat, hajiyyat, and 
tahsiniyyat (requisites, necessities, and embellishments respectively) are inevitable 
priorities for the ‘ulama to solve the European Islamic identity crisis (Ramadan, 
1999: 101). 
Religious experts express a similar opinion about the necessity of contemporary 
ijtihad, particularly in the European context. However, the problem they repeatedly 
mention relates to the acceptance of rulings and fatawa by ordinary Muslims. For 
instance, Qari Qasim (30), a Qur’an teacher at al-Madina Jamia Masjid in Brudenell 
Road, and deputy imam of LMM, states that: 
When Muslims came to the UK, they faced problems like mortgages and 
insurance...so it is quite important for Muslim scholars to really understand 
the current situation and advise rulings to the people. But at the grass roots 
level it would not be acceptable when they talk about new rulings. People 
only accept rulings if they have a foundation in Islam. For example, it is 
known that interest is haram (forbidden) but there is a ruling that you can 
buy just one house with a mortgage, because you need to have a house 
based on a fatwa given by Imam Abu Hanifa that interest in dar-al-harb 
[abode of non-Muslim] is permitted (interviewed on 18 February 2011). 
Legal rulings or fatawa are directly related to religious feeling and entail strong 
evidence from the sources of Islamic law. In the absence of absolute authority, if it is 
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not referenced with the Qur’an and the Sunnah, religious people prefer not to follow 
the new rulings. For instance, a middle-class ordinary Muslim, Ajmal (51), used to 
have a mortgaged house, but because of his worry about the interest, he sold it. He 
currently lives in a rented house and pays more in rent, but he says, “I feel better 
about my religiosity” (interviewed on 29 March 2011).   
There are also other reasons for Muslims, since to recall Sheikh Muhammad’s 
statement, ‘ethnic’ and ‘sectarian’ factors affect the attitude of ordinary Muslims in 
following the new rulings. As documented in Chapter 5, Muslim communities are 
trying to come together in some basic practical matters, such as prayer timings and 
‘eid celebrations. However, a minority fiqh for all Muslims in Britain, and more 
broadly in Europe, seems a distant hope at present. The thoughts of Qari Asim nicely 
summarise the current situation: 
Unfortunately, although in matters like citizenship no one disagrees that you 
have to obey the law being citizens of this country, a small minority of 
people actually does not follow this ; they tend to delight in doing whatever 
they want... in financial matters, too, some people take the known fatawa, 
others do not. Religious experts, in technical terms, yes religious experts 
should develop a new methodology to deal with new issues; there is no 
doubt about that. [But] at the moment, I think we are not mature enough to 
develop that kind of methodology. 
To sum up, the ‘ulama of Leeds see that ijtihad in contemporary circumstances is 
necessary, but the mujtahid must be objective, not impose a particular dogma or 
sectarian views in the process of exercising ijtihad. The mujtahid must also know the 
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socio-cultural and economic circumstances within a non-Muslim country in order to 
contribute to ‘minority fiqh’. Currently, there is not one single fatwa institution for 
all Sunni Muslims in Britain. Instead, religious rulings and fatawa are as diverse as 
communities are. The starting point of religious authority for Muslim communities in 
Leeds is local mosque imams (see Chapter 6), and then links to well-known scholars 
within the same community circle, whether Deobandi, Barelwi, Ikhwani, Salafi, or 
Jama’ati Islami. As a result, the potential mujtahid operates within certain boundaries 
and appeals only to a limited audience among Sunni Muslims.  
7.4. Conclusion: 
This chapter provides evidence for the perception of Sunni Muslims about the 
concepts of ijtihad and taqlid in terms of religious belief and practices based on my 
research in Leeds. What is subject to change (muqayyad) and what is not (mutlaq), 
and who is eligible to exercise ijtihad are important questions in the discourse of 
ijtihad, which started in the tenth and eleventh centuries at the scholarly level and 
continued until the nineteenth century, but then widened its scope with the 
intervention of non-‘ulama (intellectuals, writers) in modernity, and ordinary 
Muslims in post-modernity. Thus, the perception of Sunni Muslims, not only 
ordinary but also experts, on such concepts has been reflected by studying four 
different mosque congregations.  
The massive migration of Muslims to Europe in the second half of the twentieth 
century has formed a new phenomenon in Islamic law, ‘minority fiqh’. Among 
European Muslims, from the first generation to the indigenous-born, variable 
tendencies towards living as a Muslim in non-Muslim lands are discernible:  
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one sees individualization and/or the fragmentation of religious authority as 
leading to the liberalization of Islam, while the other considers that in spite 
of individualization and the diversification of authority structures, the 
current situation is characterized by a relative stability of dogma and, in any 
case, not by a liberalization of Islam (Peter, 2006:107). 
In my case study, the majority of Muslim participants, both ordinary believers and 
religious experts, follow a particular school of law in religious beliefs and practices. 
In doing so, they tend to secure religiosity by following a particular madhab, and yet 
confirm that there is a need to develop existent methodologies in order to meet the 
needs of Muslims in Europe. For the majority of informants, the main reason to 
follow a madhab in the contemporary world is to secure one’s religious life by 
closing the doors to any misunderstanding. As with Berger’s ‘sacred canopy’, “the 
concern is not to be plunged into the chaos of anomy” (Berger, 1990: 39). In the 
context of Britain, with 52 per cent of Muslims being  under 25 years of age (Lewis, 
2007: 92), the importance of preserving them from the threats of politically radical 
groups (see Taji-Farouki, 1996; Wiktorowicz, 2005; Abbas, 2007: 3-4) is very great.  
Contemporary ijtihad is a crucial task for scholars in the Muslim community in 
Britain to meet the needs of society. Individual efforts bind merely a certain 
community, as in the case of LGM, the only place where Sheikh al-Judai’s fatwa on 
combining two prayers is being implemented among mosques in Leeds (see Chapter 
6). Rather than a single Muslim identity, sub-identities such as traditionalist Sufi-
Barelwi, Deobandi or reformist Jama’ati Islami, Ikhwani-Salafi have come into 
prominence. I can argue that in the case of Sheikh al-Judai, because he is an Arab or 
a reformist many Muslims do not even read his deductions and legal rulings. ‘Ethnic’ 
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and ‘sectarian’ convergence among the Sunni Muslim community in Leeds plays a 

















In this thesis, I have sought to present a local snapshot of Sunni Muslim religious life 
in Leeds, delving into religious practices, interactions between Muslims, patterns of 
religious authority, and continuity-change in its main traditional instruments, that is, 
ijtihad, taqlid and fatawa. Contrary to the theories of individualisation of religious 
practice and fragmentation of religious authority in modernity, I argue that Sunni 
Muslim religious life in Leeds continues in highly collective fashion, and mosque 
imams and muftis remain at the centre of religious authority for ordinary Muslims. 
Most of the research participants affirm that they follow one of the schools of law 
(Hanafi, Maliki, Shafi’i and Hanbali). Nevertheless, they also assert that 
contemporary ijtihad is essential in the context of Britain in order to meet the 
particular needs of Muslims in this society. However, a minority fiqh is not very well 
developed and there are conflicting views even over the timings of ‘Eid al-Adha and 
Ramadan. Intra-Muslim dialogue on such matters is lacking.     
In order to set out the basis of my argument, in Chapter 1, I began with the encounter 
of Muslims with modernity, which resulted in transformations in the social, 
economic, political and religio-cultural life of Muslims during the nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries. Although the rates of social change were not at all uniform 
across society, religious faith and practice among elites and the new middle classes 
especially began to withdraw into private and individual life, while in many aspects 
of life colonial and still independent Muslim states replaced Shari’a law with 
Western laws and rules. The emergence of reformist and neo-traditionalist thought 
was a reaction to secularism, which saw Islam as the biggest cause for the Muslim 
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world’s stagnation. Neo-traditionalists insisted more or less on the status quo 
position by following legal rulings issued by the early jurists like the Imams Abu 
Hanifa, Al-Shafi’i, Maliki, and Ibn Hanbal. However, reformists rejected blind and 
unquestioning adherence to the legal rulings of theologians-jurists in the formation 
period of Islamic law, with ijtihad having a special importance in the renewal of 
Islamic law. As literacy has grown in the modern Muslim world, and sources of 
knowledge have pluralised, the tension between reformists and neo-traditionalists on 
questions of ijtihad and taqlid have trickled down from the intellectuals and ulama to 
lay people and non-experts. Religious authority has become more ambiguous as lay 
people increasingly have the opportunity to interpret the sources of religion 
themselves.  
As a by-product of Western colonialism, Muslims migrated to Europe in order to fill 
a labour shortage in the second half of the twentieth century. In Chapter 2, I provided 
general information on the migration process and institutionalisation of Muslim 
communities in Britain with reference to neo-traditionalist and reformist movements. 
Global trends are always configured locally as can be seen in the settlement of 
Muslim communities and reproduction of mainly neo-traditionalist South Asian 
heritage Islamic institutions in Britain. Early research by Barton (1986), Lewis 
(1993), Geaves (1994), and others on key movements suggests why patterns of 
religious tradition and authority amongst British South Asian Muslims have not 
corroded and been ‘modernised’ and individualised as in some other parts of the 
Muslim world. However, better educated reformists from the Indian subcontinent 
and the Middle East tend to be more ‘modern’ in their approach than traditionalists. 
It is also evident from this chapter that the question of who speaks with authority for 
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the Muslim community per se on a local or a national level is complex as Muslim 
communities are so religiously and ethnically diverse.  
In Chapter 3, I narrated methodological reflections on the process of researching 
Sunni Muslim communities in Leeds. This provided a bridge into my ethnographic 
accounts in Chapters 4 to 7. In those chapters, I have sought to find answers to my 
research questions detailed in the introduction of the thesis. While studying Sunni 
Muslim communities in Leeds, I have shown that almost all the main themes of my 
thesis, including religious differences, conflicts, tradition, and authority, are directly 
or indirectly related to ‘ethnic’ and ‘sectarian’ (neo-traditionalist or reformist) 
diversity amongst Sunni Muslims, either South Asian (Deobandi, Barelwi, and 
Jama’ati Islami) or Arab (Salafi and Muslim Brotherhood). For example, Leeds 
Grand Mosque (LGM) is known as an Arab mosque with a reformist orientation; 
Leeds Iqra Centre (IC) is a branch of the reformist Jama’ati Islami; Leeds Makkah 
Masjid (LMM) and Leeds Islamic Centre (LIC) are traditionalist Sufi-oriented 
mosques, Barelwi and Deobandi respectively. The congregation in these last three 
mosques has mainly ethnic origins from the Indian Subcontinent.  
Having a multi-ethnic Muslim population with different religious orientations in the 
same locality is potentially an opportunity for different Muslims to come to know 
each other better and to negotiate intra-Islamic pluralism. However, as the case study 
of ‘Eid al-Adha presented  in Chapter 5 shows, the absence of a single religious 
authority for all Sunni Muslims in Leeds (or the non-Muslim society of the UK more 
generally) means that there is no real mechanism for cooperation on agreed religious 
practices, such as when to start Ramadan and celebrate the two ‘eids. The fragmented 
structures of religious authority, in terms of ethnic and sectarian clusters, whether 
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neo-traditionalist or reformist, are the biggest obstacles to unity. Meetings and talks 
for unity have been unproductive so far. Created as a unified platform to represent 
Muslims to the media and local authority after ‘9/11’, Leeds Muslim Forum (LMF) 
was a temporary solution which regained momentum again after the ‘7/7’ London 
bombings, but eventually closed in 2011, unable to bridge the sectarian divide.  
Contrary to the assumption that religious life must become privatised and 
individualised in modernity, and religious authority further fragmented, this research 
suggests that the majority of Sunni Muslims in Leeds maintain traditional forms of 
collective religious life, with dogma and authority remaining relatively stable (Peter, 
2006: 107). This is evident from Chapters 6 and 7 with the main instruments of 
religious authority - ijtihad, fatawa, and taqlid - working largely as they did in the 
past. The continuity of taqlid, following one of the four schools of law, can be given 
as a specific example in this regard. The majority of my informants affirm that they 
follow a particular school of law, while only a minority claim the reverse by 
interpreting the sources based on their own self-perceptions or understandings.  
Notably, not following a particular school of law (taqlid) is a preference for some 
ordinary Muslims amongst the congregation in the mainly reformist LGM and IC. 
The four case studies of the mosques of Leeds suggest that imams are the focus for 
religious authority despite not being the most qualified in religious education. Easy 
access and close rapport between the imam and members of the congregation explain 
this. Mosque imams know their clients and accordingly give advice or legal opinions. 
Here, there is continuity in the traditional function of mosque imams. More expert 
ulama if available in the mosque or in the local/regional environment are often 
referred to, as in the case of Sheikh al-Judai in LGM. Furthermore, some young 
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Muslims consult prominent fatwa websites alongside mosque websites. Without 
embarrassment, female Muslims can here ask questions relating to their religious and 
social life (such as, forbidden acts during the menstrual period, rights in terms of 
husbands, working and studying).  
Sunni Muslims in Leeds generally recognise that contemporary ijtihad is necessary 
to meet the needs of contemporary society. The need for a ‘minority fiqh’ is urgent, 
yet, the divergence of Muslim communities and the failure of previous attempts for 
unity in the city are not promising in this regard. Rather, there are as many fiqhs as 
Muslim communities. Sheikh al-Judai does attempt to solve problems Muslims face 
in the context of Britain. His fatwa on combining two prayers is a contribution to a 
minority fiqh. In Leeds, however, his ijtihad is merely implemented in Leeds Grand 
Mosque. Although he reaches a wider audience of reformists through the European 
Council for Fatwa and Research (ECFR), many other Muslims are entirely unaware 
of his deductions and legal rulings.    
The content of questions asked of mosque imams for fatawa varies from simple 
matters of religious practice (in making mistakes during prayers, for instance) to 
socio-economic transactions such as income earned from selling alcohol and serving 
drunken people. Further research on the content of fatawa is necessary to see what 
new interpretations have been made in the context of ‘minority fiqh’. It would also be 
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A note on transliteration 
I use the transliteration of Arabic according to current usage in the relevant literature 
as simply as possible to prevent any confusion. The only attempt to Arabicize the 
transliteration in the text itself, however, is the presence of the right facing 
apostrophe (‘ ) referring to the letter ‘ayn (ع - e.g. shari‘a) and the left facing 
apostrophe ( ’ ) referring to the letter hamza (ء - e.g. Qur’an). Other letters such as غ 
– gh (ghayb); ث – th (hadith); خ - kh (khutbah); ذ – dh (dhikr); and ش – sh (sheikh) 
have been used as counterpart in English in such way. I italicise the foreign names 
that are followed immediately by the English equivalent in brackets. Or, if I use 
technical terms in English, I put the Arabic term in brackets.  
Urdu versions of religious terms originally come from Arabic, such as zikr, I prefer 
to use Arabic counterpart in English as aforementioned word dhikr unless quoting 
from the literature. Persian and Urdu names have been used less throughout the 
thesis compared to Arabic. Namaz, kasbah, and urs are for example. Regarding 
pluralising the terms I use both adding the letter ‘s’ at the end of Arabic word, such 
as fatwas, and Arabic plural form like fatawa. But I refrain from adding the letter ‘s’ 
to some words like hadith which create problems in pronouncing it. I use the word 






‘alim    scholar 
‘ulama    plural form of scholar 
‘isha    the last prayer of the day after about 2 hours sunset 
‘urf    custom 
‘amal    deed 
‘adala    justice 
adha    Sacrifice 
adhan    call for prayer 
adilla    proof 
adille-i Shari’a  the proofs of Law 
ahadith   the plural form of hadith 
ahl al-sunnat wa’l Jama‘at people and community of the prophetic path 
ahl-e Hadith   the people who follow the sayings of the Prophet 
al-ahkam   legal verdicts 
ahwal an-nas   the state of people 
akhlaq    moral 
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al-Muhajirun   the immigrants 
Amir    leader 
‘aql    reason/logic 
asbab    reasons 
‘asr    afternoon prayer 
awliya    the Sufi saints or friends (of Allah) 
‘ayat/ayah   A Qur’anic verse 
bayan    conference/seminar 
bid‘ah    innovation 
da’wah   mission 
daiyah    preacher 
dar al-‘ulum   religious seminar/school 
dars-i nizami   the syllabus of Farangi Mahall in the 18
th
 century India 
daruriyyat   necessities 
dhikr    remembrance of Allah 
dhuhr/ duhr   noon prayer  
Dhul-Hijjah   the 12
th
 month of the Islamic calendar 
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du‘a     pray 
durud sharif an invocation which Muslims make by saying specific 
phrases to tribute Prophet Muhammad 
‘eid al-adha    Sacrifice feast 
‘eid al-fitr    Ramadan feast 
‘eid    feast   
fajr    pre-dawn prayer in a day 
fard    compulsory 
fatawa    legal rulings, plural form of fatwa 
fatwa jama‘iyya  collective legal ruling 
fatwa    legal opinion  
fiqh    jurisprudence 
fiqhi    jurisprudential  
hadith    the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad 
hafiz someone who has memorised the entire Qur’an by 
heart 
hajiyyat   the needs 
hajj    pilgrimage 
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halal    allowed   
halaqatu’t-tafseer  Qur’anic exegesis circle 
haram    forbidden 
hazir u nazir   present and observant 
hifz    to memorise 
ibadat    religious practices 
ifta    the act of issuing a legal opinion 
ijazah a graduation certificate given to the student in 
traditional religious education 
ijma    consensus 
ijtihad jama‘i collective effort to derive rulings from the sources of 
Islam 
ijtihad individual ‘effort’ in deriving interpretations in Islamic 
law 
ikhlas    sincerity  
ikhtilaf-e matali‘  diversity of horizons 
Ikhwanu’l Muslimin  the Muslim Brothers 
‘ilm    knowledge  
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‘ilmu’l-ghayb   the knowledge of unseen 
imam religious leader or someone leading to prayer in a 
mosque 
isnad    the chain of transmitters of a hadith 
istihsan   a process of legal preference 
istislah    seeking the greater benefit to act on public interest 
istishab   presumption of continuity 
ittiba    to obey and follow 
Jahiliyyah   ignorance 
janaza    funeral 
jum‘ah khutbah  Friday sermon 
jum‘ah    Friday 
kalam    word or theology 
kasbah    town 
khalifa    vice-regent 
khaliq    the creator 
khutbah   sermon 
kufr    disbelief 
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ma‘qulat   the rational studies 
madhab   the path/method 
madhahib   the plural form of madhab 
madrasa   school 
maghrib   sunset prayer 
majlis    assembly 
makatib   schools 
makhluq   creation 
manqulat   the studies of Qur’an and Hadith 
maqasid al-Shari‘a  the aims of Islamic law 
maqbara-e pir   A sufi leader’s grave 
masjid    mosque 
maslaha   common good 
maslak    theological position 
mawlana   a religious leader or mosque imam 
mawlid/milad   birthday 
milad un-Nabi   the birthday of the Prophet Muhammad 
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mu‘amalat   social transactions 
mufti    a qualified scholar who issues legal opinions 
mujaddid   reviver 
mujtahid   a qualified scholar who exercises ijtihad 
muqallid   follower of a particular school of law 
muqayyad   limited by a restriction 
mushrik   someone who attributes a partner to Allah 
mutakallim    speaker 
nafil     not compulsory 
najm    star 
namaz    prayer 
namaz    prayer 
nass    source, the Qur’an and Sunnah 
nikah    marriage 
pirs    Sufi masters  
qari     someone recites Qur’anic verses or poems 
qiyam    stand up position during prayer 
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qiyas    reasoning by analogy 
Rabi‘ul-Awwal   the first month in Islamic calendar 
rahbar    guide 
rahmah    blessing  
rak‘ah a series of ritual movements which form a part of the 
prayer 
Ramadan the ninth month in Islamic calendar in which Muslim 
fast 
ru’yati hilal   observing the new moon 
sadaqa   charity 
sahabah   the friends/companions of the Prophet Muhammad 
sajdah    prostration 
salaf    the predecessor  
salaf’u salihin   the rightly predecessors 
salam     greeting 
salat    prayer/worshipping 
salat o salam   greetings and prayers 
sawm    fasting, especially during Ramadan 
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Sha‘ban   the eighth month of the Islamic calendar 
Shari‘a   Islamic Law 
Sheikh al-Islam  the grand religious leader 
sheikh    mosque imam or sufi leader 
shirk     associating Allah with someone or something 
shu’ra    consultation 
shurut    conditions 
sirah    the biography of the Prophet Muhammad 
Sunnah the acts, sayings, and approvals of the Prophet 
Muhammad 
Sunni    the main branch of Islam 
tafseer    Qur’anic exegesis 
tahsiniyyat   embellishments in Islamic rulings 
tajweed   to pronounce and read Qur’an properly  
takfir    to blame someone for being infidel 
tamsil    to represent 
taqlid    to follow/imitate a path or someone 
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tarawih a sunnah prayer up to 20 rak’ah performed during 
Ramadan nights after ish’a prayer 
tarbiyah   training 
tariqat    Sufi Orders  
tasawwuf    Sufi way of life 
tawassul   supplicating Allah through an intermediary 
‘ulama    scholars 
ummah   universal Muslim community 
urs     death anniversary 
usul    methodology   
usul al-fiqh   methodology of Islamic jurisprudence 
va‘z    religious advice 
waqf    religious endowment 
wasatiyya   to be in the middle in behaviour, etc. 
wudu’    ablution 
zakah    alms-giving, one of the five pillars of Islam 




Appendix A: Sample Interview Schedule for Masjid 
Attendees 
Name (if applicable):                    
Nationality:  
Country: 
Gender: Male/ Female 
Age: 
Length of time being in the UK: 
Occupation: 
Education level: 
1. What do you think about general conditions of Muslims in contemporary 
world in terms of religious belief and practices, ie applying the religion to 
social life?  
   
2. There is a main division within Islam in terms of faith and practice: Sunni 
and Shi’i. In Sunni branch of Islam, four well-known madhahib, namely 
Hanafiyya, Shafi’iyya, Malikiyya, and Hanbaliyya, are followed (taqlid) by 
many Muslims in practice.  
A. Which scholar’s methodology within ahl as-Sunnah wa’l-Jamaah, do 
you follow in faith matters, Islamic theology? 
a) Imam Ash’ari 










c) Malikiyya  
d) Hanbaliyya 
e) None of the above 
f) Not necessary follow any of them 
g) More than one: ............................... 
3. What is the reason for you to follow this school of thought? (if answered any 
of first four options in the previous question) 
a) It is common madhab in my country (national and local area). 
b) It was taught to me by my parents, teacher, etc. 
c) I chose the madhab (...................) after a comprehensive research that it 
answered my needs more accurate other than three school of thoughts. 
d) None of the above, please specify? ............  
 
4. What do you think about such diversity mentioned above within Sunni 
Muslim community? 
 
5. Is it necessary to follow any of these schools of thought in contemporary 
world, in which human-being can easily access every kind of knowledge?  




6. Which jama’at/organisation do you belong to or how do you describe 
yourself within Sunni branch of Islam in Britain? 
a) Deobandi 
b) Barelwi 
c) Salafi  
d) Wahhabi 
e) Ahl-e Hadith 
f) Jama’at-i Islami 
g) Tabligh-i Jama‘at 
h) Muslim Brotherhood 
i) Other............. 
 
7. Do you have any idea about main areas of agreement and disagreement 
among these groups, could you give examples in top three or four main 
issues? 
 
8. The prophet (pbuh) said: “Difference in my community is blessing.” Do you 
think it is good for Muslim community having such diversity at the moment?   
9. What does it mean to be a Sunni Muslim? 
10. Do you think intra-Muslim dialogue within not only Sunni Islam, but also 
between Sunni and Shi’i Islam should be made in Britain, where all religious 
differences and feelings are accommodated?  
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11. What do you think about living in a non-Muslim country in terms of 
applying religious belief and practices to social life? To what extent, do you 
feel more freedom or how do you compare your home country with Britain 
for these matters? 
12. What are the main challenges for Muslims face in terms of religious belief 
and practices in the UK? 
  
 Secular society 
 Plural, multi-ethnic society 
 Liberal, democratic 
 








14. What is your attitude towards non-Muslims in social life, e.g at work, 




15.  Do you think interfaith dialogue (it refers to communicate with other 
religious traditions in order to work for common good, positive interaction, 
and cooperation) should be  
 
a) Permitted, why? 
b) Forbidden, why? 
c) Encouraged, why? 
 
16. What sort of people must be involved in inter-faith dialogue? 
a) Religious leaders 
b) People who are in religious posts 
c) Everyone 
 
17. Have you noticed any differences in the implementation of the rituals 
(combining two prayers, etc.) when you pray in this mosque? Could you give 
an example(s), please? Or are you aware of other Madhab’s different 
practice ways in rituals? 
 
 Why is there such difference? 
 
 Is it a problem? 
18. When you stand behind an imam (leading to prayer) who follows another 
sect, how do you feel about yourself and what do you think about your 




19. How often do you come across any problem regarding faith and practices? 
a) Daily 
b) From time to time 
c) Never 
d) Occasionally (............................) 
 
20. What sources of advice and legal opinions (fatawa) are you aware of about 
religious practices and other social matters in the context of Britain? 
 
21. Who/What do you apply or consult when you come across any problem 
regarding faith and practice? 
a) Local mosque imam 
b) Shaikh 
c) Shari’a council 
d) European Council for Fatwa and Research 
e) An Islamic website 
f) A religious expert in home country 
g) Other................. 
 
22. How do you get fatwas from any of above places, and what is the procedure 
to get fatwa? After getting fatwa, do you search another authority to make 
sure you have got right fatwa? 
 




24.  How important is it to have a fatwa? In your opinion, is this a concern for 
a) All muslims 
b) Most Muslims 
c) A minority 
d) Very few 
 
25. Do you think religious experts should produce a new methodology in Islamic 
law in order to meet the needs of Muslim society in Britain? For example, 
about financial matters such as bank interest, mortgage...or any other matters 
like citizenship under British state...for example, Prof. Yasir Suleiman 
argues that citisenship a contract between individual and the state, and he 
sees that it is identical with Bay’ah in Islamic context. What do you think 
about that? 
 
26. “To bear witness to human kind” a verse from the Qur’an is interpreted by 
one of contemporary Muslim academics (Tariq Ramadan) that active role of 
every Muslim living in Europe in terms of representing Islam as the best 
example, before other humans, non-Muslim governments, and society. What 






Appendix B: Sample Interview Schedule for Mosque 
Imams and Religious Experts 
Name (if applicable):                    
Nationality:  
Country: 
Gender: Male/ Female 
Age: 
Length of time being in the UK: 
Occupation: 
Education level: 
How do you describe yourself? 
Imam     b) Sheikh      c) Mufti     d) Alim     e) Academician   f) researcher in 
Islamic studies   g) Other (...................) 
 
1. What do you think about general conditions of Muslims in contemporary 
world in terms of religious belief and practices?  
 
2. In your opinion, how the terms of “dar al-Muslim” (land of Muslim) and 
“dar al harb” (land of non-Muslim) should be interpreted? 
   
3. There is a main division within Islam in terms of faith and practice: Sunni 
and Shi’i. In Sunni branch of Islam, four well-known madhahib, namely 
Hanafiyya, Shafi’iyya, Malikiyya, and Hanbaliyya, are followed (taqlid) by 
many Muslims in practice.  
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C. Which scholar’s methodology within ahl as-Sunnah wa’l-Jamaah, do 
you follow in faith matters, Islamic theology? 
e) Imam Ash’ari 
f) Imam Maturidi 
g) Other 
h) None 




j) Malikiyya  
k) Hanbaliyya 
l) None of the above 
m) Not necessary follow any of them 
n) More than one: ............................... 
4. What is the reason for you to follow this school of thought? (if answered any 
of first four options in the previous question) 
e) It is common madhab in my country (national and local area). 
f) It was taught to me by my parents, teacher, etc. 
g) I chose the madhab (...................) after a comprehensive research that it 
answered my needs more accurate other than three schools of thought. 
h) None of the above, please specify? ............  
 





6. Is it necessary to follow any of these schools of thought in contemporary 
world, in which human-being can easily access every kind of knowledge?  
Yes / No      Why? / Why not? 
 
7. Which jama’at/organisation do you belong to or how do you describe 
yourself within Sunni branch of Islam? 
j) Deobandi 
k) Barelwi 
l) Salafi  
m) Wahhabi 
n) Ahl-e Hadith movement 
o) Jama’at-i Islami 
p) Tabligh-i Jama’at 
q) Muslim Brotherhood 
r) Other............. 
8. Do you have any idea about main areas of agreement and disagreement 
among these groups, could you give examples in top three or four main 
issues? 
 
9. The prophet (pbuh) said: “Difference in my community is a blessing.” Do 
you think it is good for Muslim community having such diversity at the 
moment?   




11. Do you think intra-Muslim dialogue within not only Sunni Islam, but also 
between Sunni and Shi’i Islam should be made in Britain, where all religious 
differences and feelings are accommodated?  
 
12. What do you think about living in a non-Muslim country in terms of 
applying religious belief and practices to social life? To what extent, do you 
feel more freedom or how do you compare your home country with Britain 
for these matters? 
 
13. What are the main challenges for Muslims in terms of belief and practices in 
the UK? 
 





15. What is your attitude towards non-Muslims in social life, e.g at work, 
neighbouring, friendship?  
 
16.  Do you think interfaith dialogue (it refers to communicate with other 
religious traditions in order to work for common good, positive interaction, 
and cooperation) should be  
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d) Permitted, why? 
e) Forbidden, why? 
f) Encouraged, why? 
17. What sort of people must be involved in inter-faith dialogue? 
a) Religious leaders 
b) People who are in religious posts 
c) Everyone 
18. Have you noticed any differences in the implementation of the rituals when 
you pray in this mosque? Could you give an example(s), please?  
 
 Why is there such difference? 
 Is it a problem? 
19. When you stand behind an imam who follows another school of thought, 
how do you feel about yourself and what do you think about your prayer 
whether accepted or not? 
 
20. How often do you come across people who ask for fatwa regarding faith and 
practices? 
e) Daily 
f) From time to time 
g) Never 




21.  How important is it to give a fatwa in a special matter such as family law, 
marriage, divorce, etc?  
 
22. In your opinion, is this a concern for 
a) All Muslims 
b) Most Muslims 
c) A minority 
d) Very few 
 
23. In contemporary era, how a religious expert or mujtahid should be, and what 
kind of status should be given to the religious expert so that mujtahid can be 
more effective in this religious role?  
 
24. Do you think religious experts should produce a new methodology in Islamic 
law in order to meet the needs of Muslim society in Britain? For example, 
about financial matters such as bank interest, mortgage...or any other matters 
like citizenship under British state... 
 
25.  In what matters do other Muslims consult you to get a fatwa and what is the 
order of these if we align them descending from the most popular? 
 Family (Marriage, divorce, guidance for responsibilities and rights) 






26. Nowadays, in a globalised world, Muslims probably need much more intra-
dialogue amongst themselves compared with the past. In your opinion, how 
do Muslims manage that? 
 
27. To name another Muslim as tradionalist, reformist, modernist, liberal, etc. is 
common in academic milieu and on the media. Do you think such naming is 
another division within Muslim community or is that a kind of classification 
to identify different types of Muslims in contemporary era? 
 
28. How would you describe or classify Muslims in Britain? 
 
29.  How could Muslim scholars in Europe, particularly in the UK, contribute to 
Islamic heritage in terms of producing new methodology and solutions to 
current problems? 
 
30. What do you think about current Muslim identity, representation in Britain? 
 
31. Recently, Muslims have celebrated eid al-Adha. However, some of them 
accepted the first day of the eid, 16
th
 of November, Tuesday; on the contrary 
some others agreed to celebrate on 17
th
 of November, Wednesday as the first 




32. What can be done for Muslim unity (wahdet-i ummet) or “ecumenism” in 
Islamic faith and practices? 
 
33. What can be done to prevent such disagreement mentioned above?  
a) Should umbrella organisations such as Organisation of Islam 
Conference, and Muslim World League undertake to schedule on the 
same date for whole Muslim community?  
b) In the UK context, what can be done with Muslim organisations at 
local and national level (Leeds Muslim Forum, MCB, SMB, and 











Appendix C: Participant Consent Form 
Title of Research Project: Sunni Muslim Religiosity in the UK Muslim Diaspora: 
Mosques in Leeds Compared 
Name of Researcher:  Aydin Bayram 
 
Initial the box if you agree with the statement to the left 
1 I confirm that I have read and understand the information sheet dated, 
15
 
December 2010, explaining the above research project and I have 
had the opportunity to ask questions about the project. 
 
2 I understand that my participation is voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw at any time without giving any reason and without there 
being any negative consequences. In addition, should I not wish to 
answer any particular question or questions, I am free to decline. 
Insert contact number here of lead researcher/member of research 
team (as appropriate). 
 
 
3 I understand that my responses will be kept strictly confidential.  
I give permission for members of the research team to have access to 
my 
anonymised responses. I understand that my name will not be linked 
with 
the research materials, and I will not be identified or identifiable in 
the 
report or reports that result from the research.  
 
4 I agree for the data collected from me to be used in future research  
5 I agree to take part in the above research project and will inform the 
principal investigator should my contact details change. 
 
6 I agree to give my permission for the researcher to record audio 





Name of participant Date Signature 
(or legal representative) 
 
____________________ 
Name of person taking consent Date Signature 
(if different from lead researcher) 





 Lead researcher Date Signature 
To be signed and dated in presence of the participant 
 
Copies: 
Once this has been signed by all parties the participant should receive a copy of the 
signed and dated participant consent form, the letter/pre-written script/information 
sheet and any other written information provided to the participants. A copy of the 
signed and dated consent form should be kept with the project’s main documents 
















Appendix D: Information Sheet 
        15 December 2010 
Research Project Title:  
 Sunni Muslim Religiosity in the UK Muslim Diaspora: Mosques in Leeds Compared 
You are being invited to take part in a research project mentioned above. Before you 
decide it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what 
it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully and 
discuss it with others if you wish. Ask us if there is anything that is not clear or if 
you would like more information. Take time to decide whether or not you wish to 
take part. Thank you for reading this. 
What is the project’s purpose? 
Sunni Muslim religiosity including religious life, belief and practices of British-
Muslims of different schools of thought and ethnic backgrounds are my main 
concerns. In the media, the Muslim minority is usually considered in terms of 
outsider’s concerns with political, social, economic, and ideological issues. However, 
in my case, as a Muslim insider, I am more interested in the reality of how Muslims 
live in a non-Muslim society, the implementation of Islamic law in daily life, 
whether in terms of ritual, commercial law, family relations, and so on. 




You are randomly chosen to participate in this project. About nine more participants 
in this mosque/community will be chosen for this research project. 
Do I have to take part? 
Taking part in this research is entirely voluntary and is up to you to decide whether 
or not to take part. If you do decide to take part you will be given this information 
sheet to keep (and be asked to sign a consent form) and you can still withdraw at any 
time. You do not have to give a reason. 
What will happen to me if I take part? 
You will be interviewed by the researcher who already prepared some questions 
(both open and close answers) on religiosity. The interview normally takes about one 
hour and it might be longer or shorter in parallel to your answers. 
Will I be recorded, and how will the recorded media be used? 
The audio recordings of your activities made during the interview will be used only 
for analysis and for illustration in conference presentations and lectures after 
transcribing them into text, and all quotations will be anonymised. No other use will 
be made of them without your written permission, and no one outside the project will 
be allowed access to the original recordings. After submitting the thesis, all voice 
recording will be destroyed. You will not be identified by the mosque committee, or 
the attendees in the mosque.   
What are the possible benefits of taking part? 
298 
 
Whilst there are no immediate benefits for those people participating in the project, it 
is hoped that this work will contribute more accurate understandings about Muslims 
in the UK.  
Will my taking part in this project be kept confidential? 
All the information that we collect about you during the course of the research will 
be kept strictly confidential. You will not be able to be identified in any reports or 
publications. 
What type of information will be sought from me and why is the collection of this 
information relevant for achieving the research project’s objectives? 
I am comparing similarities and differences among Sunni Muslims in the UK, in 
terms of religiosity. My aim is to illustrate views and opinions from ordinary and 
expert Muslims in contemporary era.  
What will happen to the results of the research project? 
The results will be analysed and published as PhD thesis, then it would be basic or 
beneficial for further research about Islamic diversity. 
Who is organising and funding the research? 
I am a scholarship student sent by Turkish Ministry of National Education. 
Contact for further information: 
Aydin Bayram 
Department of Theology and Religious Studies 
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University of Leeds 
LS2 9JT 
Email: tr07ab@leeds.ac.uk  
Tel. no: 07525483717 
 
Thank you very much for taking part in this project.  
Note: the participant will be given a copy of the information sheet and, if 














Appendix E: Permission Letter to the Mosque 
Committees 
Aydin Bayram  
Department of Theology and Religious Studies 
University of Leeds 
LS2 9JT 
Email: tr07ab@leeds.ac.uk  
Tel. no: 07525483717 
 
26/04/2010 
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN, 
I am currently a postgraduate research student at the department of Theology 
and Religious Studies, University of Leeds. I have MA degree in Religion and Public 
Life from the same university having come to Leeds from Turkey during 2007. I am 
generally interested in Islamic law and the history of different schools of theology 
having gained my undergraduate education at divinity school (Shari’a Faculty) in 
Erzurum. I was also a mosque-imam in Turkey before coming to the UK.  
 In terms of my current research, the religious life, belief and practices of 
British-Muslims of different schools of thought and ethnic backgrounds are my main 
concerns. In the media, the Muslim minority is usually considered in terms of 
outsider’s concerns with political, social, economic, and ideological issues. However, 
in my case, as a Muslim insider, I am more interested in the reality of how Muslims 
live in a non-Muslim society, the implementation of Islamic law in daily life, 
whether in terms of ritual, commercial law, family relations, and so on.  
All information given will be confidential, and if any material is quoted in 
writing, names will be changed to keep the information anonymous. I will only 
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discuss the interviews with my tutor at Leeds University, who would also be 
committed to confidentiality and would be happy to meet with you to assure you 
about the ethical nature of this research. Hopefully, I will contribute to more accurate 
understanding about Muslims in the West, with the permission of Allah. If you assist 
to me in this process, may Allah be pleased with you.  I would be happy to answer 
any questions you have and in the first instance can be contacted by telephone, email 
or post as directed at the beginning of my correspondence. 
  
I look forward to hearing from you. 
 
Yours sincerely, 
Aydin Bayram  
 
